

Independent Office  
of Evaluation



## Republic of Mozambique

### COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION





Independent Office  
of Evaluation



**Republic of Mozambique**  
**Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation**

**November 2017**  
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Photos of activities supported by IFAD-financed projects in the Republic of Mozambique

Front cover: Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors. Member of a farmers' group engaged in learning the economic and environmental benefits of growing vegetables in a shade-cloth greenhouse. ©IFAD/Carmen Lahoz

Back cover: Rural Markets Promotion Programme. Partnerships between Cavala farmers' association and agribusiness enterprises have been fairly beneficial for the farmers who managed to get reasonable prices for their products (right). ©IFAD/Carmen Lahoz; Pro-poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors of Mozambique. Women walk towards their small farms early in the morning. Women make up 80% of the members of the Smallholder Association of Nhatine, as men tend to emigrate in search of alternative opportunities to farming (left). ©IFAD/Clarissa Baldin

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## **Foreword**

*This is the second country strategy and programme evaluation conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD in Mozambique, following the first one completed in 2009; it covers all IFAD-supported initiatives that were operational during the period 2010-2016.*

*Since 1983, the total value of IFAD-supported projects in Mozambique has amounted to approximately US\$394.6 million. During the period under evaluation, IFAD provided financial resources for six loans and associated grants, for a total current value of US\$239 million; all were medium-sized projects, with an average duration of 7.7 years.*

*The country strategy (2011-2017) focused on increasing the production and productivity of agriculture and fisheries, working with economically active poor and facilitating their integration into profitable and accessible markets, as well as helping producers to access financing. The IFAD-supported projects included investments in developing value chains for horticultural products, cassava, sesame, livestock and fisheries.*

*The evaluation found a strong level of project alignment with Government priorities and noted that IFAD was able to leverage additional resources thanks to its credibility as a good partner. Positive impacts included significant capacity development at the institutional, community and individual levels, improvements in access to micro-credit for household assets and petty-trade through Savings and Credit Associations, and empowerment of women thanks to literacy initiatives.*

*Notwithstanding these achievements, several issues deserve further attention. First, projects did not explicitly include objectives or approaches aimed at tackling overarching goals for improving food security and nutrition. This is a major challenge for the Government and IFAD to consider in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 in particular. Second, targeting strategies should consider more vulnerable groups, including women, youth, and people living with HIV. Against the backdrop of the SDGs, the challenge is no longer to reduce poverty but to eradicate it by 2030.*

*Among the main recommendations of the evaluation are: (i) Focus on rural poor and on more vulnerable groups, including women, youth and people living with HIV; (ii) Give full attention to sustainable natural resources management and to strengthening climate-change resilience; (iii) Conceptualize support to the rural finance sector within a long-term commitment horizon and based on lessons learned to date; (iv) Enhance efficiency of financial execution of projects; (v) Develop principles for the reliance on service providers in project implementation; and (vi) Dedicate more attention and resources to knowledge management and policy dialogue.*

*This report includes the agreement at completion point along with the evaluation recommendations that the Government of Mozambique and IFAD Management agree to adopt and implement within the established timelines.*

*It is hoped that the results of this independent evaluation will serve to promote accountability and learning and thus improve IFAD's performance in supporting rural poor women and men to achieve sustainable livelihoods in Mozambique.*



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# Currency equivalent, weights and measures

## Currency equivalent

Monetary Unit = Mozambican Metical, MZN  
1 US\$ = 72 MZN (August 2016)

## Weights and measures

1 kilometre (km) = 0.62 miles  
1 metre (m) = 1.09 yards  
1 hectare (Ha) = 10.000 m<sup>2</sup> (0.01km<sup>2</sup>)  
1 hectare (Ha) = 2.47 acres  
1 acre (ac) = 0.405 hectares (ha)  
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.204 pounds

## Abbreviations and acronyms

ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
ASCAs	accumulative savings and credit associations
CEPAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Agriculture Promotion Centre
CHAPANI	Coastal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Nutrition Improvement Project
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluation
CPE	Country programme evaluation
CPM	country programme manager
DBM	Diamondback moth
DNEA	National Directorate for Agricultural Extension
DNT	National Directorate of Treasure
DUAT	<i>Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento dos Terras</i> (land use and utilization rights)
EU	European Union
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division (IFAD)
e-SISTAFE	electronic financial administration system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFS	Farmer field school
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ICO	IFAD Country Office
IDEPA	Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture
IIAM	Mozambique National Institute for Agricultural Research
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IPM	integrated pest management
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MASA	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MDG1c	Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1C in Mozambique – IFAD Sub-Programme
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MIMAIP	Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries
MITADER	Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development
MTR	midterm review
NAES	National Agricultural Extension Service
NRM	natural resources management
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PARP	Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PEDSA	Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector




PESPA	Strategic Plan for Artisanal Fisheries Sector
PLWH	people living with HIV
PMU	project management unit
PROAQUA	Project for Promotion of Small-Scale Aquaculture
ProDIRPA	Strengthening Artisanal Fishers' Resource Rights Project
PROMER	Rural Markets Promotion Programme
PRONEA	Programme for National Agricultural Extension
ProPesca	Artisanal Fisheries Promotion Project
PROSUL	Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors
PSP	PRONEA (Programme for National Agricultural Extension) Support Project
RFSP/PAFIR	Rural Finance Support Programme
SBAFP/PPABS	Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project
SPCU	IFAD Sub-Programme Coordination Unit (in the National Directorate of Treasure, Ministry of Economy and Finance)
WFP	World Food Programme

# Map of ongoing IFAD-supported operations

## Mozambique

### Country strategy and programme evaluation




The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 09-12-2015

# Map of closed IFAD-supported operations

## Mozambique

### Country strategy and programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 09-12-2015

## Executive summary

### A. Background and context

1. At the request of the Executive Board at its 116<sup>th</sup> session in December 2015, the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in Mozambique in 2016. This was the second evaluation conducted by IOE in Mozambique; the first country programme evaluation was conducted in 2009 (and published in 2010).
2. **Scope.** The CSPE evaluated the partnership between IFAD and the Government during 2010-2016 under the 2011 country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP). The CSPE covered: (i) the performance and impact of the portfolio of six IFAD-funded projects, four of which are currently ongoing; (ii) the performance and results of non-lending activities (including policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership-building); and (iii) the performance of the country strategy.
3. **Objectives.** This CSPE's main objectives were to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and Mozambique for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication. The CSPE was conducted in accordance with the second edition of the IOE Evaluation Manual (2015). The CSPE findings, learnings and recommendations will be used in preparing the new COSOP.
4. **IFAD in Mozambique.** Since the start of its operations in the country in 1983, IFAD has approved: 12 loans for 12 projects, all granted on highly concessional lending terms; and associated grants from the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) and the European Union, for a total of US\$239 million, representing 61 per cent of the total US\$394.6 million portfolio. Over the same period, additional financial contributions were committed by: (i) the Government of Mozambique, with US\$39.3million or 10 per cent of the portfolio; (ii) external cofinancing partners including the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund and the Belgian Fund for Food Security, for a total of US\$108 million or 27 per cent of the portfolio; and (iii) beneficiaries' contributions, estimated at US\$7.55 million or 2 per cent of the portfolio.
5. IFAD established a country office in Mozambique in 2003, initially staffed with a country programme officer supported by a series of headquarters-based country programme managers (CPMs). During the period under evaluation, the IFAD Country Office (ICO) has been growing. By the time of the CSPE, it included a country director, a country programme officer, a project officer, a programme assistant and four consultants.
6. IFAD's strategy in the country, which addressed poverty alleviation and vulnerable groups in the northern provinces from 2000-2005, shifted its focus to value chain development and work with the economically active poor. Coverage also expanded to include the southern provinces, the entire coastal areas and in one case, all provinces. The portfolio has grown considerably over time in terms of number and size of loans; current projects range from US\$23 million to US\$54 million and have an average duration of 7.5 years. The loan portfolio has also been complemented by significant financial contributions leveraged from other partners in the form of linked or stand-alone grants.

### B. Performance of the lending portfolio

7. **Relevance.** The IFAD-supported portfolio was found to be well-aligned with the policies and strategies of the Government and consistent with national rural

development priorities. All IFAD-supported projects broadly aim to contribute to the first general objective of the Poverty Reduction Action Plan 2011-2014: "Boost production and productivity in agriculture and fisheries" by enhancing rural producers' access to improved technology. In addition, the portfolio was harmonized with the Government objective of strengthening markets through IFAD's focus on value chain development.

8. The portfolio was also consistent with the 2011 COSOP strategic objectives, with most projects aimed at raising incomes among the rural poor by promoting more and better-quality production, and marketing their surpluses more profitably. In 2013, with additional resources for three loans and one grant provided by the European Union, IFAD's overarching goal of improving food security and nutrition among poor rural people became more visible within the portfolio.
9. Project participants appeared to comprise the economically active poor. As members of farmers' and fishers' associations and groups, they produced a surplus, but needed better access to technology, financial products and markets to achieve higher productivity, production and returns. The Pro-Poor Value Chain Development Project in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors (PROSUL) and the PRONEA Support Project (PSP)<sup>1</sup> also engaged with small and medium emergent commercial farmers who operate outside associations and have stable or growing linkages with markets. However, this approach was not fully in line with IFAD's core mandate of working with poorer segments of the rural population and arguably was not the most appropriate targeting strategy in a country with absolute poverty incidence of 50 per cent in rural areas. No projects, except for the Coastal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Nutrition Improvement Project (CHAPANI), made any effort to integrate people living with HIV among their beneficiaries.
10. **Effectiveness.** At the time of the CSPE, results were slowly emerging from most projects. Work was progressing well, but the portfolio's effectiveness was mixed.
11. The portfolio adequately addressed the commitment in the 2011 COSOP to develop value chains for small-scale producers in agriculture – and to a lesser extent fisheries because of delays in the Artisanal Fisheries Promotion Project (ProPesca) rural finance component. In addition, the first-point-of-sale markets for the catch from artisanal fisheries did not appear to meet the needs and requirements of this specific production and marketing environment.
12. The portfolio made a solid contribution to the COSOP goal of improving small producers' knowledge and – to some extent – access to new technologies. This largely happened through support to the operations of both the National Agricultural Extension System and the extension network of the Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries.
13. With the exception of accumulative savings and credit associations (ASCAs), which successfully reached a large number of poor rural women and men, results with respect to rural finance fell short of expectations and needs. At completion, the Rural Finance Support Programme (RFSP/PAFIR) had not achieved its objectives. From 2013 onward, the three value chain-focused projects had to establish their own mechanisms for rural finance – a complex endeavour that led to serious delays in implementation and limited results in this domain by the time of the CSPE.
14. All projects significantly contributed to institutional development within the Government and among farmers' organizations. Good progress was made by several projects in enabling farmers to obtain land-use titles – an important factor contributing to enhanced production and food security.

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<sup>1</sup> Formerly known as the National Agricultural Extension Programme (PRONEA).

15. In line with COSOP objectives, loan-funded projects contributed to improving the network of feeder roads and markets, as well as other aspects of social infrastructures. The population benefiting from the rehabilitated roads went well beyond the projects' immediate participants; however, results from new market infrastructures were still not visible and are likely to emerge more slowly.
16. **Efficiency.** The low level of efficiency was the greatest weakness in the implementation of IFAD-supported projects during the evaluation period. Contributing factors included: lengthy project inception phases due to delays in establishing project management units (PMUs); low financial disbursement rates, partly due to the effort to harmonize projects with the Government's electronic financial disbursement platform and diverging donor procedures for disbursement; and complicated project designs and implementation set-ups caused by the inefficient division of tasks and responsibilities between PMUs and service providers.
17. **Impact on rural poverty.** The strongest impacts were related to: (i) food security through diversified agricultural production; (ii) capacity development of farmers with simple but appropriate technologies to improve management skills such as planning, basic accounting and financial management, marketing, technical knowledge on conservation agriculture, horticulture, nutrition, food-processing, fishing techniques and sustainable natural resource management (NRM); and (iii) institutional development, which enabled well-trained and adequately equipped staff to provide higher-quality extension services to a larger number of smallholder farmers. PSP also supported development of the National Extension Monitoring and Evaluation System. With respect to food security however, the lack of robust data does not allow any firm conclusions to be drawn on the longer-term impacts of improved production and access to markets.
18. The main obstacle to achieving more positive impacts on incomes and assets was a lack of accessible financial services for beneficiaries to profitably engage in the proposed value chains. During the time remaining in ongoing projects, filling this gap should be the absolute priority, supported by outcome- and impact-focused monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems.
19. **Sustainability.** The main drivers of sustainability were the strong integration of some PMUs and line ministries, and the efforts and resources dedicated to capacity development at all levels. Most projects did invest considerable time and resources in developing the technical and management capacities of farmers, breeders, fishers and traders. Nevertheless, the potential for sustained benefits for farmers and fishers from the value chains is uncertain. Unless appropriate financial products beyond ASCAs are universally accessible to beneficiaries before the end of these projects, their benefits may not be realized. This concern should be a core consideration in the preparation of robust exit strategies for projects approaching completion in the next 18-24 months.
20. **Innovation and scaling up.** Several projects introduced innovations in: farming and fishing technologies (fishing gear, boat construction, solar-powered ice makers, etc.); approaches to value chain development that integrate most elements required for linking poor producers to markets; and building resilience to climate change by applying standards for the rehabilitation of rural roads. Scaling up proved successful with technologies that did not need additional inputs for broader adoptions, such as credit.
21. **Gender equality and women's empowerment.** All loans and related grants (with the exception of RFSP/PAFIR) explicitly foresaw the inclusion of women as project beneficiaries and many defined quantitative targets for women beneficiaries. Targets ranged from 25 per cent to 50 per cent, and significant results were achieved with respect to women's participation in project activities.

22. Nevertheless, positive impacts on women's empowerment and gender equality remained elusive at the community and household levels despite efforts made to improve the awareness and competence among staff in PMUs and government organizations on issues related to gender equality. More effort is necessary to improve gender analysis during planning, implementation and M&E, including: systematically collecting sex-disaggregated data; and raising awareness among women and men beneficiaries about the ways in which perceptions of women's position in society and roles can be changed.
23. **Environmental and natural resource management.** Although IFAD has long recognized that sustainable environmental and NRM are paramount to alleviating rural poverty and improving the livelihoods of rural producers, too little attention was given to these issues in the design of the projects in the current portfolio.
24. One positive note was the inclusion in PROSUL of a grant component funded by the multi-donor IFAD-based ASAP, which enabled climate change adaptation measures to be integrated across the project's three value chains. Some of these proved beneficial for different groups of the rural poor. Adjustments in activities during implementation of most other projects also bode well for future results.
25. **Adaptation to climate change.** IFAD developed its Climate Change Strategy in 2010, which means that more projects in Mozambique could have integrated this perspective into their designs. PROSUL was the only project that integrated a relevant component, representing the first grant financed by IFAD's ASAP. The aim of this component was to increase the climate resilience of the three PROSUL value chains and reduce the impact of climate change on the productivity and profitability of smallholder farming systems. All projects investing in rural roads began promoting the rehabilitation of climate change-resilient roads. In addition, the Rural Markets Promotion Programme (PROMER) planned to allocate funds to introduce adaptation measures across its various activities. Finally, an ASAP junior expert was posted to the ICO to support climate change adaptation in PROSUL and other IFAD-supported projects.

### C. Non-lending activities

26. **Knowledge management.** Efforts by the ICO and IFAD's sub-programme coordination unit to improve results from knowledge management have contributed to the visibility of IFAD projects in Mozambique, disseminating experiences and achievements. However, in the view of the CSPE, most of the outputs can be considered communication products rather than knowledge management since they were not underpinned by a rigorous analysis of key factors leading to the successful outcomes. At the same time, projects and country teams did not have access to adequate financial and human resources for developing a knowledge management strategy and knowledge products.
27. **Partnerships.** IFAD developed solid and successful partnerships with the Government and benefited from deep-rooted respect and trust. IFAD also has solid credibility with several development partners, as proven by the size of the financial resources leveraged for cofinancing. The ICO and project teams developed a solid rapport with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme in the context of the European Union-funded implementation of efforts towards Millennium Development Goal 1.C. This wealth of experience with partnerships can generate lessons learned regarding the costs and benefits of some partnerships. The outposting of the country director in Maputo was also a key factor in developing constructive new partnerships.
28. **Policy dialogue.** During the evaluation period, contributions to policy dialogue included: advocacy and support for mainstreaming nutrition in the National Agricultural Extension System; and efforts to integrate lessons from field activities into the e-SISTAFE electronic platform. However, this area of work was mostly

hampered by: (i) the high turnover of CPMs during the evaluation period and the small size of the ICO until 2015; (ii) the slow progress of project implementation, delaying the achievement of results that could feed into discussions about policies; (iii) weaknesses in the M&E and knowledge management systems; and (iv) the limited time available to the country director for policy dialogue, amplified by the lack of earmarked resources for this work in the administrative budget.

29. **Grants.** The grant portfolio was characterized by a high level of interconnectedness and synergy. All grants attached to loans enhanced the latter's relevance and filled their design gaps, especially regarding nutrition, HIV and AIDS, and NRM. The stand-alone Project for Promotion of Small-Scale Aquaculture (PROAQUA) grant met a specific government requirement and may pave the way for more significant engagement by IFAD in the aquaculture subsector. The regional grants were successfully integrated into the National Agricultural Extension System, with good prospects for institutional sustainability.

#### **D. Performance of partners**

30. **IFAD.** The Fund made strong efforts to be a reliable and supportive partner of the Government. However, this came at the cost of implementation efficiency and effectiveness, with complicated project set-up and lengthy procurement procedures. The portfolio's focus on value chain development and integration of producers into the market also undermined IFAD's traditional thrusts on poverty and vulnerability. These are lessons to be learned, which should guide the development of the next COSOP and related projects.
31. **Government.** The commitment and availability of many government organizations to collaborate with IFAD was satisfactory and sustained over time, despite major national institutional reforms. The Government also made efforts to ensure that PMUs were established in a relatively short time. In the few cases where there were significant delays in the recruitment of the project coordinator, the scarcity of competent professionals at the national level may have played a role. Once established, PMUs were remarkably stable.
32. A good indicator of the Government's openness to learn from IFAD-supported projects was the strong element of internal knowledge management in ProPesca and PROMER. In these projects, professionals who had worked in previous IFAD-supported projects were recruited for the PMUs. The same attitude was noted whenever proposals were made regarding norms and standards, technological innovations and inclusion of new components in projects, as in the: adoption of climate change-resilient road rehabilitation approaches; integration of nutrition education in the farmer field school curriculum and the plant clinics approach within the National Agricultural Extension System.
33. However, a few important weaknesses in the fiduciary aspects of the portfolio negatively affected its efficiency, including the: limited availability of counterpart funds for IFAD-supported projects; complexity of the Government's electronic financial administration system e-SISTAFE; and complex procedures for approving contracts and procurement-related actions, and the delays this created.

#### **E. Performance of country strategy and programme**

34. **Strategic relevance.** In Mozambique, IFAD supported a portfolio of projects rather than a country strategy and programme. There were several reasons for this, including: a disconnect between the COSOP and project design, approval and implementation; and a high turnover of CPMs. Implementation and progress towards objectives suffered greatly due to: complex and over-ambitious project designs; harmonization with national procedures and platforms for financial execution; and an operational and institutional gap in rural finance – a major pillar of the portfolio. The targeting strategy did not appear fully relevant to the country



context and there were missed opportunities at the conceptual level that prevented the portfolio from achieving more in terms of poverty reduction.

35. **COSOP effectiveness.** IFAD's portfolio contributed to extensive capacity development of government staff, partners and producers. Thanks to its trustworthiness among international development partners, it leveraged additional resources that enhanced the relevance and scope of the portfolio. With these additional resources, nutrition education components were integrated into both value-chain initiatives and the curriculum of the National Agricultural Extension System. At the time of the CSPE: positive impacts on household incomes were becoming evident for PROMER beneficiaries; rehabilitated roads were benefiting large numbers of people; women were being empowered through functional literacy initiatives; the ASCAs supported by the projects were significantly improving members' livelihoods; and positive steps were being taken to make financial products available for fisheries value chains.

## **F. Conclusions**

36. Overall, the programme was relevant to the needs of the country and had a reasonable level of internal coherence. The projects were well-aligned with national policies and strategies. Strong government ownership of projects was achieved through the full integration of three PMUs into the governmental organizations responsible for project execution and building upon the experience gained in previous IFAD-supported projects.
37. However, the COSOP and projects did not explicitly include objectives or approaches to improve food security and nutrition, and reduce poverty. They identified the target population as the economically active poor, who already had potential to commercialize their activities and receive support to enhance access to inputs, markets, credit and engagement with the private sector. This led projects to focus on producers who already had access to improved production and were often already members of associations and groups in districts that had potential for surplus production and marketing. In addition, projects focused on value chains that ended up transferring most added value outside rural communities. Furthermore, despite the dire national statistics on HIV and AIDS, few efforts were made to integrate people living with HIV into value chains, ASCAs or capacity development initiatives on nutrition, functional literacy or any other area supported by loans.
38. The NRM and environmental dimensions of the portfolio were found to be weak. This undermined the potential positive impacts and sustainability of the projects with respect to food security and production, especially considering producers' dependency on natural resources – including the economically active poor.
39. Enabling access to rural financial products was one pillar of the proposed approach to value chain development. But with the exception of the successful and sustainable ASCAs, little tangible progress was made in improving access to credit for small-scale rural producers in agriculture and fisheries. This gap undermined the effectiveness of many efforts made through projects in capacity development, technology transfer and improving access to markets (since projects spent precious time and resources on finding their own way forward in the highly complex microfinance sector). The need for one robust and sustainable rural financial institution in the country cannot be over-emphasized.
40. Delays in project financial execution and slow implementation were recognized by all stakeholders as a main weakness; efficiency was low across the whole portfolio, except for PROMER. This appears to be a major issue requiring urgent attention by both IFAD and the Government. Although Mozambique benefits from highly concessional loans from IFAD, such a low level of efficiency risks jeopardizing the benefits of this otherwise important partnership.

41. All projects except for ProPesca largely relied on the recruitment of service providers, as envisaged in the 2011 COSOP. Although this was beneficial for a number of activities, the reliance on service providers should not include the delegation of tasks that are better performed by PMUs. IFAD's experience across the country portfolio in dealing with service providers allows a careful re-think of this implementation model, with a view to ensuring that future projects benefit from the added value that competent and experienced service providers can bring – without requiring costly and inefficient implementation mechanisms.
42. An important part of the partnership between IFAD and the Government of Mozambique was related to the non-lending activities carried out by the ICO. Nevertheless, many provisions made did not materialize. Although some progress was made on knowledge management, no significant progress in either this area or policy dialogue was made during the evaluation period.

## **G. Recommendations**

43. **Recommendation 1. Focus on rural poor and on more vulnerable groups, including women, youth and people living with HIV.** A bottom-up approach to reducing food insecurity, malnutrition, poverty and vulnerability is compatible with value chain development and integration into markets, and likely to be more effective and efficient in the medium-term compared to trickle-down strategies. However, this needs to be supported by project strategies that must first and foremost tackle the needs of the poorer and more vulnerable producers, and the obstacles they face in: (i) improving their production (quality and quantity); (ii) processing and transforming their products at the local level and thus adding value to their produce at the market; (iii) enhancing their participation in farmers' organizations; and (iv) strengthening their capacity to negotiate more profitable access to markets. This vision should fully inform all steps in project design and implementation, from selection of participants to choices of value chains and market opportunities, to identification of capacity development needs, including functional and financial literacy, nutrition and HIV prevention.
44. **Recommendation 2. IFAD-supported projects in Mozambique should include full attention to sustainable natural resources management and to strengthening climate-change resilience.** All projects should explicitly include sustainable NRM and climate change adaptation and mitigation, as appropriate and relevant to their goals, and in line with IFAD's most recent policies and the Government's relevant strategies. Moreover, NRM and climate change adaptation and mitigation should be mainstreamed in all project activities, including capacity development and technology transfer.
45. **Recommendation 3. IFAD's support to the rural finance sector should be conceptualized within a long-term commitment horizon and based on lessons learned to date.** Based on the extensive lessons learned and experience gained by IFAD in the country and elsewhere, a long-term engagement, possibly over a 15-year period, would be required and appropriate to enable robust and transparent institutions at all levels and across all productive subsectors to gain strength and credibility and provide sustainable financial services to the rural poor in Mozambique.
46. **Recommendation 4. Enhance efficiency of financial execution.** Integration of IFAD-funded projects into the governmental procedures and systems (e.g. e-SISTAFE) should be pursued and sustained in the spirit of governmental ownership and for reasons of transparency. Some specific measures will be fundamental to raise implementation efficiency up to standard. These include: (i) enabling e-SISTAFE to meet the requirements of IFAD-supported projects in terms of flexibility in workplans, formal requirements for beneficiaries and timing of disbursements; (ii) until e-SISTAFE is able to safely meet the specific requirements of IFAD-supported projects, allocating 25 per cent of project

budgets to be executed outside e-SISTAFE to enable adjustments over plans and continued execution throughout the year; (iii) developing a fast-track mechanism for approving contracts and service procurement acts for IFAD-supported projects that fully complies with the requirements of the State in terms of controls and transparency; (iv) privileging the application of financial agreements and accounting tools that allow counterpart funds from the Government to be provided in kind rather than cash, and avoiding any requirement for parallel financial execution; (v) negotiating with other partners to mainstream their contributions within IFAD's standard disbursement and financial execution procedures; and (vi) strengthening the capacity of PMUs in financial planning.

47. **Recommendation 5. Develop principles for the reliance on service providers in project implementation.** The principles should include the following lessons learned: (i) service providers should be recruited only for components and activities that governmental organizations and PMUs do not have the capacity to implement; (ii) service providers should be selected based on their proven experience and competence, and long-term engagement in the areas for which they are recruited; (iii) service providers have in general proven to be more effective than governmental services in supporting empowering processes at the level of communities, associations, households and individuals; (iv) and service providers who do not have previous experience in handling contracts in the framework of an IFAD-funded project should be entitled to an induction training on administrative and financial procedures, and relevant and clear manuals should be prepared at the very beginning of a project's life.
48. **Recommendation 6. Dedicate attention and resources to knowledge management and policy dialogue.** IFAD headquarters and the ICO should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated in project and ICO budgets for non-lending activities, starting with sound M&E systems, and that the country programme rests on the following pillars:
- (a) The development of robust outcome-level monitoring indicators for COSOPs and projects;
  - (b) A country programme-level knowledge management strategy closely anchored to key COSOP elements and to those project components that can usefully be scaled up through national policies and strategies; and
  - (c) The early identification of evidence-based issues and results that can be usefully fed into policy dialogue processes at a high strategic level, through appropriate knowledge management processes.

## **Agreement at completion point**

### **A. Introduction**

1. The IFAD Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) carried out a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in Mozambique in 2016. This is the second country programme evaluation conducted by IOE in Mozambique since the Fund started its operations in the country in 1982. The previous country programme evaluation was completed in 2009 and its findings served as an input to the preparation of the 2011 COSOP.
2. The current evaluation had two main objectives: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and Mozambique for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication; and (iii) to provide inputs for the preparation of the future Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP) for Mozambique to be prepared by IFAD and the Government in 2017.
3. The Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) reflects the understanding between the Government of Mozambique and IFAD Management of the main conclusions and recommendations of the CSPE of Mozambique. In particular, it includes a summary of the main results of the evaluation in Section B, while the ACP is in Section C. The ACP is a reflection of the commitment of the Government and IFAD to adopt and implement the recommendations of the CSPE within specific deadlines.
4. The follow-up to the implementation of the agreed recommendations will be carried out through the President's Report on the Status of Implementation of the Evaluation Recommendations and the Management Actions, which is presented to the Executive Board of IFAD by the Fund Management on an annual basis.
5. The ACP shall be signed by the Government of Mozambique (represented by the Minister of Economy and Finance) and IFAD Management (represented by the Associate Vice-President of the Program Management Department). The role of the IOE is to facilitate the finalization of the final ACP. The ACP will be presented to the Executive Board of IFAD as an annex to the new COSOP for Mozambique and will be included in the final report of the Mozambique CSPE.

### **B. Main evaluation findings**

6. IFAD maintains a long-standing partnership with Mozambique in agriculture and rural development. Overall, the programme was relevant to the needs of the country and had a reasonable level of internal coherence. The alignment of the projects with national policies and strategies was good and government ownership was strong, including full integration of three Project Management Units in the governmental organizations responsible for project execution.
7. The COSOP, partly endorsing the approach in the on-going projects and partly stretching it further away from IFAD's traditional beneficiaries, identified the target population on the economically active poor, who already had the potential to expand and commercialize their activities and who would receive support to enhance access to inputs, markets and credit, and be facilitated in their engagement with the private sector. This led projects to focus on producers who already had access to better factors of production and who often were already members of associations and groups, in districts that had a potential for surplus production and marketing, and on value-chains that ended up transferring most of the added-value, to outside the rural communities.
8. This meant that the bulk of the rural producers in the same districts of intervention who were not so advanced were either left out from projects'

activities or were only marginally involved through the enhanced out-reach capacity of the National Agricultural Extension Service (NAES). Some of the value-chains proposed missed the potential for stronger value addition at the local level for more producers; and led to producers selling to traders who operated under almost monopolistic conditions.

9. Further, despite the dire statistics on HIV and AIDS, no efforts were made to integrate People Living with HIV in the value-chains, ASCAs or even in the capacity development efforts on nutrition, functional literacy or any other topic, in any of the loans.
10. Main results achieved by the programmes in Mozambique outlined in the evaluation include: (i) extensive capacity development of governmental staff and producers, across a broad range of topics, such as technology transfer in agriculture and fisheries, functional and financial literacy and management and business development -his appeared to be a long-term fruitful investment that will contribute to the overall national capacity development; (ii) improvements in the production and productivity of maize and of other crops, mostly horticulture, were visible for the beneficiaries of IFAD supported interventions, thanks to the stronger operational capacity of the NAES, the direct links created between research and extension and to innovative phyto-sanitary practices and methods made available; (iii) nutritional education components integrated in the development of value chains and in the curriculum of the National Extension System; (iv)improvements in access to micro-credit for household assets and petty-trade through Savings and Credit Associations; (v) rehabilitated rural roads Rural roads benefitted a large number of people in the areas covered by the programme
11. On the other hand, there have limited results in the development of rural finance. At the time of the CSPE, exception made for the highly successful and sustainable ASCAs, very little tangible progress had been made in improving access to credit for small-scale rural producers in agriculture and fisheries. This gap was undermining the effectiveness of much of the efforts made by the projects in capacity development, technology transfer, improving access to markets, while projects were spending precious time resources in finding their own way forward in the highly complex sector of micro-finance
12. Efficiency was assessed as moderately satisfactory. Delays in project financial execution and slow implementation were recognized by all stakeholders as a main weakness; efficiency was low across the whole portfolio, exception made for PROMER. Delays were due to a variety of causes including harmonization efforts with national financial implementation procedures and platforms, delays in the processes of contracting the teams of the projects and the consultants and inefficiencies in the use model of the Service Providers.
13. All projects, exception made for ProPesca, largely relied on the recruitment of Service Providers, as envisaged in the 2011 COSOP. There is no doubt that Service Providers with the required experience and knowledge had to be contracted to support the implementation of highly complex projects. However, the experience gained by IFAD across the country portfolio in dealing with Service Providers calls for a careful re-thinking of this implementation model. Future should be able benefit of the added value that competent and experienced Service Providers can bring to IFAD-supported initiatives, without incurring in over-costly and inefficient implementation mechanisms.
14. Women are taking part in IFAD projects, such as members of producer associations and Savings and Credit Groups, but activities have little positive impact on women's empowerment and gender equality at community and family level.

15. The national resources management and environmental dimension of the portfolio was found to be weak overall. This partly contributed to undermine potential positive impacts and sustainability of the projects with respect to food security and production, considering the high dependency of producers' livelihoods, including the economically active poor, on natural resources
16. Efforts made by the IFAD Country Office (ICO) and the recently created IFAD Sub-Programme Coordination Unit (SPCU) to improve results from knowledge management work were visible, but must be strengthened and expanded with more financial and human resources. There are opportunities to strengthen knowledge management, both within the country programme, and also bringing IFAD's knowledge and experience from other countries to Mozambique.
17. In terms of policy dialogue IFAD has contributed to prepare national standards for phytosanitary control monitoring. There is ample potential for both ICO and IFAD to better engage in policy dialogue sharing lessons and experience gained in the country, both directly with the Government and through platforms with other partners.
18. IFAD has developed solid and successful partnerships with the Government and benefits from deeply-rooted respect and trust. IFAD is also credible with several development partners, as proven by the size of the financial resources leveraged for co-financing. A solid rapport has been established with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme in the context of the implementation of the EU-funded MDG1c programme.

## C. Recommendations

19. **Recommendation 1. Focus on rural poor and on more vulnerable groups, including women, youth and people living with HIV.** A bottom-up approach to reducing food insecurity, malnutrition, poverty and vulnerability is compatible with value-chain development and integration into markets and likely to be more effective and efficient in the medium term compared to trickle-down strategies. This however must be supported by project strategies that must first and foremost tackle the needs of the poorer and more vulnerable producers, and the obstacles they face in: (i) improving their productions, quality and quantity-wise; (ii) processing and transforming their products at the local level and thus add value to their produce reaching the market; (iii) enhancing their participation in farmers' organizations; and (iv) strengthening their capacity to negotiate more profitable access to markets. This vision should inform all steps in a project design and implementation, from selection of participants to choices of value chains and market opportunities, to identification of capacity development needs including functional and financial literacy, nutrition and HIV prevention.
 

**Proposed follow-up:** The new RB-COSOP for Mozambique will have a Targeting Strategy broken down by specific sub-target groups to ensure their access and participation to benefit from investments and will be aligned with the Gender and Nutrition strategies.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** IFAD financed investments lead by Government, service providers and implementation partners.

**Deadline for implementation:** The new approach will start in 2018 following the completion of the new COSOP design and approval by Government and IFAD.
20. **Recommendation 2. IFAD-supported projects in Mozambique should include among their principles, full attention to sustainable natural resources management and to strengthening climate-change resilience.** All projects should explicitly include as appropriate and relevant to their goals, and mainstream throughout all their activities including capacity development and technology transfer, sustainable natural resources management and climate change adaptation and mitigation, in line with IFAD's most recent policies and the Government relevant strategies.

**Proposed follow-up:** Based on the SECAP for the new COSOP new investments will respond to the SECAP framework provided.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** IFAD financed investments lead by Government, service providers and implementation partners.

**Deadline for implementation:** The new approach will start in 2018 following the completion of the new COSOP design and approval by Government and IFAD.

21. **Recommendation 3. IFAD's support to the Rural Finance sector should be conceptualised within a long-term commitment horizon and with basis on the lessons learned so far.** Based on the extensive lessons learned and experience gained by IFAD in the country and elsewhere, a long-term engagement, possibly over a 15-years horizon, would be required and appropriate to enable robust and transparent institutions at all levels and across all productive sub-sectors, to gain strength and credibility and provide sustainable financial services to the rural poor in Mozambique.

**Proposed follow-up:** A national rural finance and enterprise programme is currently under design to respond to this recommendation.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** The Implementing agency and project staff lead by Government, IFAD and co-financiers, service providers and implementation partners.

**Deadline for implementation:** The new approach will start in 2018 following the completion and approval by Government and IFAD of the new Rural Finance and Enterprise Programme.

22. **Recommendation 4. Enhance efficiency of financial execution.** Integration of IFAD-funded projects into the governmental procedures and systems, e.g. e-SISTAFE, should be pursued and sustained in the spirit of governmental ownership and for transparency reasons. Some specific measures will be nevertheless of paramount importance to raise implementation efficiency up to standards. These should include: (i) enable e-SISTAFE to meet the requirements of IFAD-supported projects in terms of flexibility in work-plans and reporting, formal requirements for beneficiaries and timing of disbursement; (ii) develop a fast-track mechanism for approval of contracts and service procurement acts for IFAD-supported projects, that fully complies with the requirements of the State in terms of controls and transparency; (iii) negotiate with other partners for mainstreaming their contributions within IFAD's standard disbursement and financial execution procedures; and (iv) strengthen the capacity of PMUs in financial planning.

**Proposed follow-up:** The process has commenced to further expand the work which responded to EU financed requirements.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** Ministry for Economy and Finance.

**Deadline for implementation:** It is anticipated that the process will be ready for implementation by the end of the first quarter of 2018.

23. **Recommendation 5. Develop principles for the reliance on Service Providers in project implementation.** The principles should include the following lessons learned: (i) Service Providers should be recruited only for components and activities that governmental organizations and PMUs do not have the capacity to implement; (ii) Service Providers should be selected with basis on their proven experience and competence, and long term engagement in the themes for which they are recruited; (iii) Service Providers have in general proven to be more effective than governmental services in supporting empowering processes at the level of communities, associations, households and individuals; (iv) Service Providers who do not have previous experience in handling contracts in the framework of an IFAD-funded project should be entitled to an induction training on administrative and financial procedures, and relevant clear manuals should be prepared at the very beginning of a project's life.

**Proposed follow-up:** The recommendation will be responded in the design of new investments, including training and access to contracting resources which will be provided.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** IFAD/Government.

**Deadline for implementation:** Commence immediately.

24. **Recommendation 6. Dedicate more attention and resources to Knowledge Management and Policy Dialogue.** IFAD headquarters and ICO should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated in project and ICO budgets for non-lending activities, starting from sound M&E systems, and that the country-programme rests on the following pillars:

- i. the development of robust outcome-level COSOP and projects' monitoring indicators;
- ii. a country programme-level Knowledge Management Strategy closely anchored to key COSOP elements and to those project components that can usefully be up-scaled through national policies and strategies;
- iii. the early identification of evidence-based issues and results that can be usefully fed into Policy Dialogue processes at a high strategic level, through appropriate Knowledge Management processes.

**Proposed follow-up:** Within the new COSOP specific strategies for both Policy Engagement and Knowledge Management will be included.

**Entity/s responsible for implementation:** IFAD co-financed investments, Project Staff, IFAD.

**Deadline for implementation:** Will commence with Projects under design and the new COSOP starting in 2018.

## Signatures



Perin Saint Ange  
Associate Vice-President  
Programme Management Department  
IFAD

Date *L*



Adriano Afonso Maleiane  
Minister of Economy and Finance  
Ministry of Economy and Finance  
Republic of Mozambique

14.09.2017  
Date



# Republic of Mozambique

## Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

### I. Background

#### A. Introduction

1. At the request of the Executive Board at its 116<sup>th</sup> session in December 2015, the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in Mozambique in 2016. The main purpose of the CSPE was to generate an overall appreciation of the partnership between IFAD and the Government of Mozambique in reducing rural poverty, and through this, to contribute to accountability, learning and strengthening of IFAD's development effectiveness.
2. This was the second evaluation conducted by IOE in Mozambique; the first country programme evaluation was conducted in 2009 (published in 2010). This CSPE covers the period 2010-2016 and includes the analysis of all IFAD-supported initiatives that were operational during this timespan.
3. **Overview of the IFAD-supported programme.** Mozambique is the seventh largest portfolio among IFAD-supported operations in the East and Southern Africa region. Since the start of its operations in the country in 1983, IFAD has approved 12 loans, all granted on highly concessional lending terms, and associated grants from the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) and the European Union, for a total of US\$239 million, representing 61 per cent of the total portfolio (US\$394.6 million). Over the same period, additional committed financial contributions were as follows: the Government of Mozambique, with US\$39.3 million or 10 per cent of the portfolio; external cofinancing partners, including OPEC Fund for International Development, European Union (EU), African Development Bank, Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund and Belgian Facility for Food Security, for a total of US\$108 million or 27 per cent of the portfolio; and the beneficiaries' contribution, estimated at US\$7.5 million, or 2 per cent of the portfolio.
4. IFAD established a country office in Mozambique in 2003, initially staffed with a country programme officer supported by headquarters-based country programme managers (CPM). During the period under evaluation, the IFAD Country Office (ICO) has been growing and by the time of the CSPE, it included a country director, a country programme officer, a project officer, a programme assistant and four consultants.

#### B. Objectives, methodology and processes

5. **Objectives.** As stated in the Approach Paper, this CSPE had two main objectives: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and Mozambique for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication.
6. **Scope.** The CSPE was asked to cover the full range of IFAD's support to Mozambique in the period between 2010 and mid-2016, and provide an assessment at the programme and strategy level, based on the analysis of the three pillars described below, each to be individually rated:
  - (a) Lending activities: a portfolio-level analysis of IFAD-funded closed and ongoing projects that have been operational during the period 2010-2016;
  - (b) Non-lending activities: analysis of knowledge management, policy dialogue and partnership-building activities; this pillar included the self-standing national grants, and a sample of regional grants benefiting the country, as well as South-South and Triangular Cooperation; and

- (c) The performance of IFAD and the Government of Mozambique in managing the country programme, including respective contributions to the design, execution, supervision, implementation, support, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of both projects and the country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP).<sup>1</sup>
7. The evaluation, aimed at both lessons learned and accountability, focused on identifying the relevance and results achieved in the framework of the COSOP's strategic objectives so as to provide lessons and recommendations at the strategy level for the next COSOP formulation. In order to do so, the evaluation carried out an evaluative assessment of the ongoing projects, and integrated findings from other IOE products, with a focus on the respective theories of change and impact pathways, and most importantly, on progress made and the challenges ahead while working to achieve objectives and goals.
  8. **Methodology.** The CSPE was conducted within the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy and followed IOE's methodology and process for CSPEs (IOE Evaluation Manual – second edition). The approach paper for this CSPE provided further and specific guidance for the exercise. The evaluation adopted a transparent and inclusive approach with respect to canvassing information and views from stakeholders, participants in IFAD-supported activities and observers.
  9. Evidence for the CSPE originated from the analysis and triangulation of information and data canvassed using several tools, namely:
    - Extensive review of documents, including: the Mozambique COSOPs; project design reports, midterm reviews (MTRs), supervision and technical reports; projects and the East and Southern Africa Division (ESA) self-assessment reports; national and IFAD policies; IFAD corporate information systems for management and financial data;
    - Integration in the evidence base of the findings and conclusions of three IOE products, namely two project completion report validations and the impact evaluation of the Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (SBAFP/PPABS);
    - In-depth desk review by a sector specialist of all IFAD-supported interventions in the fisheries and aquaculture sector in the country;
    - Semi-structured interviews with IFAD stakeholders and project participants, based on team's check-lists. In total, the CSPE team met and discussed with 276 officers from governmental organizations and development partners, and with 482 members of communities and associations that collaborate with IFAD projects. These interviews were complemented by data provided by project management units (PMUs) upon CSPE request; and
    - Observation of a sample of project achievements at community level, including rehabilitated roads and markets, crop production fields, plant clinics, aquaculture ponds, etc.
  10. **Criteria.** The CSPE examined and rated the project portfolio based on the internationally recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, scored on a six-point rating scale. Additional IFAD-specific criteria were: rural poverty impacts, including at the level of household incomes and assets, human and social capital empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, and institutions and policies; as well as innovation and scaling up, gender equality and women's empowerment, natural resources, the environment and climate change (see definitions in annex I).
  11. The CSPE individually assessed and rated each of the three pillars mentioned above, lending, non-lending, and partners' performance. It also examined the synergies

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<sup>1</sup> Until 2006, COSOP stood for country strategic opportunities paper. It was updated in 2006 and stands for country strategic opportunities programme.

among the different IFAD-supported projects, both loans and grants, as well as the cross-cutting dimensions of the non-lending activities; and finally, accounting for the performance of the COSOP, the CSPE generated a composite rating and assessment of the overall IFAD-Government partnership.

12. The standard criteria for the evaluation provided the framework for the identification of the evaluation questions. In addition, the approach paper, following extensive interviews at IFAD headquarters and in Maputo with key stakeholders, identified a few key issues of great concern to most stakeholders, namely: (i) the performance of IFAD's project portfolio in the area of rural finance; (ii) targeting within IFAD projects; (iii) alignment with the Government's electronic financial planning and reporting platform; and (iv) the model of implementation, relying on national and international service providers. The CSPE analysed these issues more in depth, in consideration of their impacts on the overall portfolio performance.
13. **Selection of projects to be reviewed.** The IFAD portfolio in Mozambique in the period under evaluation included six loans and five national grants.<sup>2</sup> Of these, four loans and three grants were ongoing at the time of the CSPE; and three grants, including a closed one, were linked to ongoing loans. In addition, Mozambique also benefited in the same period from 15 regional and global IFAD-funded grants; the CSPE selected two closed regional grant projects that had been implemented with the support of an ongoing national loan.
14. The CSPE analysed all the national projects, though to different extents, depending on available documentation and information for the closed projects; and on the respective state of implementation for the ongoing projects. Three of the ongoing loans, namely PRONEA, PROMER and ProPesca, could be assessed against most of the evaluation criteria, although the assessment of effectiveness, sustainability and impacts was mostly couched in terms of "potential for" rather than tangible evidence, in consideration of delays in implementation. At the time of the CSPE, PROSUL had not yet gone through a MTR, which meant that only its relevance was rated, whereas efficiency and effectiveness were assessed but not rated.
15. The CSPE drew information and ratings from the IOE reports for the two closed loans, both of which had gone through an IOE-led validation process of the project completion report (PCR), and one was also analysed through an IOE-led impact evaluation. Information was drawn from available documentation, interviews and direct observation, whenever possible, for the closed national and regional grants. With respect to the ongoing projects, both loans and grants, the CSPE based its analysis on project documentation, interviews and direct observation. Furthermore, whenever necessary and useful, the 2004-2008 COSOP<sup>3</sup> framework was taken into account. Table 1 shows which criteria were used to assess each project.

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<sup>2</sup> The use of the term portfolio rather than country programme or COSOP in the CSPE addresses the disconnect between the scope of the evaluation, from 2010 to 2016 including projects that had been formulated much earlier, and the shorter implementation period of the 2011 COSOP.

<sup>3</sup> The third COSOP was extended to cover IFAD's work in Mozambique until 2010/11.

Table1  
**Evaluability of projects**

Cohort Projects	Closed projects			Ongoing projects		
	SBAFP	PAFIR	PRONEA	PROMER	ProPESCA	PROSUL
Beginning of implementation	<b>Already evaluated by IOE</b>		2007	2009	2011	2012
IFAD loan disbursement level (Jan 2016)			54%	68%	45%	14%
<b>Criteria</b>						
Relevance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Effectiveness	Yes	Yes	Partly	Partly	Partly	Partly
Efficiency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partly	Partly
Sustainability	Yes	Yes	Partly	Partly	Partly	No
Rural poverty impact	Yes	Yes	Partly	Partly	Partly	No
Innovation, replication and scaling up	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Natural resources and environment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partly	No
Adaptation to climate change	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partly	Partly
Gender equality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partly
Performance of partners	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partly

16. **Process.** The CSPE started with a desk review by IOE of project and non-project activities and strategic issues, and the preparation of a draft approach paper. During June-July 2016, interviews were held in IFAD headquarters and a ten-day mission was carried out in Mozambique to allow interaction with a broad range of stakeholders within the Government and with other partners, to elicit their views on specific questions and issues that should be reflected in the CSPE. IFAD-ESA, the project teams and the Government were also invited to conduct a self-assessment of the portfolio of current projects, non-lending activities and 2011 COSOP performance. The approach paper was finalized, including comments from IFAD and the Government and on this basis, additional evaluation tools were prepared.
17. The main evaluation mission was conducted from 21 August to 14 September 2016. Additional interviews were carried out in Maputo,<sup>4</sup> before the four-person team split into two sub-groups and conducted field visits to six provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Nampula and Zambezia) and several districts, to interact with the participants/beneficiaries, and directly observe activities of all the ongoing projects, as well as of three closed ones.
18. On 14 September, a wrap-up meeting was organized with key Government stakeholders, ICO staff and project staff, to present and discuss the preliminary findings of the CSPE team. The meeting was well attended and the discussion constructive and helpful for the report writing phase.
19. The advance draft report, after peer review within IOE, was shared with IFAD divisions, the ICO, the Government and PMUs. Their comments were taken into account in finalizing the report, which was presented to national and IFAD stakeholders in a national workshop in Maputo on 2 March 2017, to discuss the main findings and recommendations.

<sup>4</sup> During meetings with PMUs, the CSPE team explained in detail the evaluation process and the criteria used for the assessment.

20. **Limitations.** Throughout its work, the CSPE team chose to perform a full assessment of all projects included in the country programme under evaluation over an in-depth analysis of a selected sample of initiatives. However, time and budget availability only allowed for field visits of project activities at the community level in a limited sample of locations, and with only some of the participants of each project. Furthermore, the M&E systems of all projects exclusively focused on activity progress and delivery of outputs; in addition, the information made available was rather disproportionate. This had negative consequences on the availability of outcome and impact-level information, consistency of the data and on the overall evidence base, particularly in terms of impact assessment. Also, no project had developed any analysis of the internal rate of return. All these factors led the CSPE to rely on its own observations during the work in Mozambique.

#### **Key points**

- This was the second evaluation of the IFAD portfolio in Mozambique and covered all work in the country since 2010, when the first country programme evaluation (CPE) was finalized.
- IFAD established a country office in Mozambique in 2003, initially staffed with a country programme officer supported by a headquarters-based CPM. At the time of the evaluation, the ICO included the country director, the country programme officer, one project officer, one programme assistant and four consultants.
- Mozambique is the seventh largest portfolio among IFAD-supported operations in the east and southern Africa region. Since the start of its operations in the country in 1983, IFAD has approved 12 loans, all granted on highly concessional lending terms, and six Debt Sustainability Framework grants, including from the ASAP, for a total of US\$239 million, representing 61 per cent of the total portfolio cost (US\$394.6 million).
- The main objectives of the CSPE were: (i) the assessment of the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) generation of findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and Mozambique for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication.
- The CSPE assessed four ongoing and two closed loans, along with two closed national and two regional grants and three ongoing grants. In addition, the evaluation also analysed the non-lending activities and the performance of IFAD and the Government in the management of the country programme. The scope of the CPE was broader than the 2011 COSOP.

## II. Country context and IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

### A. Country context

21. This chapter briefly describes the key features of Mozambique that mostly relate to IFAD's mandate and to the strategic thrust of the 2011 COSOP.
22. **Geography.** Mozambique, with a land-area of 799,380 square kilometres, has a coastline of 2,800 km along the Indian Ocean and 4,330 km of land borders with the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland. Administratively, the country is organized into 11 provinces, 151 districts and 53 municipalities.
23. **Population.** The projections of the 2007 Population Census indicate that in 2016, the population should have reached 26,423,623 inhabitants, 52 per cent of whom are women. The same source indicates that in 2016, 68 per cent of the population would live in the rural areas, while estimates suggest that two thirds of the population lives along the coastal area. The population has been growing at an annual rate of 2.6 per cent and on average, households have 5 members. In rural areas, the median age is about 16 years old, and the total dependency ratio is estimated to be 104 per cent.
24. **Political evolution.** Upon independence in June 1975, the Government of Mozambique opted for developing a centralized planning economic system, whereby the state companies and cooperatives were the key and priority development actors; and construction of communal villages was the basic approach for development in the rural areas. Two years later a civil war erupted, putting the ruling party Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) against the Mozambican National Resistance party (RENAMO). Over 16 years, about 1 million people were killed and millions of people were displaced internally. Another 1.5 million refugees in neighbouring countries formed another serious consequence of the war and many of the existing socio-economic infrastructures were destroyed. The paramount challenges to be faced in October 1992, when the two sides to the civil war signed the Rome General Peace Agreement, were national reconciliation and socio-economic rehabilitation of the whole country.
25. **The current situation** (September 2016). In 2014, in the central region of the country, civil unrest activities by RENAMO started again, representing a threat to security and circulation in some districts of two provinces.<sup>5</sup> In mid-2016, mediators for both parties were appointed and initiated a peace dialogue, whose outcome was still unknown at the time of finalizing this report.
26. In the period 1992-2014, Mozambique witnessed significant economic recovery, with average GDP growth of 7.4 per cent annually and GNI per capita in 2014 reaching US\$630.<sup>6</sup> However, these positive achievements have not triggered significant reductions in poverty, and evidence suggests that economic growth has become less pro-poor over time.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the new coal mining and gas extraction projects that were expected to spur further economic growth were slower than planned in taking off. The country remains in the World Bank low-income group and the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014 was at 0.416. It ranked 180<sup>th</sup> in 2013 out of 188 countries, within the Low Human Development group.
27. Furthermore, since 2015, the Mozambique economy has showed a significant slowdown. The national currency (metical, MZN) depreciated against the United States dollar and other hard currencies, with the exchange rate US\$/MZN going from 31.8 in

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<sup>5</sup> Within IFAD's portfolio, ProPesca and PROAQUA in Sofala and Manica provinces suffered some limitations to their work-plans due to the military instability and tense security situation.

<sup>6</sup> IFAD Rural development portal.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020, Maputo, January 2016.

January 2015 to 49.5 in December 2015, with the annual average at 38.3. The disclosure to international partners in April 2016 of a significant “hidden debt” within national accounts brought to a halt several donors’ programmes, including the World Bank’s budget support programme. A further exchange rate depreciation was registered from December 2015 onward. After achieving a record peak in September 2016, the exchange rate at the time of finalizing this report (January 2017) appeared to be stabilizing around 70 MZN/US\$, an increase of 41 per cent over 12 months. This deterioration was accompanied by a rise in the inflation rate, the national budget deficit and bank interest rates, following successive increases of the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) and Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) rates by the central bank, the Banco de Moçambique. The January 2017 forecast was of persisting macroeconomic instability in the near-term and struggling economic growth, owing to low foreign investment.<sup>8</sup>

28. Lastly, by mid-2016, the whole of the southern Africa region, including the southern provinces of Mozambique, was facing a second year of serious drought attributed to the El Niño phenomenon. The Government of Mozambique had eventually called an emergency appeal, but in the words of some, “a silent humanitarian crisis” was unravelling. A ReliefWeb bulletin in November 2016<sup>9</sup> referred to a food and nutrition report estimating 1.4 million people in a food insecurity situation, with a potential increase to 2.3 million by March 2017. Heavy rains in January 2017 were adding to the plight of people in the southern and central regions.
29. **Poverty and food and nutrition insecurity.** According to the Fourth National Poverty Assessment Report 2014/2015, released in October 2016, welfare levels improved over the period 2008/09,<sup>10</sup> although the gap between rural and urban zones was large and at best, persistent. At the national level, the poverty headcount rate was calculated at 46.1 per cent, five percentage points below the previous measurement. Also, the decline in poverty rates between 2008/09 and 2014/15 has not been sufficient so far to reduce the size of the population in conditions of absolute poverty, which rose again to 11.8 million, similar to the numbers in 1996/97. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020 states that “endemic food insecurity in Mozambique exacerbates a cycle of poverty and malnutrition with high social and economic costs. Over 50 per cent of households are food insecure, 24 per cent chronically, leaving them highly vulnerable to shocks and in turn undermining their production and productivity.”<sup>11</sup>
30. Comparatively, poverty affects rural areas much more (50.1 per cent) than urban areas (37.4 per cent) although rural poverty slightly decreased over time, when compared with the 2008/2009 figure of 53.8 per cent. Also, women are typically more affected by poverty than men; the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2007-2009 (PARPA II) stated that “...families headed by women have a higher incidence of poverty—62.5 per cent compared with 51.9 per cent for families headed by men. The determinants of poverty indicate that high rates of poverty among families headed by women are related to low educational levels, widowhood and high rates of dependency, and incomes too low to meet family needs.”
31. Other relevant indicators<sup>12</sup> were as follows:
  - Illiteracy rate in 2014/2015: 44.9 per cent (30.0 per cent for men and 57.8 per cent for women) with a marked difference between urban areas, at 23.1 per cent; and rural areas, 56.6 per cent;<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 2 February 2017, <http://country.eiu.com/mozambique>.

<sup>9</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-drought-humanitarian-situation-report-october-2016>.

<sup>10</sup> The Third National Poverty Assessment Report assessed the period 2008/2009.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Mozambique, 2017-2020.

<sup>12</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, the source for data in this paragraph was the 2015 Human Development Index.

<sup>13</sup> National Household Income Survey 2014/15, National Institute of Statistics, December 2015.

- Life expectancy at birth: 55.1 years, though 53.6 years for males and 56.5 years for females;
  - Fertility rate: 5.2 births per woman in the period 2010/2015;
  - Chronic undernutrition rate in the country was assessed at 43 per cent,<sup>14</sup> with the central and northern regions comparatively more affected, Cabo Delgado and Nampula being the provinces with the worst indicators. Stunting rates among children below five in 2008-2013 were at a high of 43.1 per cent, lower than the levels recorded in 2002 but higher than in 1997; and
  - Up to 87.8 per cent of workers during the period 2008-2013 could be classified as being in "vulnerable employment", with this share rising to over 90 per cent for women and rural workers.
32. Further, according to the Fourth National Poverty Assessment Report 2014/2015, greater inequality of consumption between urban and rural areas was emerging from all surveys, with a dramatic acceleration of this trend recently.
  33. In rural areas, less access to resources, higher illiteracy rates and lack of decision-making power, especially with regards to food and nutrition security issues, are among the major factors causing the higher vulnerability of women. Agriculture tends to be a female activity, and typically it goes unpaid. Furthermore, violence against women and girls constitute a major restraint to their development, not to mention their human rights.
  34. Mozambique ranks eighth in the world in terms of prevalence of HIV among its adult population. In 2015, overall incidence was estimated at 10.5 per cent, affecting 8.3 per cent of men and 13.3 per cent of women. Although prevalence is higher in urban areas, rural areas are also affected and location is a strong factor in the diffusion of the pandemic, with higher rates of new infections in the southern provinces of the country. The 2010-2019 Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector (PEDSA) identified mitigation of HIV and AIDS as a cross-cutting theme of particular importance for young rural women, in consideration of their role in agricultural development. It also stated that the development of a special agricultural extension programme addressing the needs of women living with AIDS should be a priority for the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA).
  35. Lack of and poor infrastructure and services like access roads, electricity, safe water and telecommunications are some of the factors behind the poorer living standards in rural areas compared to urban areas. These factors contribute, in particular when compounded with others more specific to the agricultural sector discussed below, to low productivity and low volumes of agriculture and fishery products, and consequently low incomes. Low incomes, in turn, affect not only consumption but also investment, which results in low productive capacity. Thus, a vicious cycle of poverty is continuously affecting rural people, calling for an urgent need to break it.
  36. **Natural resources and climate change.** Nationwide, over 82 per cent of jobs depend on Mozambique's natural resources and it is estimated that natural capital contributes up to 50 per cent of GDP.<sup>15</sup> However, agricultural encroachment and unsustainable production of bio-energies (i.e. firewood) are leading to deforestation and soil degradation and further threats to the environment include illegal mining, logging, including its illegal practice, hunting, poaching and overfishing. Major challenges in marine natural resources management (NRM) remain, including coastal erosion, marine habitat degradation, overfishing by unlicensed operators, encroachment by industrial fishing vessels, and a shortage of human resources and infrastructure for implementation of fishery laws and regulations.

<sup>14</sup> Demographic and Health Survey 2011, Technical Secretary for Food Security and Nutrition Baseline Study 2013.

<sup>15</sup> Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Affairs and Poverty and Environment Initiative, Environmental Economic Analysis of Natural Resources Management in Mozambique, 2012.



37. Climate change models indicate an increased likelihood of extreme weather events such as flood, drought and cyclones, leading to severe negative impacts on the agricultural sector in Mozambique. These trends have already altered cropping calendars and seasonal agro-climatic conditions, and will likely continue to do so.
38. **National development policies and strategies.** In 2003, the Government defined its long-term vision for national development with "Agenda 2025 – the Nation's Vision and Strategies", a national multi-stakeholder document "intended to be a guide for the development of Mozambique up to 2025. The Agenda 2025 resulted from a process of dialogue and relentless search of consensus, laid upon a foundation of technical and scientific research." The Agenda was made operational through a series of five-year plans, and several strategies and plans. The Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) was the medium-term strategy of the Government for putting into operation the Five-Year Government Program (2010-2014). It focused on the objective of combating poverty and promoting a culture of work, with a view to achieving inclusive economic growth and reducing poverty and vulnerability in the country.
39. The new Five Year Government Program 2015-2019 set the main goals for the social and economic areas in the current governance cycle; some of the established achievements are:
- (a) Reduction of malnutrition in children under five years of age from 43 to 35 per cent;
  - (b) Increase in fishery production volumes from 254,342 to 402,340 tons;
  - (c) Construction and/or rehabilitation of irrigation perimeters increased from 9,158 to 16,000 hectares;
  - (d) Construction of working fish markets increased from 11 to 43 units; and
  - (e) Reduction of households facing chronic food insecurity from 24 to 16 per cent.
40. In order to reinforce its commitment to meet improved nutrition-related goals, the Government also approved a Multi-sectoral Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition in Mozambique (PAMRDC) 2011-2020.
41. **Agricultural development.** The country has a total of 36 million hectares of arable land, out of which 5.1 million hectares (14.2 per cent) are cultivated.<sup>16</sup> Agriculture accounted for 25.2 per cent of GDP in 2015;<sup>17</sup> in 2014, the sector experienced a growth rate of 4.6 per cent. Main crops cultivated are maize, rice, millet, sorghum, cassava, beans, Irish potato, sweet potato (including the orange flesh sweet potato), groundnut, sunflower, sesame, soybeans, vegetables, banana, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, cashew, coconut and fruit. The country is self-sufficient in maize, sorghum, cassava, beans and sweet potatoes and cereal imports mainly consist of rice and wheat. A variety of agricultural products and food, including vegetables, fruit and red meats, are also imported to meet the demand from the Maputo market, approximately 1.2 million people.
42. Agriculture employs 81 per cent of the labour force, and the majority (54.78 per cent) of family households in 2014 worked in agriculture, including livestock, as their main activity. There are 4.4 million agricultural holdings in the country, out of which 4.2 million (98.9 per cent) are small and cultivate on average 0.5 to 1.5 hectare; 45,320 (1.1 per cent) are medium and 626 (0.02 per cent) are large. The 2009/2010 Agriculture and Livestock Census found that 72.5 per cent of agricultural holdings are headed by men and 27.5 per cent by women. As the size of the agricultural holdings increases, the proportion of holdings run by family households headed by women decreases.

<sup>16</sup> Statistics Year-Book 2012-2014, National Institute for Statistics (INE).

<sup>17</sup> World Bank, World Development Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>.

43. Smallholder farmers account for more than 80 per cent of food crops production, although less than 10 per cent of the households market their surpluses.<sup>18</sup> Cross-border trade has a significant impact in agricultural marketing for those districts along the borders with neighbouring countries, especially Malawi. Contract farming, involving smallholder farmers and private companies, has shown a steady increase in past years. Major crops grown under contract farming schemes so far have been cotton, tobacco, sugarcane and soybean.
44. Cattle, pigs, small ruminants and chicken are the main livestock species raised in the country, bred for meat, dairy products and eggs. Smallholder farmers tend to keep their stock, particularly cattle, pigs, goats and sheep, as a security reserve to be sold/used at moments of financial crisis or pressing needs. Cattle and pigs are, to some extent, raised by better-off farmers or breeders, whereas chicken is the most commonly raised livestock species.
45. Major constraints to agricultural development which affect particularly smallholder farmers have been the limited access to improved inputs and credit services; low genetic quality of breeding animals; fragile network of veterinary services; limited infrastructures for watering and managing animals, especially cattle; limited mechanization services; lack of irrigation; lack of storage facilities; high post-harvest losses; lack of transportation means; prevalence of poor market linkages; and inexistent or poor access roads, especially feeder roads. The country also has an irrigation potential of 3 million hectares, but only 4 per cent of these have irrigation infrastructure, and only approximately 2 per cent were in operation in 2015/2016.
46. The Government adopted PEDSA 2011-2020, as the strategic guide for medium- to long-term agricultural development.<sup>19</sup> PEDSA also represents the Mozambique implementation plan for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme and for the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Regional Agricultural Policy.<sup>20</sup> Its strategic objective is defined as "Contribute to the food security and incomes of agricultural producers, through a competitive and sustainable approach that ensures social and gender equity."
47. PEDSA takes into consideration all activities linked to: (a) technology generation and transfer and provision of agricultural inputs; (b) agricultural production; (c) processing and marketing activities that add value to agricultural, livestock, forest and wildlife products; and (d) sustainable management of natural resources. The strategy also identified six agricultural development corridors (Maputo, Limpopo, Beira, Zambeze Valley, Nacala and Pemba-Lichinga) and selected priority crops in each whose production and marketing should be given more attention.
48. In other words, the goal is to transform subsistence agriculture into a competitive sector fully integrated into market mechanisms. Value chain development is a recurrent objective and expected result of many of the strategies underpinning PEDSA, and of PEDSA itself. Furthermore, the strategy includes among its expected results, the "development of the institutional capacity of the Agricultural Extension Service, in view of improving access to effective and advanced technologies." The establishment and functioning of the National Agricultural Extension Service (NAES) are considered responsibility of the Government, and the development of the NAES was a priority of the 2010-2014 Government Five-Year Plan. The Government also

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<sup>18</sup> World Bank, Mozambique Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment, 2015.

<sup>19</sup> For the current decade PEDSA integrates seven key documents that define the goals and overall framework for the agricultural sector, namely the 1996 Agricultural Policy and Implementation Strategy (PAEI), the Absolute Poverty Reduction Action Plan 2001-2009 (PARPA); the Government Five-year Plan 2010-2014; the Green Revolution Strategy; the Food Production Action Plan (PAPA); the Rural Development Strategy (EDR); and the Food and Nutrition Security Strategy.

<sup>20</sup> CAADP is an initiative of the African Union and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), it represents a fundamental shift toward development that is fully owned and led by African governments. (<http://www.nepad-aadp.net/>). The SADC RAP was approved by all SADC members in 2013 ([http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/Policy\\_Dialogue/Regional\\_Agricultural\\_Policy\\_SADC.Policy\\_Dialoguef](http://www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/Policy_Dialogue/Regional_Agricultural_Policy_SADC.Policy_Dialoguef)).

approved the Extension Master Plan 2007-2016 to provide a strategic and operational orientation to agricultural extension interventions.

49. Further, a National Irrigation Strategy 2011-2019 was approved with the aim of increasing agricultural productivity and production. The strategy foresees that the total irrigated land will be doubled in the central provinces of Sofala, Manica and Zambezia, from 60,000 hectares to 113,000 hectares by 2019.
50. With respect to national resources and the environment, the Government of Mozambique launched a Green Economy Roadmap in 2012. This encompasses low carbon emission, green societies, sustainable development, and ecological scarcities, with an overall objective of guiding the integration of policies and practices into environmental sustainable planning and make Mozambique an inclusive middle-income country, based on the protection, restoration, and sustainable use of natural capital and ecosystem services, ensuring efficient and inclusive development.
51. **Access to land and its tenure.** All land in Mozambique was nationalized after independence in 1975 and belongs to the state. The law recognizes as "existing rights" the occupation of land by local communities or individuals, following customary norms and practices, and occupation in good faith by individuals for a period of at least 10 years. These arrangements are the closest to land titles, as recognized in other countries, and are called DUATs (the acronym for land use and utilization rights in Portuguese). An inventory based on cadastral information revealed that, by early 2009, less than 10 per cent of rural communities, covering less than 10 per cent of the national territory, had been mapped and assigned relevant DUATs.
52. Improving and securing access to land of communities and smallholders has been an issue of concern of some partners of Mozambique for many years. In 2014, an International Monetary Fund publication wrote that "Community land tenure should be strengthened, particularly given the rising global interest in farmland".<sup>21</sup> The national Land Law (Lei das Terras) is internationally regarded as a highly positive legislation on land tenure. Nevertheless, underfunding of the governance mechanism for DUATs attribution, and consequent weaknesses and failures in the process, have led to a rise in conflicts around land, between external investors, individuals and communities. With support from development partners, in 2016 the Government launched the Secure Land Programme (Programa Terra Segura), with the highly ambitious goal of issuing five million DUATs over the next five years. Also, the Government committed to adhere to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security,<sup>22</sup> adopted by the Committee on World Food Security in May 2012, and will also consider the Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment produced by several international organizations and endorsed by, among others, the G8 and G20.
53. **The fishery and aquaculture sector** in Mozambique is characterized by semi- and industrial fleets (vessels >10m), whose catches (shrimp mainly) are directly exported. Small-scale/artisanal fishing (vessels <10m, canoes mostly), provides the bulk of catches (91 per cent), which however are not closely monitored. Although smaller in terms of value, the catch from artisanal fisheries plays an important role in domestic consumption and food security in both coastal and inland areas. In 2014, about 334,000 people, or 1.4 per cent of the population, was estimated to depend directly or indirectly on artisanal fisheries, a threefold increase from the previous census in 2002; the contribution of the sector to the national GDP is estimated to be in the range of 2-3 per cent.
54. The sector faces challenges typical of fisheries in a low-income country context, which successive projects have aimed to address:

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<sup>21</sup> Mozambique Rising, International Monetary Fund, 2014.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/>.

- Artisanal fishing communities are considered among the poorest in the country and suffer from isolation and lack of access to basic facilities;
  - The coastal areas are overfished, as large numbers of small-scale fishers still use under-sized mesh nets to catch mainly small pelagic fish – in high demand in the market. There is a general lack of awareness about sustainable fishing practices and small-scale fishers compete for resources, at a disadvantage, with semi- and industrial fishers;
  - Post-harvest losses are very large;
  - The capacity of governmental institutions in supporting the sustainable management of the sector and its potential contribution to human and ecological wellbeing is weak; and
  - There are untapped fisheries resources further out in the open sea; successive fisheries projects have aimed at enabling their exploitation, by facilitating the access of small-scale operators to adequate fishing technology, skills and financial and credit resources.
55. The Fisheries Sector Master Plan, enacted in 1996, sets out the Government's policy and strategy for the improvement of the fishery sector and defined the typologies of fisheries (artisanal, semi-industrial and industrial) by species, vessel size, and other specifications related to fisheries. Since the establishment of a dedicated Ministry of Fisheries at central level in 2000, Directorates of Fisheries and delegations of the various specialized institutes under the Ministry have been established at provincial level, as part of the governmental decentralization policy. Furthermore, in 2006 the Government approved the Strategic Plan for Artisanal Fisheries Sector (PESPA) 2006-2015, developed with IFAD's support as discussed later in the report, which represented a milestone in the development of artisanal fisheries. Also, in 2010 the 1996 plan was revised and replaced by the Fisheries Master Plan II which was currently in use.
56. Fresh-water aquaculture is considered to hold significant development potential in several areas of the country. The Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries (MIMAIP) aims at upgrading the activity out of subsistence and transform it into a commercial activity through the establishment of aqua-parks in strategic locations. This would allow economies of scale upstream and downstream. In 2016, the Ministry prepared a very ambitious, ten-year horizon National Plan of Aquaculture, for discussion with partners before submitting it for approval to the Council of Ministers.
57. Within a rather complex sectoral and subsectoral institutional set-up, the newly formed Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDEPA), the executing agency of IFAD-supported fisheries projects, is responsible for the promotion of artisanal fisheries and aquaculture and the improvement of livelihoods in fishing communities.
58. **Rural finance sector:** access to appropriate rural finance services is vital for uplifting people out of poverty by stimulating investment, boosting the productive capacity and increasing incomes. In 2003, Agenda 2025 already mentioned that "Special credit lines should be reserved for activities that are currently not eligible to the banking sector for being high-risk activities", and rural finance development has been systematically included in all national strategies and plans since. For example, one of the strategic objectives of PARP 2011-2014 was "Facilitate access to financial services in rural areas, ensuring better scope for women." Nevertheless, progress made in developing a rural finance sector in the country has fallen short of expectations.
59. As of 2015, in Mozambique there were: 18 banks, 11 micro banks, 9 credit cooperatives, 2 electronic money institutions, 12 saving and credit organizations and 330 microcredit institutions, but unfortunately 70 of the 151 districts in the country had no banks. Commercial banks were still reluctant to expand into rural areas due to the lack of reliable infrastructures (access roads, electricity, telecommunications), a

dispersed clientele, and the risks implicit in engaging in lending to the small-scale agriculture and artisanal fisheries sectors, due to the vulnerability of the activities and the length of production cycles. With a view to extending the coverage of rural areas with banking institutions, the Government and four commercial banks (Millennium Bim, BCI, Mozabanco and Nosso Banco) had recently signed a memorandum of understanding which under the slogan "one district, one bank" should ensure that by 2019 all districts in the country will be served by commercial banks.

60. For the period under evaluation, about 90 per cent of the population had no account with a formal financial institution and the access rate to rural credit was 3 per cent. Additional challenges for smallholder farmers and artisanal fishermen included illiteracy; lack of collateral – which was always obligatory; and their limited knowledge of business and loan management.
61. In 1999, the NGO CARE introduced the accumulative savings and credit associations (ASCAs) in Mozambique from a model adapted from a previous experience in Niger, through the IFAD-supported Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project (PPAN). The goal was to meet the needs of the target population (especially women) who demanded solutions to keep their savings and get access to credit. Since then, ASCAs have been established and supported all over the country through NGOs and other organizations, including IFAD projects. Through ASCAs, people with limited financial resources and no access to the formal banking system due to geographical location and/or lack of collateral, have an incentive to save, can develop their financial literacy and have access to short-term loans to meet their consumption and some of their investment needs. At the same time, ASCAs are not suitable tools for agricultural credit, given the small size of monthly loans and the high interest rates, typically 10 per cent per month.
62. In 2011, the Government approved the Rural Finance Strategy (EFR) as a tool to orient and mobilize synergies and resources for provision of financial resources in rural zones. Its fundamental objective is to promote the creation and consolidation of an inclusive financial system in rural zones that is able to support and leverage the economic and social development, ultimately aiming to improve social welfare. In the current governance cycle, the responsibility for implementing the strategy lies with the Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER).
63. A National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2016-2022 was issued in 2016. Its objective is to offer structured and logic policy measures and priority actions, involving all similar sectors, with a view to take significant steps in the process of building a financially inclusive society in Mozambique, as well as setting up a follow-up, evaluation and monitoring methodology and a coordination structure among the various actors in the financial sector.
64. **Official development assistance (ODA).** Since independence, the country has benefited from ODA. Key partners include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the EU, several agencies of the United Nations, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), along with many of the bilateral cooperation agencies.
65. Historically, ODA has financed a substantial proportion of the national public budget, albeit the declining trend in the recent past. In 2008, almost 56 per cent of the Government's budget was financed through ODA, while the share decreased to 42 per cent in 2011 and 31 per cent in 2014. Between 2009 and 2014, Mozambique received about US\$8.5 billion and in 2014, it was the seventh largest recipient of ODA in sub-Saharan Africa. The average inflow of ODA into agriculture and rural development in 2012-2013 was US\$133 million, representing approximately 6 per cent of total ODA inflow. IFAD's average disbursement in 2012-2013 was US\$15.7 million, close to 12 per cent of total ODA to agriculture to Mozambique in the same period.

66. ODA in Mozambique was characterized for a long time by a strong push towards harmonizing Government's and donors' efforts, with some of the first international initiatives in sectoral budget support in the late 1990s. In the 2000s, several partners in the agricultural sector joined resources and established PROAGRI, a budget support programme for agriculture and food security. PROAGRI came to an end around 2010, but in other areas, for example education, budget support remains a common approach for bilateral donors up to the present day.

## B. IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

67. **COSOPs in Mozambique.** IFAD produced its first COSOP for Mozambique in 1997, the second in 2000 and the third in 2004. The fourth and current COSOP was approved in September 2011, hereinafter called 2011 COSOP, with an initial timespan of five years; it was the first results-based COSOP, jointly signed by the Government of Mozambique and IFAD. In 2014, the COSOP Annual Review recommended extending the validity of the 2011 COSOP by three years, until 2018. At the time of writing this report, it was foreseen that the fifth COSOP would be ready for approval in late 2017.
68. A comparison between key aspects of the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs are shown below in table 2.

Table 2

**Main elements of the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs logical/management frameworks for comparison**

<i>Issue</i>	<i>2004 COSOP</i>	<i>2011 COSOP</i>
<b>Strategic goal</b>	To empower the rural poor so that they can reduce their poverty	Contribute to the first objective of PARP, to increase the production and productivity of agriculture and fisheries, and support the implementation of sectoral strategies for agriculture, artisanal fisheries and rural finance
<b>Objective</b>	To develop coherent and supportive national policies and a conducive institutional framework for smallholder development	To facilitate the integration of small producers (smallholders and artisanal fishers) into profitable and accessible markets
<b>Strategic objectives (strategic focus in 2004)</b>	<p>A. Increased income for the rural poor through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• agricultural production</li> <li>• technology/knowledge</li> <li>• marketing and the private sector</li> <li>• access to finance</li> </ul> <p>B. Empowerment of the rural poor through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• grass-roots organization</li> <li>• partnerships</li> <li>• participation</li> <li>• decentralization</li> </ul> <p>C. Cross-cutting issues</p> <p>Mainstreaming of gender in programmes through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• gender balance</li> <li>• equity in access</li> <li>• participation</li> </ul> <p>Mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS issues in rural development programmes through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prevention</li> <li>• information</li> </ul>	<p>The access of smallholders and artisanal fishers to production factors, technologies and resources is increased</p> <p>The access and participation of smallholders and artisanal fishers to markets that can bring them equitable shares of profit are increased</p> <p>The availability of and access to appropriate and sustainable financial services in rural areas are increased</p>

<i>Issue</i>	<i>2004 COSOP</i>	<i>2011 COSOP</i>
<b>Geographic priority</b>	No geographic emphasis	IFAD will continue to focus on geographic areas with a high incidence of poverty, but within these areas, due attention will be given to issues such as demographic density, agroecological potential and reasonable access, which are likely to affect the potential for market integration and the efficiency of provision of services
<b>Subsector/ thematic focus</b>	<p>Increase marketable production</p> <p>Develop linkages with private-sector operators for input supply and marketing</p> <p>Enhance sustainable access to financial services</p> <p>Empowerment of the rural poor and strengthening of their organizations</p>	<p>(i) Access to technologies and production support services; (ii) Mitigation of the impact of climate risk; (iii) Promotion of secure rights of use and management of key natural resources</p> <p>(i) Development of economic infrastructure for post-harvest storage and conservation, processing and marketing; (ii) Enhancement of the efficiency of market intermediaries, (iii) Development of equitable business partnerships between small-scale producers and agribusinesses</p> <p>(i) Fostering an institutional and policy environment that is conducive to the development of sustainable rural financial services; (ii) Promotion of savings and credit groups and other similar arrangements, from grass roots to second- and third-tier institutions; (iii) Support to the expansion of formal financial institutions to rural areas; and (iv) Expansion of the range of financial products and services to meet increasingly diversified needs</p> <p>An inclusive value chain approach will be adopted, ensuring that small-scale producers take part in the development of the whole chain to maximize their benefits. Interventions will focus on those crops and products that are produced by large numbers of small-scale producers and that have the most potential to bring them larger shares of profits and better income</p>
<b>Opportunities for innovation</b>	See cross-cutting issues above	Financial products; higher-level financial institutions grouping savings and credit associations; sustainable networks of agri-dealers; public/private partnerships for extension service delivery; inclusive business partnerships
<b>Target groups and targeting approach</b>	Rural poor, smallholders and artisanal fishers	Economically active poor, through an inclusive and dynamic approach, by facilitating participation of disadvantaged categories and close monitoring
<b>Gender dimension</b>	See cross-cutting issues above	Every project will be required to prepare a gender strategy. Request for Gender-disaggregated M&E indicators
<b>Country programme management</b>	Regular annual COSOP reviews and MTRs	<p>COSOP management, through new M&amp;E system based on project M&amp;E systems; annual reviews with the Country Programme Team; mid-term review to be conducted in 2013 and final completion review in 2015</p> <p>Programme management: Country Programme Team responsible for regular programme monitoring and management and strengthen programme coherence. A Programme Support Group to be established to provide support on fiduciary aspects, M&amp;E and knowledge management</p> <p>Strengthening of IFAD Country Office</p>

69. The 2004 COSOP objective to increase incomes through improved access to technology, inputs, markets and financial services, i.e. to the three inter-linked and complementary pillars of a sustainable value chain, was strongly embedded in an explicit commitment to alleviating various dimensions of rural poverty, including through up-front attention to gender equality and vulnerability caused, among others, by HIV and AIDS.
70. While the 2004 COSOP was still operational, three of the four loans that were ongoing at the time of the CSPE, namely PROMER, ProPesca and PRONEA Support Project

(PSP), were designed and approved.<sup>23</sup> This meant that the 2011 COSOP broadly reflected the thrust of the loans approved by the Board between 2006 and 2010 and that were going to be implemented during the new COSOP period. In addition, the hypothesis that the COSOP formulation was significantly influenced by the promising national background of a strong, decade-long economic growth, appeared to be legitimate according to many stakeholders.

71. The 2011 COSOP was finalized after the Council of Ministers approved the PARP 2010-2014. Its focus, moving away from the earlier broad "community-managed development" model that also made room for integration into markets, shifted towards a model of intervention focused on individual entrepreneurship and "business development services". The target group of "the economically active poor",<sup>24</sup> also defined as "small-scale producers who have the potential to expand and commercialize their activities", was to be integrated into local and national markets, following approaches of "trickle down" and "pull of the poorer from above". Within this view, attention to the more vulnerable was planned to come through project-level strategies for inclusiveness and gender equality. One of the basic assumptions underpinning the programme was the establishment of a robust programme monitoring, coordination and knowledge management mechanism. Lastly, neither COSOP made any commitment nor included food security and nutrition in the respective frameworks; this despite the fact that both concepts were well embedded in the corporate narratives and frameworks since 2002 and became explicit elements of IFAD's goal in 2011.
72. **Lessons from previous IOE evaluations.** In 2010, IOE finalized a country programme evaluation (CPE) that covered the period 2000-2009 of cooperation with Mozambique, during which the IFAD-funded project portfolio had focused on five broad thematic areas: (i) primary production and fishing; (ii) commercialization and market linkages, including feeder roads; (iii) rural finance; (iv) social infrastructure; and (v) institutions and policies. In geographic terms, projects were concentrated in the provinces north of the Zambezi River.
73. The overall loan portfolio achievements were assessed as "moderately satisfactory but mixed". Positive achievements included linking the rural poor to markets and provision of rural credit and savings through ASCAs. Main weaknesses related to limited impacts on social capital and empowerment, and on natural resources and the environment, as well as to poor sustainability. The assessment for non-lending activities was moderately satisfactory overall and the CPE found that the position of country programme officer, created in 2003, had been instrumental in developing partnerships with civil society, and with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in the context of the UN Delivering as One initiative. Overall, the performance of the country programme was assessed as moderately satisfactory. Recommendations can be summarized as follows:
  - (a) Maintain the current goal and strategic thrusts and strive to ensure the integration of the three programmatic pillars: (i) increasing surplus production and its value; (ii) developing agribusiness small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and smallholder organizations as well as market linkages; and (iii) enhancing the access to finance of smallholders and SMEs;

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<sup>23</sup> IFAD Board approved the support to the National Agricultural Extension Programme (PRONEA) in 2006; in 2011, the MTR partly reformulated the initial project and re-named it PRONEA Support Project (PSP). As the reformulation mostly focused on the institutional set-up, objectives and approach in 2016 largely continued to be those of the 2006 project design report.

<sup>24</sup> According to the IFAD policy on targeting and IFAD Strategic Framework 2011-2015, the economically active poor are "Rural people who are living in poverty and experiencing food insecurity, and who are able to take advantage of the opportunities to be offered".



- (b) Develop and implement an innovation agenda and a scaling-up strategy, adapted to realities in the field, and dedicate resources and efforts to policy dialogue, knowledge management, and building partnerships.
  - (c) Develop a more articulated targeting strategy, giving priority to interventions that directly support more disadvantaged areas and provinces rather than interventions that only support general capacity development of central institutions. Expansion to the provinces in the south was suggested where evidence showed that poverty was increasing. The recommendation also stressed the need to make strategies for gender equality and HIV/AIDS more operational.
  - (d) Engage private and civil society organizations as component implementers when they are better positioned than governmental organizations to deliver the required services; the option to gradually assign implementation responsibility for programme components to private and civil society organizations was also suggested.
  - (e) With a view to strengthening both development effectiveness and non-lending activities, establish a permanent and well-resourced country presence in Mozambique, possibly including an out-posted CPM.
74. The five recommendations were accepted in the Agreement at Completion Point and as such, included as an annex to the 2011 COSOP. However, the COSOP itself left out the recommended attention to targeting and operational strategies for HIV/AIDS.
75. **The total envelope of IFAD-supported projects** since 1983 amounts to approximately US\$394.6 million, approximately 61 per cent of which was provided through highly concessional loans and associated grants, 27 per cent through partners' cofinancing, and 12 per cent from the Government and beneficiaries. During the period under evaluation, IFAD provided financial resources for six loans, for a total expected cost of US\$261 million; all were medium-sized projects, with a budget range of US\$23-54 million. This was a significant scale up of commitment for IFAD, when compared to the period 1983-2009, during which six loans were operational over 17 years, for a total cost of approximately US\$126 million; and budget range was US\$11-28 million. The average duration of projects implemented in the period 1983-2009 was 7.4 years;<sup>25</sup> for projects that were completed or will come to completion from 2010 onward, the average duration was 7.7 years so far, if the entry-into-force of the PSP with a revised design is set in January 2012.<sup>26</sup> Table 3 shows the key features of the IFAD portfolio in Mozambique since 1983.

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<sup>25</sup> This was calculated taking into consideration the entry-into-force/effectiveness date and the completion date.

<sup>26</sup> Alternatively, if the original entry-into-force date for PRONEA is used, the average duration of loans that completed or will come to completion from 2010 onward, will increase to 8.4 years. Furthermore, if PROMER is extended as planned, average duration will increase further.

Table 3  
**A snapshot of IFAD's operations in Mozambique since 1983**

Number of approved loans	12
Number of ongoing loans	4
Total amount of IFAD lending	US\$239 million
Total amount of counterpart funding (Government of Mozambique and beneficiaries)	US\$46.9 million
Total amount of co/parallel financing amount	US\$108 million
Total portfolio cost	US\$394.6 million
Lending terms	Highly concessional
Focus of operations	Value chain development through economically active poor in the agricultural and artisanal fisheries sector
Main cofinanciers	African Development Bank, Belgian Facility for Food Security, European Union, OPEC Fund for International Development, Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund (Spanish Trust Fund)
COSOPs	1997-1999; 2000-2003; 2004-2010; 2011-ongoing
Country office in Mozambique	Yes
Number of CPMs in last 10 years	5
Main government partners	Ministry of Economy and Finance, National Directorate for Treasure

76. Also in terms of leveraging capacity of additional financial resources, a significant shift took place: during the period 1983-2009, IFAD provided 72 per cent of the required resources, with 9 per cent from other partners. Since 2010, IFAD's contribution represented 51 per cent of total required resources, but a much larger contribution came from other partners – 39.5 per cent. If "linked grants" by other partners are added to the latter figure, the share of cofinancing goes up to 39.8 per cent; further, when all national grants are included, cofinancing represents 41.6 of the total. Planned contributions from participants and beneficiaries also increased between the two periods, from 1.6 to 2.5 per cent, whereas governmental share went from 17 per cent in the first period, to 7.3 per cent in the second period. Table 4 shows these values.

Table 4  
**Financial resources for IFAD-supported projects (United States dollars)**

	<i>Total cost</i>	<i>IFAD's contribution</i>	<i>Cofinancing</i>	<i>Government's contribution</i>	<i>Beneficiaries' contribution</i>
Total loans 1983-2009	126 849 596	91 898 253	11 088 000	21 863 343	2 000 000
		72.4%	8.7%	17.3%	1.6%
Total loans 2010-2019, plus linked grants	261 645 499	147 410 152	91 680 947	16 999 118	5 555 282
		56.3%	35/	6.5%	2.2%
Total 2010-2019, all loans and grants	267 775 398	147 693 668	97 041 547	17 484 901	5 555 282
		55.2%	36.2%	6.5%	2.1%


Sources: IFAD corporate system, March 2017.

77. **IFAD-supported investment by component.** Component shares in the portfolio supported by IFAD in Mozambique over the last 15 years are shown in figure 1. The

largest investment has been in the project management, institutional and policy support component (29 per cent);<sup>27</sup> followed by business development (19 per cent), rural finance (14 per cent), and rural infrastructure (13 per cent). Other important components are food and animal production (8 per cent), technology (7 per cent) and fishery, including capture, processing and resource management (6 per cent).

Figure 1

**IFAD-supported investment in Mozambique 2001-2016 by component**



78. The expansion of the portfolio also corresponded to an expansion of the geographical scope of IFAD-supported interventions as suggested in the 2010 CPE. In the current portfolio, two projects, namely PSP and ProPesca were addressing the national level; PROMER was working in the northern region; and PROSUL in the southern region. In all provinces, districts with the highest potential for production and marketing growth were selected. Three of the loans, namely PROMER; ProPesca and PROSUL were focused on value chain development; and PSP was strengthening the capacity of the National Agriculture Extension System. Brief profiles of the loans and grants initiatives analysed by this CSPE are included here below.
79. Since 2008, IFAD supervised directly all projects under implementation, taking over from UNOPS following the relevant corporate decision. Main implementing partners in the Government are MASA, the Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development and the Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries. The core responsibility for IFAD's programme in the country rests with the National Directorate of Treasure in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).

### Loans

80. The **Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (SBAFP/PPABS)** was approved by the Executive Board in September 2001, became effective one year later and came to completion in March 2011. The total cost was almost US\$33 million, with IFAD contributing 54 per cent of the total; the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 24 per cent; the Belgian Survival Fund, 10 per cent; the Government, 10 per cent; and beneficiaries, 1 per cent. The project worked on the Sofala Bank fisheries, which occupies the central-northern coast of the country, and supported the management of artisanal fisheries and the development of community socio-economic infrastructures.
81. The **Rural Finance Support Project (RFSP/PAFIR)** was approved by the Executive Board in December 2003 and came into force in July 2005. The total cost was US\$34.3 million, with IFAD contributing 27.6 per cent; the African Development Bank,

<sup>27</sup> It is important to clarify that this percentage does not represent the total management cost percentage, however it is included as part of this component.

63.5 per cent; the Government, 5.7 per cent; other national organizations, 2.4 per cent; and beneficiaries 0.8 per cent. The project aimed to establish an effective rural finance system at the national level, which in turn should have provided rural financial services to the new value chain focused projects. Due to allegations of embezzlement that were not confirmed by an audit, IFAD decided not to extend the project beyond its original completion date of September 2013.

82. The **Agricultural Support Programme** was approved by the Executive Board in November 2006, representing IFAD's contribution to the implementation of the National Agricultural Extension Programme (PRONEA) through the sectoral budget support programme PROAGRI. The project became effective in November 2007 and was due for completion in December 2015. The project was re-formulated in late 2011 to adjust to the winding down of PROAGRI and was renamed PRONEA Support Programme (PSP); new entry-into force was January 2012 and completion date at the time of writing was December 2017. The total cost was calculated at US\$25.2 million, 79.2 per cent provided by IFAD; 9.1 per cent by the Government; 4 per cent by private sector organizations; and 1.8 per cent by beneficiaries. In addition, the EU provided additional funds, representing 5.9 per cent of the new total budget, through the Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1C in Mozambique – IFAD Sub-Programme (MDG1c), which became operational for the PSP in July 2014, with the objective of outsourcing extension work, including rural radio extension programmes. In operation since 2012, the PSP covers 42 districts, across all provinces in the country.
83. The **Rural Markets Promotion Project** (PROMER) was approved by the Executive Board in September 2008 and came into force in April 2009, with original completion planned for June 2016. A first extension brought completion to June 2018 and additional funds were provided by the EU, through the MDG1c grant since January 2014, to expand project activities, integrate a nutritional education component and support the IFAD Sub-Programme Coordination Unit (SPCU) in the MEF/Directorate of Treasure (DNT). In December 2015, the Executive Board approved a top-up loan of US\$25 million, as well as a project extension of four years. As of March 2017, the budget was US\$65.5 million, with IFAD's contribution representing 85.6 per cent; the EU, 5.4 per cent; the Government, 4.4 per cent; and beneficiaries, 4.7 per cent. The project was developed as a follow-up to a seven-year project in support of the Agricultural Markets Support Programme, which came to completion in mid-2008. PROMER focuses on integrating farmers' associations and producers' groups into the market, by developing value chains and contributing to bridging the gaps between producers and traders. It operates in four provinces and 25 districts in the northern region of the country.
84. The **Artisanal Fisheries Promotion Project** (ProPesca) was approved by the Executive Board in December 2010 and came into force in March 2011. The original, and current completion date is March 2018. Current budget is estimated at US\$58.6 million, with IFAD's contribution representing 36 per cent and the Government's contribution is 8 per cent. Additional funds to the original budget were provided by: the EU, 28 per cent of the total, through the MDG1c grant since January 2014, to integrate a nutritional education component; and by OFID, 23 per cent of the total, mostly for road rehabilitation and electrification of marketing sites; and 6 per cent, other domestic contributions. The project focuses on developing value chains for the artisanal fisheries sector and operates in selected Growth Poles located in all coastal provinces. It was and is supported by two grants, both funded by the Belgian Facility for Food Security (BFFS): the Coastal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Nutrition Improvement Project (CHAPANI), with a budget of EUR 500,000, operational in the period May 2012-October 2015; and the Strengthening Artisanal Fishers'

Resource Rights Project (ProDIRPA), with a budget of US\$623,347, which started in December 2013 and was due for completion in December 2016.<sup>28</sup>

85. The **Pro-Poor Value Chain Development in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors** (PROSUL) was approved by the Executive Board in September 2012, the only project approved after the current COSOP was signed. It came into force in October 2012 and the expected completion date is December 2019.<sup>29</sup> Current budget is estimated at almost US\$45 million, with IFAD's contribution, both loan and grant, representing 51 per cent; the Government, 5.5 per cent; and beneficiaries' contribution, 3 per cent. Additional funds were provided by the Spanish Trust Fund through IFAD, 36.3 per cent; the UN Commodity Development Fund, 0.3 per cent; and national private investors, 4.2 per cent. The project focuses on supporting three value chains, namely horticulture, red meats and cassava, and intervenes in 19 districts in the three southern provinces of the country.

#### **Grants**

86. The **Community Investor Partnership Project** was approved by the Executive Board in August 2010, came into force in March 2011 and was completed in December 2013, with contributions from IFAD, the Netherlands and FAO for a total amount of almost US\$ 1.6 million. The project contributed to a wider national programme and aimed at developing community-investors partnerships, through participatory approaches, to secure investments and improve livelihoods. This grant was not linked to any IFAD-supported loan.
87. The **Coastal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Nutrition Improvement Project** CHAPANI was approved and came into force in May 2012, and completed in October 2015. The project was implemented by the NGO *Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo* under the umbrella of ProPesca, with funds from the Belgian Facility for Food Security for a total of EUR 500,000. The project aimed to improve food security and the livelihoods of households involved in artisanal fisheries by reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and malnutrition among fishing communities.
88. The **Securing Artisanal Fishers' Resource Rights Project** (ProDIRPA) was approved and came into force in December 2013 and its completion was planned, at the time of writing this report, for December 2016, although a one-year extension had been requested. The project was being implemented under the ProPesca umbrella, with funds from the Belgian Facility for Food Security for a total of US\$623,347. Executed by the national IDEPA, its objective was to support mapping marine and land natural resource use in coastal areas.
89. The **Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1C in Mozambique - IFAD Sub-Programme** (MDG1C) was approved by the Executive Board and came into force in June 2013, with completion planned for 2018. The project was funded as part of a EU grant programme to the three Rome-based agencies in Mozambique, for a total value of EUR 67 million, plus EUR 10 million from the Government of Mozambique, to support the country to achieve Millennium Development Goal 1c.<sup>30</sup> The IFAD subcomponent initially was EUR 25.9 million from the EU and EUR 4.4 million from the Government of Mozambique in taxes and duties. The main purpose was to expand the work of three IFAD projects (PSP, ProPesca and PROMER), and integrate a nutrition component in ProPesca and PROMER. An EU MTR in 2015 re-allocated resources across Rome-based agencies (of the United Nations: FAO, IFAD and WFP) and components, also drawing from contingencies, and approved an increase of resources for the IFAD subcomponent.

<sup>28</sup> A no-cost extension was requested, but no reply had been received as of August 2016.

<sup>29</sup> This was the only project in the portfolio that had not gone through the MTR, hence it was scored only for its relevance.

<sup>30</sup> MDG 1: Eradicate extreme Poverty and Hunger; Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Source: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml>.

90. The **Project for Promotion of Small-scale Aquaculture** (PROAQUA), was approved by the Executive Board and came into force together with the EU-funded MDG1c programme in June 2013, with a total budget of US\$3.4 million. Its planned completion date was set for June 2017 at the time of writing this report; as of July 2016, its total execution rate was 36.6 per cent and a one-year no-cost extension had been requested; no decision had been made in this regard by the time of the CSPE. Executed by the National Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture, the project had started as a small-scale aquaculture development for food security initiative and was shifting towards a pilot initiative to test economically viable approaches to aquaculture.
91. **The performance-based allocation system.** The period under evaluation covers four complete performance-based allocation system (PBAS) cycles. The average allocation between 2004 and 2015 included, was US\$10,07 million per year and all loans were granted on highly concessional terms.
92. Table 5 shows the allocations to Mozambique since 2004. The main reason for variations in PBAS allocations were due to changes in the total amount of resources IFAD allocated to partner countries through the PBAS. Other possible factors could be changes in the country's situation, e.g. population and GDP. In the case of Mozambique, variations in allocated amounts were consistent with the overall variations of PBAS allocations.

Table 5

**Performance-based allocations to Mozambique  
(Millions of United States dollars)**

<i>PBAS cycle</i>	<i>2004-2006</i>	<i>2007-2009</i>	<i>2010-2012</i>	<i>2013-2015</i>	<i>2016-2018*</i>
<b>Allocations</b>	13.17	31.23	38.89	37.62	50.09

\*2016-2018 allocation is not final (given that the allocation for 2017 and 2018 are indicative).

### Key points

- In Mozambique, 68 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. In 2014, agriculture accounted for 31.8 per cent of GDP and that same year, the sector experienced a growth rate of 4.6 per cent.
- Agriculture employed 81 per cent of the labour force, and the majority of family households in 2014 had agriculture, including livestock, as their main activity. There were 4.4 million agricultural holdings in the whole country, 98.9 per cent of which cultivated on average 0.5 to 1.5 hectare.
- The artisanal fisheries sector provided 91 per cent of the catches; and played an important role in domestic consumption and food security in both coastal and inland areas.
- The country had made significant progress on macroeconomic indicators since the end of the civil war in 1992. An important role was played by the mining and extractive sector, although gas extraction projects that were expected to spur further economic growth, seemed to be slower than planned in taking off.
- These gains however have not trickled down to the population at large: absolute poverty affects 57 per cent of the rural population, and rural women in particular. Chronic undernutrition is estimated at 43 per cent of the population; the incidence of HIV makes Mozambique the eighth country in the world affected by the pandemic. The country remained in the World Bank low-income group and with a Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014 at 0.393, it ranked 178<sup>th</sup> out of 187 countries among the Low-Human Development group.
- ODA has represented a substantial contribution to public finance since the peace agreements, but this had declined in the recent past.
- IFAD's strategy in the country, which until the second half of the 2000s was addressing poverty alleviation and more vulnerable groups in the northern provinces of the country, had increasingly shifted to focus on value chain development and work with economically active poor; coverage also expanded to include the southern provinces, the whole of the coastal areas and in one case, all provinces.
- The total envelope of IFAD-supported projects since 1983 amounted to approximately US\$394.6 million, approximately 61 per cent provided through highly concessional loans and associated grants, 27 per cent through partners' cofinancing, 10 per cent from the Government of Mozambique and 2 per cent from beneficiaries.
- The portfolio had grown considerably over time in terms of number and size of loans, and currently projects are mostly middle-size with a long duration, with a budget range of US\$23-54 million. The loan portfolio was complemented by significant financial contributions leveraged from other partners, in the form of linked or self-standing grants.

### III. The lending portfolio

#### A. Project performance and rural poverty impact

93. This chapter analyses the performance of the loan projects supported by IFAD that were operational during the period under evaluation (2010-2016), as well as of the EU-funded MDG1c grant accruing to PROMER, PSP and ProPesca, and two grants funded by the Belgian Fund for Food Security that closely contribute/d to ProPesca. Unless otherwise mentioned, the assessment includes the loans and related grants. By the time of the CSPE, two loans and one grant were closed - the loans SBAFP/PPABS, RFSP/PAFIR and the grant CHAPANI - whereas all other initiatives were ongoing: the loans PROMER, PSP, ProPesca and PROSUL, and the grants MDG1c and ProDIRPA.
94. Projects in the portfolio were at different levels of implementation by the time of the CSPE: PSP was due to reach completion at the end of 2017 and ProPesca in early 2018; PROSUL was at implementation mid-point and PROMER was waiting confirmation of a two-year extension and additional funds. This was carefully taken into account throughout the assessment.

#### Relevance

95. The relevance of the portfolio was analysed in terms of: (i) relevance of objectives, in terms of alignment of project objectives with the Government's strategies and policies, IFAD's strategies, the COSOP and the needs of the poor; and (ii) relevance and quality of project designs, in terms of approaches to reach the objectives.

#### Relevance of objectives

96. **Portfolio well-aligned with government policies.** The IFAD-supported portfolio in the period under evaluation was found to be well-aligned with the policies and strategies of the Government of Mozambique and clearly consistent with national rural development priorities. In particular, all IFAD-supported projects broadly aim at contributing to the first general objective of PARP 2011-2014, i.e. "Boost production and productivity in agriculture and fisheries" by enhancing access of rural producers to improved technology; also, the Government focus on strengthening markets was fully taken on board by IFAD through the focus on value chain development.
97. **Portfolio consistent with the 2011 COSOP, and progressively with IFAD's overarching goal.** The objectives of all projects were also consistent with the 2011 COSOP strategic objectives,<sup>31</sup> by focusing their thrust on facilitating the integration of small-scale producers into profitable and accessible markets. Nevertheless, until 2014 there was a gap in the alignment of the portfolio with IFAD's overarching goal, which was defined in the Strategic Framework 2011-2015 as "to enable poor rural people to improve their food security and nutrition, raise their incomes and strengthen their resilience." The purpose of most projects focused on raising incomes of the rural poor by promoting more and better quality production, and on marketing the surpluses more profitably. Only PSP and MDG1c explicitly mentioned food security at the level of goal or purpose, while PROSUL made it part of its overall objective as something not to be "jeopardized" by the project's focus on marketing. ProPesca used food security as an objectively verifiable indicator at the goal level, and food security was part of the impact pathways of SBAFP/PPABS, while none of the other design reports, ongoing and closed loans and grants, made any reference to it.
98. With respect to improved nutrition, in addition to being one of the two pillars of the grant CHAPANI, along with reducing HIV incidence, both PSP and ProPesca envisaged work on nutrition with respect to their commitment to engage with people living with HIV (PLWH). In the IFAD MDG1c Sub-Programme "contribution to the dietary status" was one of the purposes, to be attained by providing funds from 2014 onward to: (i) integrate nutritional education components for the benefit of value chains

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<sup>31</sup> See table 2 above.



beneficiaries of PROMER and ProPesca; and (ii) mainstream a nutritional dimension in the NAES by supporting PSP. Furthermore, IFAD's partnership with the EU, FAO, and WFP in the framework of the MDG1c programme, appeared to be highly relevant to the national Multi-Sectoral Plan of Action for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition (PAMRDC).

99. **Value chains and access to markets.** Over time, IFAD's portfolio increasingly paid attention to value chains, in both agricultural and fisheries sector, and at the time of the CSPE, three out of four loan projects focused on their development. The thrust of PROMER, ProPesca and PROSUL was on enhancing quantities and quality of produce,<sup>32</sup> strengthening farmers' and fishers' organizations and establishing market linkages to facilitate economic opportunities for the rural poor. ProPesca evolved from the SBAFP/PPBAS "community-based management with shared responsibility" model to adopt a more commercial and entrepreneurial orientation aimed at improving the artisanal fisheries value chain. The selected value chains, that included cassava, horticultural products, sesame, red meats and fish, were broadly relevant to the production potential in the targeted areas, and some of them appeared as particularly relevant for the large urban market in Maputo as well. In turn, "emerging" farmers, fishers, processors and traders have shown interest in engaging in the identified value chains, although in some cases, there was evidence that other value chains could have been developed, for example fruit-trees and their processing (dehydration) in Inhambane Province, or cassava drying and milling, with a potential to generate higher incomes for larger numbers of very small producers.
100. **Agricultural extension service.** As mentioned earlier, IFAD support to the NAES started in 2006; since 2012, PSP has been supporting the National Directorate for Agricultural Extension (DNAE) at central, province and district levels aiming at strengthening the outreach and institutional capacity of the system. Through it, IFAD was contributing to meeting the Government's priority of a more effective NAES, and therefore enhance production, productivity and food security; and responded to farming households' needs in terms of enhancing their access to improved agricultural technology.
101. **Rural finance.** In line with the consistent request from the Government in this sector, IFAD provided support to the development of rural finance systems in Mozambique since the mid-1990s. This was implemented through agricultural and value chain development projects, by linking poor rural producers to markets and by supporting the development of ASCAs. In 2005, the RFSP/PAFIR project came into force with the objective of "improving sustainable access to financial services by poor individuals, groups and enterprises in rural areas and creating a conducive institutional and policy environment for the development and sustainable provision of rural financial services", which was fully in line with the relevant national strategies.
102. **Artisanal fisheries.** ProPesca is the third project in this subsector supported by IFAD in Mozambique; engagement started in 1993 with the Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project, followed by the Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (SBAFP/PPABS), which was operational in the period 2002-2011. The CSPE found ProPesca to be broadly aligned with PESPA 2006-2015.<sup>33</sup>
103. Although ProPesca provided some support to fisheries co-management, including capacity-building at district level for licensing and surveillance of small-scale fisheries, the core of the project activities were focused on research and stock assessment. However, a major gap was identified with respect to the management of small-scale fisheries resources, as project's activities were limited to research and stock assessments. ProDIRPA should complement ProPesca in this respect, by focusing on capacity development and the establishment of community management committees

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<sup>32</sup> PROMER, as discussed later in the report, did not include a production increase component, possibly the greatest weakness of this otherwise successful project.

<sup>33</sup> PESPA was developed with the support of the SBAFP/PPABS.

for implementing a co-management approach to fisheries' resources.<sup>34</sup> With respect to the needs of fishers and post-capture actors, a major gap still unfilled by the time of the CSPE due to implementation delays, was the lack of appropriate financial services that would enable access to improved boats, engines and gears for more diversified and productive fishing. If the project will succeed in facilitating access of its intended beneficiaries to suitable and affordable financial products before its completion, the overall relevance of the project should be greatly enhanced.

104. Improved relevance to meet other governmental and national priorities was achieved by the IFAD-supported loan portfolio thanks to the additional financial resources made available with closely related national grants, that have broadened the value chain focus to integrate activities on nutritional education, HIV and AIDS awareness-raising, climate change adaptation and NRM.

#### **Relevance of design**

105. Relevance also depends on the targeting approach adopted by the projects. Across the ongoing projects, the target groups appeared to systematically consist of the economically active poor who were already involved in value chain production or had the potential and interest to produce for the market. Typically, projects' participants were grouped in farmers or fishers' associations and groups, including farmer field schools (FFSs), who could produce a surplus but needed better access to technology, financial products and markets, to achieve higher productivity, production and returns. PROSUL and PSP also targeted as a secondary group, the small and medium emergent commercial farmers, who operate outside associations and have stable or growing linkages with markets.
106. Thus, by design, the projects in IFAD's portfolio have not included the poorer farming and fishing households who produce for subsistence and fail to produce a surplus for the market for a host of reasons, and are more at risk of food insecurity and absolute poverty. Furthermore, virtually all projects have concentrated their activities in those districts that offer the greatest production and marketing potential. This was in line with the COSOP targeting strategy and with Government's adoption of the trickle-down theories for economic development. Nevertheless, this approach was not fully in line with IFAD's core mandate and arguably, nor the most appropriate targeting strategy in a country with absolute poverty at 50 per cent of the rural population. This does not exclude that some of the projects' activities, e.g. functional literacy, ASCAs and road rehabilitation, have benefited poorer households and producers; however, these were not the primary target population across the portfolio. An exception to this approach was the CHAPANI project, which by mandate engaged with PLWH and therefore reached out also to the more vulnerable in the communities of intervention.
107. All IFAD-supported projects are required to have an explicit focus on rural women.<sup>35</sup> This was important in Mozambique where the number of female-headed households in rural areas is increasing and stands at 25 per cent nationally. The CSPE found that all loans and related grants, except for RFSP/PAFIR, explicitly foresaw the inclusion of women as project beneficiaries and in most cases, also defined quantitative targets for female project beneficiaries. Targets ranged between 25 per cent, which was the PROMER minimum share of women to be recruited for road rehabilitation works, and 50 per cent, the established PROSUL target for women as participants in each value chain.

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<sup>34</sup> The co-management approach to fisheries consists in the division and sharing of responsibilities between the State and potential users in decision-making and joint implementation of measures to optimize the use of fisheries resources and ensure their preservation for the benefit of the current users and future generations.

<sup>35</sup> IFAD developed its first Gender Action Plan in 2003, to operationalize the commitments towards gender equality and women's empowerment made by the Strategic Framework 2002-2006. The 2011-2015 Strategic Framework established gender equality and women's empowerment as a cross-cutting issue across all areas of IFAD's work and as one of the principles of engagement, the latter a feature that was maintained in the 2016-2025 Strategic Framework. Since 2012, IFAD also has a "Gender equality and women's empowerment Policy", with the purpose of increasing IFAD's impact on gender equality and strengthen women's empowerment in rural areas.

108. With respect to including PLWH in IFAD-supported projects, as foreseen in the 2004 COSOP in alignment with the national policies, the project design reports of SBAFP/PPABS, PSP, PROMER, ProPesca and CHAPANI included relevant strategies focusing on labour-saving technologies, kitchen gardens at household level and even local saving schemes supporting safety-nets for affected households. As the 2011 COSOP did not include any reference to PLWH, neither did PROSUL, the only ongoing project prepared since 2011.
109. **Strong government participation in project design.** The CSPE found solid evidence that governmental institutions actively participated in the design of all projects and had a strong sense of ownership for the IFAD-supported portfolio. IFAD responded with notable flexibility to the Government's requests and priorities, content-wise and in terms of implementation arrangements. A likely drawback in this open and positive attitude was that the broad corporate experience and lessons learned in project design does not seem to have been brought to bear on the projects in Mozambique and has possibly contributed to mixed results in terms of quality of project design, as discussed below.
110. At the level of communities, on the contrary, the level of ownership for projects' activities was much lower. Evidence available from the field visits suggest that the possibility for intended beneficiaries to contribute to key issues of concern for them, including the selection of which value chains should be selected and promoted, was rather limited. For instance, the selection of the value chains in PROSUL was made by a reference group composed of public and private stakeholders, based on a preliminary study, with little consultation with smallholder farmers' groups. Although the actually selected value chains play a significant role in the livelihoods of the small farming households, as mentioned earlier, other products and different value chains could have been supported, which were more profitable for more producers. The only exception was ProPesca that upon inception carried out a participatory planning exercise in all growth poles.
111. **Complex project designs.** Most projects in the portfolio were found to have complex and complicated designs. Typically, every project included several components and subcomponents, ranging from technical and institutional capacity development at various levels, to infrastructure rehabilitation and construction, to the development and supply of financial products. Some of the projects also had complicated implementation mechanisms through many partners and service providers, and/or a range of donors, each with different disbursement mechanisms.
112. Complexity is inherent in development endeavours that want to address the multiple dimensions of poverty and should not be refrained from in principle. However, complicated design and implementation models often risk affecting coherence and integration across activities, and raise huge challenges for coordination and management. The case of PROSUL, with five components and 12 subcomponents including three value chains, rural finance, and land tenure issues among others, was the extreme example in the portfolio of over-complicated design, that risked jeopardizing the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the investment.
113. In a few cases, design reports were overly prescriptive and binding, for example, in PROMER, ProPesca and PROSUL, with respect to the entities responsible for providing rural finance products. When these institutional arrangements proved un-feasible, amendments to the projects had to be approved by IFAD Executive Board to enable implementing the respective rural finance components with other actors, which absorbed precious time for the implementation of these vital components.
114. Another example of inappropriate design, apparently counterintuitive, was the decision to fund ProDIRPA separately from ProPesca. Although the managers of both projects found the set-up appropriate, the CSPE considers that this arrangement was inefficient and contributed to prevent smooth and timely implementation, as discussed later in the report, considering how closely interrelated the mandates and objectives of the two projects were.

115. Finally, a recurrent feature of project design, magnified by their complexity and by rather challenging implementation plans, has been the overestimation of the capacity of both Government and service providers to deliver. Limited implementation capacity of the public sector has been a recurrent issue in Mozambique and in the PROAGRI context, the adopted mitigating measure was the reliance on service providers from the private sector and civil society to implement project activities. This with a view to avoid over-burdening the public sector with implementation responsibilities over its normative and regulatory function. The outsourcing model has been systematically integrated in the design and implementation of the current IFAD portfolio in the country. In the extreme case of PROSUL, the design report foresees lead service providers to implement entire project components and play a management role, including contracting and procurement of services and supplies necessary for implementing the subcomponents, although the PMU was the entity eventually issuing the contracts. Such complexity, added to unrealistic planning for irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation, meant that the horticulture value chain, by the end of the fourth year since entry-into-force, was only at an incipient level. The other components were also suffering from delays related to the implementation model. This will be discussed in more detail under efficiency.
116. **Relevance assessment summary.** The strong alignment with the Government's policies, the high level of governmental ownership, and the progressive alignment over time, also with IFAD's overarching goal, were all positive elements that need recognition. On the other hand, the portfolio lacked attention to subsistence and vulnerable producers despite the still limited progress at national level in poverty reduction. Overall, the CSPE assesses **the relevance of the portfolio as moderately satisfactory (4).**
- Effectiveness**
117. The assessment of the portfolio effectiveness focused on the extent to which project expected results (outcomes) were achieved or are likely to be achieved by the end of the projects. In addition to an overview of the projects' targeting and outreach, this section also reports on some of the outputs produced by the projects while highlighting main results and constraints in the key areas of IFAD's support, namely:
- (a) Value chain approach and market linkages;
  - (b) Rural financial services;
  - (c) Technology transfer;
  - (d) Institutional development and land tenure;
  - (e) Nutrition, HIV and AIDS; and
  - (f) Rural infrastructure.
118. This section also discusses the extent of integration in the portfolio and the progress made in mainstreaming HIV and AIDS issues, as foreseen by all national strategies and policies, as recommended by the 2010 CPE, following from the legacy of the 2004 COSOP, and as foreseen in a few project designs.
119. **Work in progress.** Projects in the current portfolio had frequently suffered delays in the inception phase and during implementation, as discussed later in this report. This meant that at the time of the CSPE, results were emerging in all projects, but most were short of plans and expectations.
120. **Targeting and outreach to beneficiaries.** The simplest indicator of progress in terms of results is the number of persons or households<sup>36</sup> receiving project services.

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<sup>36</sup> The project design reports mentioned indifferently households and persons. The CSPE assumed that one person per household does directly participate in any project's activities.

Table 6 below indicates planned and actual achievements in terms of beneficiaries' outreach, as of end of July 2016.

Table 6  
Project direct beneficiaries (end-July 2016)

<i>Project</i>	<i>Target beneficiaries (persons, as per Design Report)</i>	<i>Beneficiaries reached (persons)</i>	<i>Achievements over target (percentage)</i>	<i>Time left to foreseen completion date (months)</i>	<i>Percentage of women among beneficiaries (average)*</i>
SBAFP/PPABS	100 000	87 600	87.6	Closed	51
RFSP/PAFIR	124 000	146 394	118.0	Closed	49
PROMER	20 375	14 229	69.8	23.3	53
PROSUL	20 350	11 216	55.1	41.6	63
CHAPANI	29 000	36 781	126.8	Closed	Not available
ProDIRPA	7 000	503	7.2	4.1	31

Source: PMUs.

\* The percentage of women participants was never the same across the components of any project; hence, a simple average has been reported here.

121. Two of the closed projects, RFSP/PAFIR and CHAPANI, reported over-achieving their outreach targets, whereas SPAFP/PPABS fell slightly short of plans; however, it exceeded the target of indirect beneficiaries by 10 per cent. Among the ongoing projects: PROMER was making good progress with nearly 70 per cent of planned coverage, which made it likely that by completion, it will have reached most if not all of the intended target population. Similarly, PROSUL, which by July 2016 had just overcome implementation mid-point, reported having already reached more than 50 per cent of the intended target beneficiaries.
122. Data about ProPesca's outreach was not included in table 6 as the data available to the CSPE showed an important difference between the target figures in the design report, in the range of 40,000-50,000 direct beneficiaries, and the information made available by the PMU to the CSPE, below 32,000 people by the broadest possible interpretation, e.g. including road rehabilitation workers and possibly duplication of the same beneficiaries taking part in different activities. Also, information was not provided in a consistent manner across all activities, mixing up groups and persons.
123. Similarly, data about the outreach in the current phase of PSP was also not included in table 6, due to the lack of targets in the Project Amendment Document, and the fact that the number of beneficiaries provided by the PMU, over 182,000 households, appeared to correspond to the total number of farmers assisted by all extension workers in the 42 districts where the project was being implemented. Admittedly, the nature of institutional support provided by PSP raises a few challenges in terms of defining who is a beneficiary of the project and who is not, from among the total pool of the NAES' clients. The CSPE considered that until the National Extension Monitoring and Evaluation System (SMEA) is fully operational, it will not be possible to assess how many farmers are receiving PSP-supported services, and who they are.
124. Some projects also provided gender-disaggregated data, indicating the average share of women among participants across all project components. Due to the differences in traditional gender roles and responsibilities, participation of women was typically very high in ASCAs, agricultural production and fisheries post-capture activities, and lower in agricultural marketing and trading, fish capture and farming activities, leadership roles.
125. In terms of the profile of beneficiaries, the observations of the CSPE during its field visits confirmed the focus of the COSOP and of the projects on the "small-scale producers who have the potential to expand and commercialize their activities". Participants in meetings with the team always included the local leaders, which is

understandable, together with producers who appeared to be in general better-off than the large majority of Mozambican farmers and fishers. In general, membership in an association attracts those who are above subsistence level and who can afford and are interested in joining forces with peers to improve their standing. Furthermore, the portfolio focus on value chains and integration into markets by default leaves out those whose production assets and capacity stretches only to subsistence and who are therefore more vulnerable to food insecurity. Along the same line, projects' efforts to involve the "private sector" has led to supporting and developing the capacities of small and medium-level traders and intermediaries, who risk becoming the sole real beneficiaries of the portfolio; this at the cost of developing community-level groups of producers interested in engaging in trade and commercialization. An exception to this appeared to be the ASCAs, which seem to have the potential to attract slightly poorer persons; this may be one of the reasons why they are so attractive for women, even when they are married to better-off farmers.

### **Value chains and market linkages**

126. The 2004 COSOP referred to enhancing the production and marketing of high-value crops and fish, but did not clearly focus on the value chain concept, which became fully explicit only in the 2011 COSOP. This committed to adopting an "inclusive value chain approach", whereby small producers "would take part in the development of the whole chain to maximize their benefits". This reflected the reality of two ongoing projects focused on value chain development in agriculture and fisheries respectively, and led to the formulation of a third one, tackling crop and livestock production. However, the extent to which the approach was inclusive was short of expectations, as discussed later in the report.
127. The strengthening of farmers' and fishers' groups with a view to enabling them to take advantage of economies of scale and improving the negotiating power of their members in the markets, was a relevant component of most loans. Significant investment was also made in strengthening the capability of producers to engage with the market players or to link directly to consumers. Overall, evidence suggests some progress. Design and approaches however differed, as discussed in the following paragraphs.<sup>37</sup>
128. PROMER developed a reasonably comprehensive approach to value chain development. By design, farmers' associations and groups were to receive technical support for increasing and diversifying production from PSP; and PROMER itself supported the recruitment of extension agents to work with the project beneficiaries since 2012. However, difficulties in PSP disbursement capacity led to limited outreach of the PROMER-recruited extension agents. Thus, PROMER's work focused on providing matching grants and capacity development to both farmers' associations and intermediaries who could improve the added value and marketability of the produce. As a result, 19 small-scale value addition projects, including warehouses, mills, oil press and grain cleaning and packing equipment were developed; although they had not started yet by the time of the evaluation due to delays in the project extension process. The project was also facilitating partnerships between farmers' associations and agribusiness enterprises through both contract farming and a matching grant scheme. These arrangements have been fairly beneficial for farmers' associations, who managed to get reasonable prices for their products. The volume of marketed production as well as the number of associations involved increased significantly: the gap mentioned above notwithstanding, associations supported by PROMER increased more than fourfold the marketed production between 2012 and 2014, most likely due to an increase in production.
129. The project also made a significant contribution to developing the organizational and managerial capacity of 500 associations, by training members in business

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<sup>37</sup> Financial services, an essential element for the development of value chains that were included in all IFAD-supported projects, are discussed in the following subsection.

management, post-harvest techniques and other related issues. Also, associations supported by PROMER from the same geographical area were joining forum- and federation-level structures. Nevertheless, the level of capacity and autonomy varied across the organizations and some still needed significant support. In parallel, PROMER worked with interested investors to identify potential investments and provided technical assistance to develop relevant business plans. In this regard, the project carried out capacity-development activities, including tailored, in-service training, coaching, and assistance for business legalization, in support of the specific needs of and challenges faced by 206 rural traders, two of whom were women.

130. Last, PROMER was also supporting community radios to broadcast market information on price, type of products, quantities, locations and extension messages that are important to producers and traders. So far, 11 contracts with community radios had been signed. The information was broadcasted in Portuguese and four local languages in weekly programmes (15-20 minutes) including interviews and agricultural and marketing messages. PSP was also using community radios for disseminating agricultural extension messages, which had started in 2013 and was currently supported by MDG1c. PSP and PROMER overlapped in eight community radios in the PROMER districts. Discussions on establishing a partnership between the two projects had taken place to harmonize messages, but linkages appeared weak. Farmers appreciated these radio broadcasts which contributed to improve their market knowledge and linkages.
131. The PROSUL value chain approach focused on increasing productivity and production and on establishing market linkages. In the case of the cassava value chain, production had been increasing at a pace much faster than the market could absorb. The project design report had identified several market opportunities for the cassava-based products, namely chips for the animal feed industry, ethanol production for an industrial plant in Sofala and flour for the bakery industry; also, fresh tubers were to be supplied to mobile processing units linked to the national brewery industry. As of mid-2016, only the latter option was feasible, and farmers were forced to sell their produce to the Dutch company DADTCO, which enjoyed a monopoly situation and paid relatively low price for the cassava (2MZN/kg). The project was carrying out a cassava market development study to explore new market niches in the country.
132. PROSUL was also providing support to emergent commercially-oriented farmers' associations that could increase their technical, managerial, organizational and negotiation skills, and achieve profitability and financial autonomy. The project was adapting the FFS methodology for developing business skills among farmers, a critical gap in farmers' competences.
133. Work on the horticulture value chain was still incipient by the time of the CSPE. The project-supported FFS were selling their vegetables on an individual basis and at a rather low price in local markets, as the project had not provided any support in marketing. However, the project had facilitated linkages between the farmers' groups who were working in the shade-cloth greenhouses and large retail supermarkets in Maputo; it was too early to assess performance and results in this endeavour, harvest time had not yet come.
134. In the red meat value chain, where assistance was being provided to 158 groups, over 1,700 producers had been trained in leadership and association development. To facilitate cattle marketing, PROSUL also built five cattle fairs, which offered farmers a suitable and well-equipped location, with water, pens and scales, where animals could be shown to a larger range of buyers, thereby reducing their transport and transaction costs. Market Management Committees had been established to oversee the use and maintenance of the facilities. By late August 2016, only 84 animals had been traded in the five fairs in operation. The CSPE was aware that more time will be necessary to assess the effectiveness of the cattle fairs, while considering that a cost-benefit analysis of the trade fairs before the end of the project would be useful and due.

135. Within the fisheries sector, ProPesca adopted the inclusive value chain approach advocated in the 2011 COSOP, targeting the “active poor” and aiming at creating a dialogue between producers’ organizations, businesses and governmental administrations. The project’s focus on post-harvest value addition and value chains was a shift from the “community-managed development” model promoted under SBAFP/PPABS towards one focused on individual entrepreneurship and “business development services”. However, similar to what had already been discussed with respect to the results of technology transfer, the expected improvements in the post-harvest steps of the fisheries value chain suffered from delays in making rural finance products available to processors and traders. A few other weaknesses were identified by the CSPE:
- (a) The CSPE team visited three rehabilitated markets in Nampula Province and for several reasons, none was being used, including scarcity of catch. Of the three, only one appeared to have potential for use in the short-term. Although these observations cannot be extrapolated to the whole lot of rehabilitated markets, there seemed to be room for re-thinking the appropriateness of the “first-point-of-sale” approach; also, follow-up by the PMU would be useful to identify the bottlenecks in each case and possible solutions.
  - (b) Linked to the above, the Markets Management Committees appeared to be very weak, unable to find solutions to the very low levels of utilization of newly rehabilitated markets; this also appeared to require a more intensive follow-up by the PMU at field level, and possibly capacity development of the committees;
  - (c) Further, in the view of the CSPE, the project missed an opportunity to make these committees active players in trading and marketing; admittedly, this would require a change in the theory-of-change of the project, that may be too late to carry out.
136. Some results were nevertheless emerging with respect to the improved quality of landed fish, thanks to the long-term work done by IFAD-supported projects in this sector, resulting in increased and more systematic use of ice on board. Anecdotal evidence from the CSPE interviews did indeed suggest that better quality fish could be purchased in the local markets, but no figures on quantities were available. ProPesca was also dedicating time and effort to diversify potential fish marketing channels, by using non-edible parts of the fish, e.g. scales and skins, for handicraft and other non-edible products.

#### **Rural finance services**

137. Rural finance is an essential pillar for all IFAD-supported projects aiming at facilitating the integration of small-scale producers into profitable and accessible markets. Enhancing access to rural finance product for small producers was also part of the 2004 COSOP, and why the RFSP/PAFIR, focused on the development of sustainable rural finance institutions and services, was started and largely implemented. The third strategic objective of the 2011 COSOP was: “to increase the availability of and access to appropriate and sustainable financial services in rural areas”, as one of the three pillars on which effective value chain development would rest.
138. Despite the attention and resources dedicated to this area, the most successful activity so far in the portfolio under evaluation was the establishment and training of ASCAs, and results were quite promising, particularly in northern Mozambique. Some ASCAs were very active and had already managed to be self-sufficient by paying for the advisory services to the promoters’ association established by medium-sized financial institutions; a few were also participating in innovative experiences such as the use of a mobile phone platform for their savings and credits. Table 7 below indicates how many ASCAs have been established through the portfolio under evaluation.



Table 7

**Number and membership of ASCAs established through IFAD-supported projects (end-July 2016)**

<i>Project</i>	<i>Number of ASCAs established or supported</i>	<i>Members</i>	<i>Percentage of women members</i>
SBAFP/PPABS	1 187	20 077	46
RFSP/PAFIR	1 937	33 952	58
PROMER	254	4 625	53
ProPesca*	328	Not available	Not available

Source: PMUs. \* Work started in 2016.

139. In terms of results, RFSP/PAFIR supported 94 rural-based providers of microfinance services, including 70 MFIs, 17 micro banks and 7 commercial banks, with loans, matching grants and grants, mainly for fixed assets such as the establishment of MFIs and microbank branches, transport and equipment. The project also enhanced the supervisory role of the Bank of Mozambique by training inspectors on close oversight of rural microfinance institutions (MFIs). The Project Completion Report Validation stated that the project also contributed to establishing a rural finance unit in the National Directorate for the Promotion of Rural Development, which “oversaw drafting and approval of the National Rural Finance Strategy” in 2011. In 2013, 29 contracts were suspended due to underperformance, non-utilization of the approved budget and three cases of alleged embezzlement.
140. RFSP/PAFIR was supposed to provide financial services to all IFAD-supported projects, thus making a more efficient use of IFAD-supported initiatives and develop stronger synergies across the portfolio. However, the completion of RFSP/PAFIR at its planned date in September 2013 obliged both PROMER and ProPesca to identify alternatives.<sup>38</sup>
141. In addition to reallocating the rural finance component budget to other ongoing activities, including nutrition and rural traders, PROMER devoted resources to the promotion of ASCAs, all quite successful as already discussed, to establish the matching grant facility for small-scale value-addition initiative discussed above; and to develop a second matching grant facility for big traders and private companies to promote the development of value chains, mainly through contract farming, for an investment of US\$50,000-250,000 supported by a subsidy of 50 per cent to traders. Some constraints had emerged in the design and implementation of the facility: it did not attract big agribusiness enterprises, which needed funds for commercialization but were not interested in working with large numbers of small-scale farmers, one of the necessary conditions to make a profit, as this implied extra work for private companies that typically do not feel bound to socially responsible operations. Second, the requirements for applying to the matching grant appeared complex, bureaucratic, time-consuming and extremely formal; and small and medium traders could not apply for the facility as they usually were unable to meet the requirements, e.g. Land Use Titles (DUATs), or did not have the necessary 30 per cent of matching funds required.
142. In the fisheries sector, SBAFP/PPABS was highly effective, establishing 1,187 ASCAs against an original target of 600, and totalling a total MZM 41 million savings and approved credit of MZM 51.7 million during project implementation. ProPesca, in turn, opted for a very ambitious programme of rural finance, with provision of multiple credit streams aimed at increasing the investment capacity of fishers, processors and traders beyond what they could accumulate through ASCAs. This has proved to be highly complex, possibly premature and difficult to manage, and has achieved so far

<sup>38</sup> PROMER had signed two MoUs with the Fund for Economic Rehabilitation (FARE) to improve access to financial services in PROMER districts and four microfinance institutions were established in three PROMER districts. At the time of the CSPE, PROMER was facing difficulties in retrieving information from these institutions, as the latter did not target PROMER beneficiaries.

very little results on the ground in terms of improved access to credit. Only in early 2016, due to delays beyond the project's control in the recruitment process, a rural finance expert joined the PMU and the project started supporting ASCAs through service providers. In collaboration with the Fisheries Development Fund (FFP), a national institution whose mandate is to support investments in the fisheries and aquaculture sector and with a service provider specialized in microfinance, old and new financial products had been made available to the ProPesca target population. Some of these appeared to be innovative and promising, e.g. the Special Funds, specifically designed for women borrowers for fish processing and transformation. The PMU was also aware that additional information and capacity development were necessary at province and district levels to better market the financial products and fully operationalize this key component at beneficiaries' level.

143. With respect to the rural finance component, PROSUL ran into similar problems as PROMER and ProPesca albeit with a different service provider, this time an institution located outside the project's area of intervention and with limited experience in rural finance work. In 2015, the component was re-designed and at the time of the CSPE, an amendment had been waiting for approval for more than a year; a decision was expected to be made during the PROSUL MTR planned for late 2016. In 2016, PROSUL had contracted three service providers to promoter the establishment of ASCAs.

#### **Technology transfer**

144. Technology transfer for improving productivity and production was found to be a recurrent element in the thrusts of both the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs and in the theory-of-change of most IFAD-supported loans in the portfolio under evaluation. In several instances, projects contributed to introducing and passing on technologies aimed at improving productivity to small-scale producers, as discussed in the following examples.
145. In crop production, the PSP PMU estimated that the project's main achievements included the dissemination of at least one technology on poultry production and eight technologies on crop production, to over 182,000 beneficiaries through various extension modalities including 129 FFS, 10 on-farm trials, numerous demonstration and field days. This translated into at least 16,000 beneficiaries adopting crop production technologies and improving their production, as well as a 15 per cent increase (minimum), in the proportion of farm produce reaching markets. This without including those farmers who as members of PROMER's promoted associations were supported by NAES extension agents in developing the skills to use the improved inputs provided by PROMER itself.
146. With MDG1c funding, PSP had also started outsourcing services to service providers from the private sector, for expanding the coverage of crop-specific extension for small farmers in the PROMER area, where NAES had no skills to meet this specific demand. After an initial assessment of potential activities, some contracts with a service provider had been signed for supporting fruit tree production or poultry, and work in August 2016 was incipient.
147. In the red meats component, PROSUL had so far mainly contributed to increasing cassava production and productivity, through collaboration with the Mozambique Institute for Agricultural Research (IIAM) and the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa that led to the introduction of improved cassava varieties and new technologies and promoted crop expansion through 185 FFS. In relation to horticulture, the project had built five pilot shade-cloth greenhouses, each managed by a farmers' group engaged in learning the economic and environmental benefits of growing vegetables in these structures; also, 13 associations were being supported using the FFS methodology, and were receiving training to acquire technical knowledge as well as managerial and business skills. The project was also supporting water users associations on irrigation schemes, with training on water management and irrigation scheme's operations and maintenance, as well as organizational training.

148. **Support focused on improving animal feeding and veterinary services.** Partnership with IIAM had led to establishing multiplication plots of forage species, used for eight demonstrations forage banks and group members had also been trained in haymaking using FFS methodology. The CSPE saw evidence of strong interest and potential diffusion for these techniques, partly triggered by the severe drought currently affecting southern Mozambique. These technologies, together with the opening of multifunctional boreholes, appeared particularly relevant and appropriate for the areas of intervention. PROSUL had also trained and equipped 60 community veterinary health workers to improve the health conditions of animals, in partnership with the International Livestock Research Institute. No data were available yet on the results of these activities.
149. In the fisheries sector, a major transfer of technology under the SBAFP/PPABS work was the enhanced support to the use of ice on board boats for improved post-capture conservation. Under ProPesca, this was further reinforced and complemented with technology transfer for ice-production at the "points of first sale" markets, the construction of improved boats and the introduction of new gear for fishing off-shore. Extensive capacity development for both men and women engaged in fishing and gear preparation, and in post-capture handling and conservation, was the main approach in this respect, including exchange visits in the country and outside, as well as bringing, for example, master carpenters from outside the country to demonstrate how to build more resistant boats. Adoption of these technologies on a larger scale however was still rather low, mostly due to the lagging rural finance component of the project, which prevented fishers access, through credit, to improved gear, boats, cooling boxes, etc. Thus, although intended beneficiaries' skills and competences had been improved on many aspects of capture and should allow them safe and more productive fishing off-shore, access to means of production had not made any significant progress by the time of the CSPE.

#### **Institutional support**

150. Limitations in institutional capacity had been identified as one of the constraints to be addressed by IFAD under both the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs. Activities of institutional support have been integrated in all projects, with some achieving more than others. Factors in this were the mandate of the project, e.g. PSP had the institutional strengthening of the NAES among its objectives, and the location of the respective PMUs, which is discussed later in the report. This section mainly focuses on the specific activities of institutional development of each project.
151. In the case of PSP, its overarching goal was the steady uplifting of small farming household's production efficiency through the introduction of demand-responsive extension services provided by a more effective NAES. This included capacity development of extension officers and agents and since 2012, PSP supported more than 50 capacity-building/training events attended by more than 1,000<sup>39</sup> participants at all levels. Through a Training of Trainers approach, topics included FFS methodology, M&E and the National Extension Monitoring and Evaluation System (SMEA), financial management, statistics, procurement, contract management, communication, gender, food security, as well as specific technical matters such as yield measurement and plant clinics. PSP also contributed with transport means, fuel and computer equipment to the operations of the NAES in 42 districts.
152. A similar picture emerged with respect to SBAFP/PPABS, ProPesca and ProDIRPA, with the added value of a very long-term relationship between the IFAD-supported projects and the national organizations responsible for supporting the artisanal fisheries and aquaculture subsectors.<sup>40</sup> Government staff were trained over time on a wide variety

<sup>39</sup> This figure does not represent the number of officers trained, as some participated in several training sessions.

<sup>40</sup> Until 2016, the counterpart organization to IFAD artisanal fisheries and aquaculture projects were the Institute for the Development of Small-scale Fisheries and the National Institute for Aquaculture. In 2016, the two were merged to create the Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDEPA). For simplicity, the report only refers to IDEPA, with the full recognition of the institutional evolution.

of topics related to artisanal fisheries management, technologies, post-harvest, marketing and processing, gender mainstreaming. Institution-building support had also been provided over the years, to establish the decentralized network of current IDEPA.

153. PROSUL made available resources for two staff from MASA to get their MSc from a University in South Africa on climate change, thus creating a first core capacity to mainstream climate change concerns in the work of the Ministry.
154. CHAPANI as well contributed to some institutional development, by training field officers to integrate health and HIV- and AIDS-related contents in their extension work, in particular on risky behaviours and prevention.
155. Furthermore, institutional support was also provided directly to farmers' associations by PROMER, ProPesca and PROSUL, as discussed. PSP also contributed to this goal, under the agricultural service provision component, by providing considerable assistance to the legalization of farmers' associations and by establishing 112 FFS within existing associations. Another component that consisted of supporting farmers' associations for their economic and social empowerment had only recently made progress, through the recruitment of service providers who were defining the methodologies for undertaking a mapping and training needs-assessment of the existing associations.
156. Finally, one of the institutional pillars of rural development is ensuring legal and fair access to land, as the fundamental factor of production, and both Government and IFAD recognize that the latter is an important element in enhancing production and enabling long-term investments in agriculture. Very little reference was made to land tenure in either COSOPs, and within the portfolio under evaluation, PROSUL was the only project with an explicit mandate on issuing DUATs to individuals and communities. However, PROMER, ProPesca and ProDIRPA were being supported by an ICO consultant to integrate this dimension in their work. PROSUL had already made significant progress by July 2016: within the red meats value chain, five communities with an area of 77,781 hectares had been delimited and 46,000 hectares of common grazing areas had been identified and zoned, benefiting approximately 10,100 households. In the cassava value chain, and after several awareness campaigns, 3,923 DUATs had been approved and registered in two districts, against a target of 750 DUATs in each district. In relation to the horticulture value chain, few collective DUATs for irrigation schemes had been approved so far.
157. The upcoming top-up loan for PROMER will also include funds for granting DUATs to farmers' associations and if feasible, to individual farmers; and ProDIRPA had made some progress, in collaboration with the responsible national directorate within MITADER, in organizing community mapping and zoning as a pre-requisite for community DUATs, in the context of its work on tenure and co-management issues.
158. All these achievements were very recent to the time of the CSPE, and no evidence was available of the impacts of the access to DUATs on productivity and on producers' attitudes to investments.

### **Nutrition**

159. As mentioned earlier in the report, nutrition was not mentioned in the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs. Nevertheless, some light reference was made to nutrition, associated with PLWH, in two project design reports, which were not acted upon during implementation. Also, one associated grant, CHAPANI, included nutrition education as one of its two goals; and in 2013 an EU-funded grant was approved, which led to the inclusion of a nutritional education component at the community level in PROMER and ProPesca. Furthermore, independently from the EU grant, the PSP also decided during the 2015 MTR to allocate resources from the project budget to nutritional education. Although these initiatives started relatively recently to the CSPE evaluation period (with the exception of CHAPANI, which was closed), some results have started to emerge.

160. CHAPANI, working in fishing communities supported by ProPesca, had established 61 demonstration vegetable gardens, against a target of 60, and trained people on cropping techniques. It also trained almost 6,000 people in food preparation and cooking methods, and community leaders on the basic principles of healthy nutrition. This was twice as many people trained as planned, and they were mostly women. Anecdotal evidence from the CSPE field visits, almost one year after project completion, suggested that education on improved food preparation had been integrated into normal practice, in particular regarding children's nutrition, whereas vegetable gardens had largely been abandoned.
161. The EU-funded MDG1c programme established that, within its goal of accelerating the achievement in Mozambique of the Millennium Development Goal 1c, the purpose of the specific "nutrition" subcomponents was to "facilitate the sustainable reduction of malnutrition among the families participating in the IFAD-supported projects".<sup>41</sup> Activities would focus on demonstration gardens and kitchens, women peer-to-peer groups, community radio messages and nutrition classes in primary schools.
162. ProPesca started its work on nutrition education in mid-2016 only in Zambezia Province, due to administrative delays in the recruitment of service providers in the other provinces. By the time of the CSPE, preparatory work at community level was incipient. PROMER had launched its first activity for the nutrition component in 2015, in one of the three project areas. Results were nevertheless impressive despite the short implementation period. With a focus on farmers' associations and schools, in 2016 outputs comprised: 65 nutrition education sessions held, including 10 in schools; 40 farmers' associations and 5 schools with kitchen gardens on their premises; and 48 farmers' associations that benefited from cooking demonstrations on improved porridge for children. Participants were very satisfied with the initiative.
163. With regards to PSP, the MTR in December 2015 allocated a portion of the loan funds to a nutrition component that would include training on nutrition for provincial and district extension officers and agents, and mainstreaming of nutrition education in the FFS curriculum. A nutrition expert had been hired by the PMU early in 2016 to implement the planned activities. Among these, a nutritional education session, including cooking demonstrations, had already been held for heads of agricultural extension services and food security focal points from ten different provinces, who in turn were expected to train the extension agents in their respective areas of work.
164. Furthermore, thanks to the experience and credibility gained with MDG1c, IFAD also became a member of several fora and working groups on nutrition: nutrition donors' forum, SUN group, a UN nutrition group, and through the latter, actively participated in the development of the United Nations Agenda for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition in Mozambique, 2015-2019. Other United Nations agencies and development partners welcomed IFAD's increasingly active role in mainstreaming nutrition in agriculture and rural development programmes.
165. ProPesca and PSP were also supposed to link work on nutrition to include PLWH among project beneficiaries, and their design reports committed to work on "activities focused on improved nutrition, to be carried out in conjunction with the HIV/AIDS campaigns, which would aim to improve the knowledge in ... communities regarding the nutritional value of locally available food stuffs including food preparation and balanced diets."<sup>42</sup> Neither project acted upon this, although PSP at the time of the evaluation was developing an HIV and gender action plan in the framework of the national food and nutrition security strategy (SAN). However, some results on raising awareness on HIV and AIDS issues were achieved through two other projects:

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<sup>41</sup> Adapted from Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1C in Mozambique – IFAD Sub-Programme, Design Report – March 2013.

<sup>42</sup> Project design reports.

- (a) SBAFP/PPABS successfully implemented the first “Workplace HIV/AIDS policy” in Mozambique, which however remained a unique experience in the IFAD-supported portfolio; and
- (b) CHAPANI carried out an impressive array of capacity development work to train volunteers, community leaders, local cultural groups, community-based organizations and individuals in fishing communities, women included, through its awareness-raising campaigns on HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment, as well as on nutrition-related issues. Nevertheless, no evidence was available about its results on behaviours, nor incidence of the pandemic. And overall awareness levels in the fishing communities remained low, despite evidence of a high and increasing occurrence of HIV.

### **Rural infrastructures**

166. Rehabilitation or construction of rural and social infrastructures, including feeder roads, markets, irrigation schemes, schools and clinics was foreseen in both the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs, where it was one the thrusts of strategic objective 2, and has been a typical component of the current IFAD portfolio. The rationale for these was the facilitating role that various types of infrastructures play in improving access to markets for both producers and traders.
167. The CSPE recognized the value and relevance of these investments for the attainment of the respective project objectives; nevertheless, their inclusion as project components added to the complexity of management, and their implementation in general exerted a very heavy toll on PMUs' time and energy. Results appeared to be mixed.
168. **Feeder roads.** By July 2016, SBAFP/PPBAS, ProPesca and PROMER, all together, had contributed resources for the rehabilitation of approximately 1,900 kilometres of feeder roads, to facilitate access to production areas, markets and social facilities.<sup>43</sup> All works had been/were being executed through the well-established National Road Agency and Road Fund, who in turn contracted small-scale local construction enterprises. All projects were contributing to developing capacities in the two institutions on climate change-resilient road rehabilitation. Although this entailed higher costs, sustainability of the investments should be strengthened. The selection of feeder roads to be rehabilitated was done at the district level, based on standard criteria: population density, link to existing road network and agricultural potential. In the case of both PROMER and ProPesca, the identification process of the roads to be rehabilitated was highly participatory, under the responsibility of district level reference groups that included representatives of the local administration, farmers' and fishers' association, traders, financial institutions and the PROMER service providers. The CSPE found evidence that feeder roads were highly appreciated by large numbers of people, well beyond the projects' direct beneficiaries. Lastly, although both PROMER and ProPesca had established targets for women employed on road works, available figures of achievements in this respect were less positive or not available.
169. **Market infrastructures.** All projects, except for RFSP/PAFIR and PSP, engaged in the rehabilitation and construction of new market facilities that typically also included the construction of water and sanitation facilities. PROMER had recently supported the rehabilitation of 15 markets and was planning to support informal fairs with little investment and technical assistance, to transform the sites into “informal agribusiness centres”; and PROSUL had contributed to the rehabilitation/construction of five cattle fairs. The fisheries “points of first sale” markets rehabilitated or constructed by both SBAFP/PPABS and ProPesca along the coast, including in remote locations and islands, reached a total of 27 by July 2016. In all cases, the purpose was to facilitate contacts

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<sup>43</sup> Half of these were rehabilitated by SBAFP/PPABS. PROMER and ProPesca had achieved approximately 85 per cent of their targets.

and dealings between sellers and buyers in premises that offer higher standards of hygiene and comfort. The extent of the use of these markets was discussed earlier under Value Chains and Market Linkages.

170. **Irrigation schemes.** One major investment component of PROSUL foresees the rehabilitation of 2,100 hectares of irrigation schemes. At the time of the CSPE, works were ongoing on 407.4 ha, and the remaining areas were planned to start in 2016 or early 2017. Water users associations had already been established and some training conducted; however, it was far too early for the CSPE to make any assessment of results.
171. **Social infrastructures.** Back in 2001 when SBAFP/PPABS was formulated, the country was emerging from the war and most infrastructure had been destroyed. Therefore, in the early phase of the project the implementation focus was on the construction of infrastructure such as schools, health units and water points which were highly appreciated by local communities. Communities were mobilized into school, health and water management councils responsible for construction activities which increased the participation and responsibility of beneficiaries and fostered a greater sense of ownership of the project development activities.
172. **Multifunctional boreholes.** Another type of social infrastructure had been introduced by PROSUL, with the construction of six multifunctional boreholes, equipped with water pumps operated by photovoltaic panels located well above the ground to reduce maintenance work. The boreholes were located within fenced compounds and offered several facilities: drinking troughs for cattle, drinking fountains for human use, and tanks for washing clothes. Some vegetable gardens were also being established, taking advantage of the availability of water. Users' committees had been set up, in charge of management and maintenance, and users paid a contribution for repairs, maintenance and security. Overall, multifunctional boreholes were proving highly useful and beneficial for the livelihoods of the local communities, especially due to the severe drought affecting southern Mozambique.
173. **Effectiveness assessment – summary.** Effectiveness of the portfolio, in contributing through projects' results to the COSOPs' objectives, was mixed. Some results were tangible, namely the establishment of ASCAs, the support to NAES operation, the creation of links between farmers' associations and traders, and capacity development at all levels. Key points for each area analysed can be synthesised as follows:
  - (a) On value chains, the portfolio adequately addressed the commitment in the 2011 COSOP to develop value chains for small-scale producers in agriculture, and to a lesser extent for fisheries due to the delays in ProPesca rural finance component. However, the first-point-of-sale markets for the catch from artisanal fisheries did not appear to meet the actual needs and requirements of this specific production and marketing environment;
  - (b) The portfolio contributed to a good extent to the COSOP goal of improving small producers' knowledge and to some extent, access to new technologies;
  - (c) With respect to rural finance, this had a role of paramount importance in achieving the goals of the portfolio and of the COSOP. Results so far have fallen short of expectations, except for the ASCAs success story. The main reasons for this included the forced reliance, from 2013 onward, on individual projects establishing their own mechanisms for rural finance, the complexity of this endeavour and overall delays in implementation;
  - (d) On institutional support, the portfolio under evaluation has significantly contributed to institutional development within the governmental organizations involved in project implementation, and among farmers' organizations as well; also, good progress was made by several projects in enabling farmers to obtain land-use titles, an important factor contributing to enhanced production and food security;

- (e) Despite the strong need in Mozambique for improving nutrition in rural areas and IFAD's commitment to this goal, the country strategy and the projects did not dedicate sufficient attention to it. Also, despite commitments in project designs, no work was done to improve the nutritional status of PLWH. Only recently were some early outputs being produced with respect to nutritional education; and
  - (f) On rural infrastructures, in line with COSOP objectives, the current portfolio contributed to improving the network of feeder roads and markets, as well as other social infrastructures. With respect to roads, in most cases the population benefiting from this went well beyond the projects' immediate participants and positive results were visible; in the case of markets, results will be slower to emerge.
174. Two additional main factors appeared as paramount in affecting better progress towards planned outcomes at project and COSOP levels: delays in implementation of all projects (except for PROMER), which have slowed down many activities and achievement of results; and in the cases of PSP and ProPesca, the lack of follow-up on design plans for working with PLWH and for addressing the consequences of the pandemic in their specific subsectors of intervention. Overall, the effectiveness of the portfolio is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Efficiency**

175. The efficiency criterion measures how economically resources/input (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs. In consideration of the data available, the CSPE opted for the use of proxies for efficiency measurement, i.e. the delays, or lag-times, experienced by projects in starting up activities and during implementation. Linked to delays is the effect of alignment with the Government's electronic platform for project financial execution on implementation; the rate of financial execution; and the incidence of management costs on overall project budgets. The CSPE also tried to analyse the effects on project costs linked to the reliance on service providers for implementation, but this was eventually deemed not feasible due to a lack of relevant data.
176. **Relatively low financial execution rates.** All ongoing projects in the portfolio, except for PROMER, showed relatively low financial execution rates and this emerged as a major concern expressed by many stakeholders. Two main consequences were the risk of approaching the project completion date with unspent resources, and the fact that longer implementation periods imply, at a minimum, higher management costs and delays in starting to accrue benefits. The CSPE identified several factors contributing to this, discussed here below.
177. **Project inception phase.** In the view of many, a key problem was that the "project clock" started ticking far too early. In other words, in the view of the Government, the entry-into-force date, when the project formally starts, was too close to the date of the signature of the loan agreement.<sup>44</sup> Under the current method of calculating project duration, there is no "discount" or "zero-time lag" for project preparatory, or inception steps. These typically include: launching a tender to select and then recruit the project coordinator, open a bank account, receive and use IFAD's first disbursement, usually a few hundred thousand dollars to cover the costs of all the preparatory work, select and recruit additional PMU staff, organize premises, purchase of vehicles, contacts at field level, etc. When the PMU is sufficiently solid and field work can start, the coordinator submits the first withdrawal application that leads to the second disbursement (see below) and funds start flowing as per work plans and presentation of expenditure justifications.

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<sup>44</sup> Since the Board's decision at the corporate level in May 2010, the date of the signature of the loan agreement coincides with the 'entry-into-force' date.



178. As expected, the project milestones of the Mozambique portfolio show that the time lag between approval by the Board and entry-into-force dates significantly decreased over time. This was on average 9.8 months for the whole portfolio since 1983, and 7.2 months for the portfolio under evaluation, starting in September 2001 with the approval of the SBAFP/PPABS. These values were below the corresponding ESA regional averages, which were 10.2 months since 1983, and 8.8 months since 2001.
179. In consideration of the importance the Government gave to this issue, the CSPE focused its analysis on what is here called the "inception phase", i.e. the period between entry-into-force and the second disbursement. Table 8 below shows, for each of the ongoing IFAD-supported loans and using months as a unit of measurement, the time spent between entry-into-force and first disbursement, between first and second disbursement, the total duration of the inception phase, the planned duration of the project and the share, in percentage terms, that the inception phase represents within the planned project implementation period.<sup>45</sup>

Table 8

**Lag time between project entry-into-force, first and second disbursements dates**  
(measured in months)

<i>Project*</i>	<i>Lag time between entry-into-force and first disbursement</i>	<i>Lag time between first and second disbursement</i>	<i>Lag time between entry-into-force and second disbursement</i>	<i>Project planned duration</i>	<i>Inception phase as percentage of project duration (%)</i>
SBAFP/PPABS	4.0	24.3	28.3	104.4	27.1
RFSP/PAFIR	4.8	5.3	10.1	100.1	10.1
PSP**	10.1	7.7	17.8	73.0	24.4
PROMER	2.8	2.1	5.0	111.7	4.4
ProPesca	6.9	3.8	10.8	85.5	12.6
PROSUL	8.4	11.9	20.2	88.2	22.9

\* No information on disbursement dates was available for the grant projects.

\*\* This refers to the second phase of PSP only, considering 1 January 2012 as the entry-into-force date.

180. There was clearly significant diversity across projects, both closed and ongoing. PROMER became fully operational in a remarkably short time, five months; ProPesca and RFSP/PAFIR, in slightly less than one year; but it took PSP a year and a half, PROSUL slightly longer and SBAFP/PPABS more than two years, to achieve the same goal. There was little doubt for PSP and PROSUL that having spent more than 20 per cent of the total available implementation time for the inception phase was a liability. SBAFP/PPABS was in fact extended by 18 months to make up for the delays during the inception phase.<sup>46</sup>
181. It was possible to make a comparison between the average lag time between entry-into-force and first disbursement in Mozambique and the whole of the ESA region portfolio. This showed that Mozambique performed better than the regional average: the value for the Mozambique whole portfolio since 1983 was 5.3 months and 6.2 months since SBAFP/PPABS came into force in September 2002; and for the ESA region, values were 7.5 months, and 7.9, respectively.
182. However, delays can occur at any point in time for a variety of reasons, and to some extent each project was a case apart, although a few common features could be identified.

<sup>45</sup> Annex IV shows the actual dates for each milestone and each project.

<sup>46</sup> SBAFP/PPABS was also extended a second time, for a total of 12 months, due to EU supplementary funding.

183. For example, a recurrent problem was the administrative and procedural challenges PMUs faced in carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities at project inception. Despite efforts and improvements in this sense since the IFAD fiduciary expert joined the ICO in Maputo, a more systematic approach to induction on fiduciary aspects early on in a project's life cycle would help in enhancing implementation efficiency.
184. **Harmonization with the Government platform for financial execution and reporting.** The Government's electronic financial administration system (e-SISTAFE) was launched in 2002, and rolled out to 22 line ministries in 2006. Since then, development partners have been progressively joining in. IFAD took the decision to align disbursements with the e-SISTAFE system in 2010/2011, starting with ProPesca. At the time of the CSPE, only PROMER was operating outside the system.
185. The process appeared to be the following: the registration of a project in e-SISTAFE starts after entry-into-force; the first disbursement from IFAD happens independently from this process, but the second disbursement from IFAD only takes place after registration in e-SISTAFE is completed. The CSPE heard overwhelming accounts of very long delays in this step, due to both the system's complexity and lack of experience in this regard within the PMUs. An additional issue was insufficient training provided to PMU staff, and the fact that training only focused on operational aspects. Reportedly, this has been overcome to a good extent and current estimates of time lags for new project registration in the system are of approximately six months, with the support of both the SPCU and the ICO.
186. Data in table 8 above do indeed show that the time elapsed between entry-into-force and the second disbursement was at least twice as long for the projects registered in e-SISTAFE, with 10.8 months for ProPesca, the shortest to register in the system, against 5 months for PROMER, not registered in e-SISTAFE. At the same time, the length of the inception phases of ProPesca, PSP and PROSUL ranged from 10.8 to 20.2 months, thus suggesting that something else may have been hindering project implementation.
187. In general, delays at start-up notwithstanding, PMUs and other stakeholders expressed appreciation for the guarantees and transparency that e-SISTAFE allows. The Government also appeared very keen that all IFAD projects be implemented through the platform in the future. A few structural challenges however remain that, in the view of many stakeholders and of the CSPE team, will require mitigating measures in future IFAD-funded projects, namely:
- (a) The e-SISTAFE has very precise requirements in terms of financial planning. Details of every expenditure must be foreseen by the month of August prior to the year of disbursement. Even if PMUs' capacities in financial planning were significantly strengthened, the very nature of community level work typical of IFAD-supported projects makes such detailed planning simply impossible, and even more so if required so far in advance. In this respect the system appeared to be inflexible, with no possibility of entering new or slightly different expenditures during the year. Although it was mentioned that a procedure to make adjustments during the year existed, this was apparently not known or not used at the level of the PMUs concerned;
  - (b) The e-SISTAFE requires that recipients of payments have a legal status or identity and a bank account; however, IFAD-supported projects' beneficiaries are mainly farmers' and fishers' associations and groups, traders and ASCAs, or their members, who usually do not meet these requirements. This means that no direct financial support to participants will be possible, at least in the foreseeable future; furthermore, disbursements at district level were reported to be still very complicated;
  - (c) Up through 2015, the e-SISTAFE did not allow for disbursements after December 15 due to the closure of annual accounts. Although the system was supposed to be operational by January 1<sup>st</sup> or 15, actual practice had been that operations

would start again around mid-February. This period of inactivity coincides with the agricultural campaign when resources are most needed by IFAD agricultural projects. In addition, e-SISTAFE has been inactive periodically due to technical problems, stopping project operations. This happened between January-May 2015 and May-June 2016 and caused several problems and delays to the ongoing projects.

188. Recently, the PSP was authorized to disburse 25 per cent of its financial resources outside e-SISTAFE, in consideration of the already mentioned overlap of the end-of-the year system closure with the peak of the agricultural extension season, linked to the crop production cycle that goes from November to March. Although welcome improvements in e-SISTAFE appear to be planned to tackle similar situations, in the short term the eminently sensible solution applied to PSP could easily be extended to all IFAD-supported projects, with percentages for off-system delivery to be agreed on a case-by-case basis.
189. Other significant delays linked to harmonization with Government's procedures, although not strictly to e-SISTAFE, were due to exceedingly lengthy clearance processes for procurement and contracts by the Mozambican Administrative Tribunal. The extreme case reported was of one-year delay for clearing the contract of a single consultant, but six to eight-month lag time for any contract appeared to be very frequent, if not the norm. Although it is welcome, legitimate and useful that the Government carry out the necessary checks and controls on any procurement act, the length of time absorbed by the process in practice has represented a major factor of inefficiency, with negative consequences on overall effectiveness and people's livelihoods. IFAD and MEF/DNT will need to address this issue directly with the Administrative Tribunal, to jointly identify satisfactory solutions for all.
190. **Availability of Government funds.** The financial agreements of all IFAD projects, with the exception of ProPesca, foresee counterpart funds from the Government of Mozambique, mostly to cover the taxes for all national project expenses. The disbursement of these funds has frequently suffered delays. This situation has particularly affected PSP, whose financial agreement requires that the Government cover the tax element of every single item of expenditure at the very time the project resources are spent (pari-passu model). This has led to significant delays for virtually every single project activity. For other projects, adjustments between projects expenditures and Government's due contributions have typically been made once per year, which has allowed for smoother implementation. However, the current national financial crisis is putting increasing pressure on donors' funds to cover all costs, taxes included. Reportedly, the Government addressed a letter to IFAD in the first semester of 2016 requesting that IFAD loans cover 100 per cent of the project budgets, similar to the World Bank's approach in the country.
191. **Donor disbursement procedures.** As briefly mentioned earlier in the report, the strengthened capacity of IFAD in leveraging resources from other donors entailed stronger demand on PMU management and administration time. Overall, PMUs and IFAD have coped with the additional complexity. Nevertheless, the case of OFID is worth noting as it had important consequences on ProPesca implementation progress. The project was initially approved with 25 per cent of the total cost to be leveraged through other donors. OFID agreed to contribute US\$13.5 million, through a loan signed eight months after the project had come into force. Most, or all of OFID's loan was allocated to feeder roads rehabilitation; however, OFID disbursement procedures foresee two disbursements per year, each for a maximum sum of US\$500,000. At this rate of disbursement, it would have taken 13 years to fully execute the loan. Negotiations took place and the disbursement rate was eventually raised to US\$4 million per year. However, the additional burden of execution through e-SISTAFE and related delays and the seasonal patterns of infrastructure rehabilitation works in remote areas with small contractors, all led to an estimated 25 per cent increase of

the cost of this component for ProPesca.<sup>47</sup> The “counter-factual” in this case was the same component implemented by PROMER with IFAD funds and outside e-SISTAFE, in similar geographical conditions. A legitimate question raised by the PMUs was the following: why should funds, be they loans or grants that are disbursed through IFAD, not all follow the same procedures for execution and reporting?

192. **Financial execution rate.** All the above has seriously affected the financial execution of most projects. Table 9 below shows the total financial resources, the rate of execution of both IFAD and overall resources, and the time left before completion date, expressed as a percentage of total project duration. This clearly indicates how PSP, ProDIRPA and ProPesca will have to deliver approximately 50 per cent of their resources in less than a quarter of their overall lifespan, which will be a challenging task.

Table 9  
Financial execution rate as of 31 July 2016

<i>Project</i>	<i>Total financial resources (US\$)</i>	<i>IFAD funds disbursement rate (%)</i>	<i>Total financial execution rate (%)</i>	<i>Months to completion as % of total project duration</i>
SBAFP/PPABS	32 977 000	98.0	99.0	Project closed
RFSP/PAFIR	32 200 000	72.0	94.0	Project closed
PSP*	23 659 338	58.5	53.2	23.6
PROMER	48 994 000	80.4	64.4	20.9
ProPesca	54 510 375	71.6	46.5	23.7
PROSUL	44 960 000	24.6	26.8	47.2
CHAPANI	500 000	Not applicable	95.0	Project closed
ProDIRPA	623 346	Not applicable	36.4	11.2

\* This refers to the second phase of PSP only.

193. Based on the data above, two projects deserve specific attention. First, PROSUL shows a low delivery rate, being in its fourth year of implementation. With slightly more than half of its life to go, it is possible to greatly improve its disbursement rate. The inception phase was the longest among the ongoing projects; reportedly, registration in e-SISTAFE did not play a important role in this, whereas the complexity of the project design discussed above was a major factor. During implementation, delays and constraints in starting the rural finance component and the irrigation schemes rehabilitation, two components that should absorb significant shares of project funds, have been a major cause for slow execution. Additional causes of delay were:
- The reliance on lead service providers to fully manage the three value chain components of the project. The selected service providers, who were fully competent in their respective areas of specialization but had never taken up this role for IFAD, had to be trained. This appeared to many observers, the CSPE team included, as a duplication of the PMU’s role, which in any case comprised 12 staff and could well take on all the management tasks delegated to the lead service providers;
  - A certain degree of inflexibility in the PMU, in managing expenditure justification procedures.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Estimate provided by National Road Agency.

<sup>48</sup> Reportedly, when implementing partners submit the expenditure justification before requesting new funds, one incorrect expenditure justification is sufficient to block the whole process for weeks. This entails considerable delays and waste of time and resources.

194. The second heavily delayed project was ProDIRPA. The PMU reported that it only took four months to appoint the project team from within IDEPA staff. However, funds were made available for the inception workshop almost one year later (late 2014) and full fund availability was only granted in 2015. Furthermore, no training was provided to staff regarding rules and procedures. Reasons for the above were not clarified; additional delays occurred, these apparently mostly due to lengthy internal IDEPA decision-making processes. Although a one-year no-cost extension had been requested,<sup>49</sup> no significant progress in implementation had been made by the time of the CSPE; overall, it appeared legitimate to question the actual interest of the Government in this initiative.
195. **Management cost ratios.** The management cost ratio measures the share of project funds allocated to project management. In the case of IFAD projects, which are basically investment initiatives, the higher the management cost ratio, the lower the efficiency of the project. Project management costs as calculated in the PCRVs and by PMUs as of July 2016 are shown in table 10. The average for the whole portfolio was 14.1 per cent, slightly above the average in the ESA region for IFAD loans, at 13.05 per cent. Noticeably the three projects with PMUs fully embedded in line ministries, i.e. SBAFP/PPABS, PSP and ProPesca, showed management costs below the regional average. In the case of PROSUL, management costs should arguably include the overhead costs claimed by lead service providers for the overall management of their components. The closest proxy value available for this was the organizational overhead, that altogether represented 1.2 per cent of the total PROSUL cost, thus raising the total share of PROSUL management costs to 16.1 per cent. However, the main factor that seemed to influence the management cost ratio was the extent of reliance on online ministries for project implementation.

Table 10

**Project management costs and rates at completion and during implementation**

<i>Project</i>	<i>SBAFP/ PPABS</i>	<i>RFSP/PAFIR</i>	<i>PSP</i>	<i>PROMER</i>	<i>ProPesca</i>	<i>PROSUL</i>
Project management costs (United States dollars)	Not available	Not available	2 022 886	8 827 471	6 733 540	6 720 000
Project management costs as percentage of total budget	8%	24%	8.6%	18.0%	12.4%	14.9%
Source of information	PCRv	PCRv	PMU	PMU	PMU	PMU

196. **Cost per beneficiaries.** The sources for this information were the RFSP/PAFIR Project Completion Report Validation and the Impact Evaluation of SBAFP/PPABS, as this could not be calculated for the ongoing loans. With respect to RFSP/PAFIR, towards the end of the project the cost per ASCA members indicated a value around US\$40/person, against a global average of US\$30-33. But the project was assessed as highly inefficient due to its very high management costs. Conversely, the SBAFP/PPABS cost per beneficiary was assessed to be within the range of other similar IFAD fishery development projects by the impact evaluation.
197. **Implementation through service providers.** Most projects also had some delays in implementation caused by the implementation model through service providers. As discussed earlier in the report, all IFAD-supported projects have contracted service providers to implement project components, subcomponents or specific activities. Evidence showed that working through service providers had been effective for carrying out activities that were important and complementary to the main thrust of the project, for which the PMUs and responsible governmental organizations did not have adequate skills and competencies. A relevant example were the nutritional education components added to PROMER and ProPesca, which could not be expected

<sup>49</sup> By the time of the CSPE, it was not known whether this would be granted or not.

to be effectively and professionally implemented by the responsible ministries – MITADER and MIMAIP. Also, service providers appeared in general to have a comparative advantage when work had to be carried out at community and producers’ level, for example in establishing and supporting ASCAs or producers’ organizations. However, selecting, recruiting and supporting service providers in their work were time-consuming tasks that needed to be fully factored in when developing project work plans.

198. The CSPE calculated the percentage of project resources spent through service providers, shown in table 11 below. The analysis confirmed that a project like ProPesca, with a defined sectoral focus, reasonably well-staffed PMU and implemented through a line ministry, needed fewer inputs and contributions from service providers, and was also likely to be more efficient in terms of management costs than a project like PROSUL, that works on three different value chains, in addition to land tenure and climate change resilience, and whose explicit strategy was to rely as much as possible on the private sector and NGOs for implementation, rather than on the Government. The relatively high share of project budget implemented through service providers in PSP was similarly due to the decision to test outsourced extension operations; and in the case of PROMER, to the fact that the project operates largely independently from the responsible ministry MITADER. Also, service providers had to be recruited to implement the rural finance component, in addition to a few activities for which the project had no technical competence, which absorbed significant amounts of resources. However, the share of project budget spent through service providers should not be an issue per se, if there is a real added value in the service providers’ contributions to the projects.

Table 11  
Project budgets implemented through service providers \*

Project	PSP	PROMER	ProPesca	PROSUL
Financial resources implemented through service providers in United States dollars	4 556 165	11 423 400	4 300 000	9 165 503
Financial resources implemented through service providers as percentage of total budget	19.3%	23.3%	7.9%	20.4%
Source of information	PMU	PMU	PMU	PMU

\* No information was available for SBAFP/PPABs and RSFP/PAFIR.

199. Nevertheless, a few challenges remained with respect to the use of service providers for implementation, namely the number of reliable service providers available on the national market, the sunken costs of developing their capacities when service providers are contracted to carry out activities that are not within their traditional mandate and the delays linked to their selection and recruitment.
200. With respect to the availability of reliable service providers in Mozambique, few service providers operate in the country and most of those working for IFAD projects appeared to be overloaded with contracts of a different nature, often outside their traditional areas of specialization. This required IFAD PMUs to dedicate resources and time to the capacity development of service providers staff, so that the latter could implement the activities foreseen in their contracts in a satisfactory manner. This additional step had obvious consequences on work plans and on PMUs staff time, and led to delays in projects implementation. A positive finding however, was that the question initially raised for the evaluation, whether IFAD should spend project funds in developing the capacities of international NGOs recruited as service providers, was not pertinent because most of the latter operate through national branches. This means that eventually, any capacity development effort by IFAD-supported projects contributes to strengthening the overall national capacity.
201. With respect to delays in the selection and recruitment processes of service providers, this had been and will remain a major obstacle to more efficient implementation

unless a satisfactory solution is found that will allow a significant curtailing of lengthy national procedures for the procurement of services.

202. **Efficiency assessment summary.** Although some leniency could be invoked for the delays, due to the early days of e-SISTAFE and for the complexity of some projects that bear a heavy toll on efficiency, the CSPE still considered that the low levels of efficiency was where most weaknesses in the IFAD portfolio became tangible. Based on the weaknesses and gaps identified, the way forward should include action on the following issues: project design, for these to become more realistic and streamlined; contributions from other donors should be harmonized with IFAD procedures for disbursement and financial execution; government organizations should improve their efficiency in establishing PMUs; Service Providers should be engaged and recruited only for those tasks where they bring a real added value; and last, solutions to key bottlenecks should be found by the Government and IFAD, including with respect to the Government's counterpart funds, to enable efficient and effective execution, still harmonized with Government procedures. Overall, the efficiency in portfolio implementation is assessed as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

### **Rural poverty impact**

203. The assessment of impact<sup>50</sup> resulting from IFAD-supported projects across the four domains that follow was largely based on the interviews of approximately 500 beneficiaries by the CSPE team members. These interviews were held because of the lack of data and information from project monitoring systems that would have facilitated a credible analysis of the rural poverty impact of the projects in the portfolio, including for RFSP/PAFIR.<sup>51</sup> As mentioned earlier in the report, this was a limitation of the CSPE which could not be resolved. The sole exception to this source was the evidence drawn from the IOE impact evaluation in 2015/16 of the closed SBAFP/PPABS project.
204. In addition, an important caveat with respect to the impacts that could have been achieved stemmed from the targeting strategy oriented to work with the "small-scale producers who have the potential to expand and commercialize their activities". This entailed that in a broader perspective of poverty alleviation, the number of producers benefiting from project activities was smaller, and improvements in their incomes and food security may have been less visible than if the targeting strategy and value chain development model had been more inclusive. Arguably, in the short term, "better-off" producers will respond faster to the support provided, but in the medium to long term, fewer producers will benefit. There was no analysis of unexpected negative impacts, such as the possible drop in agricultural prices at the local level due to over-production by some or the tying-up of some producers' groups to traders who operate from a monopolistic stance.

### **Household income and net assets**

205. Across all projects, participation in ASCAs and the subsequent access to small loans and interest generated through savings enabled members to buy better quality food and domestic assets (i.e. telephones, bicycles, etc.), to pay for school fees and house improvements, and even to invest in small productive assets such as cattle and goats.
206. PROMER also appeared to have contributed to increased income for the members of farmer's associations. The number of contracts between farmers and traders was also increasing as was the income farmers were obtaining. According to the PMU, the average income of beneficiaries selling their surplus through contract farming arrangements increased from US\$100 in 2012 to US\$170 in 2014 and anecdotal evidence from the CSPE meetings with associations' members confirmed this information.

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<sup>50</sup> At IFAD, impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor, whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended.

<sup>51</sup> As already stated, the CSPE did not assess impact for PROSUL.

207. The evidence of PSP's impact on rural poverty was lower, due to the very nature of the project: The PSP supports the Agricultural Extension Service, which in turn supports smallholder farmers, which makes the causality chain long and complex, and even proving contributions becomes a difficult exercise. Nevertheless, initiatives like the introduction through the PSP of the biological control of the Diamondback moth (DBM) in some farmers' associations in Manica Province, and the NAES vigilant support to ensure that the terms of contracts with an agro-dealer were respected are sufficiently robust examples of a link between PSP support and increased incomes at the household level.
208. In the fisheries sector, the IOE impact evaluation showed that overall, SBAFP/PPABS had a positive impact on household incomes and assets. The percentage of households living above the poverty line was higher for the project beneficiaries than for households in the comparison group. Also, significantly higher household monthly incomes and higher assets ownership were found among the beneficiaries than in the comparison group. SBAFP/PPABS also contributed greatly to improved community and individuals' access to social infrastructures such as water points, health centres and schools that had a positive impact on the quality of life of poor artisanal fishing households and communities.
209. Furthermore, the achievement of the SBAFP/PPABAS project in linking project beneficiaries to ASCAs was impressive, and this had a direct positive effect on the assets and incomes of members and led to increased personal savings and improved investment capacity in the artisanal fishery sector. However, effective links with the formal financial sector were not created and there was no evidence that individual ASCA groups have become federated into viable institutions with a greater voice and capability to link to formal and/or commercial financial institutions to access larger loans, which, overall, weakens the impact of the project in increasing access to rural finance.
210. With respect to ProPesca, a baseline assessment of socio-economic wellbeing of the targeted beneficiaries was carried out at the beginning of the project, and its follow-up was under preparation at the time of the CSPE as part of a regular five-year exercise by IDEPA. No data were available at the time of the CSPE, nor was evidence found about impacts that could be related to ProPesca in the sites visited by the CSPE. Similarly, there was no evidence available about impacts on incomes, generated from CHAPANI.
211. Improvements and rehabilitation of roads and bridges by all projects also resulted in economic benefits, according to the people interviewed. Farmers had better access to markets and selling points, even during the rainy season, and traders could access more easily remote productive areas using vehicles with greater capacity, reducing the transport costs. This opened up the possibility of new farming contracts for IFAD-supported associations.

### **Human and social capital and empowerment**

212. Overall, the IFAD-supported portfolio did contribute significantly to enhance the human capital of the large majority of its beneficiaries among the rural poor. Virtually all projects invested in developing the capacities of farmers and fishers through awareness-raising, formal trainings, learning by doing (FFS, demonstration fields) and advisory services. Associations' and groups' members acquired technical, organizational and managerial skills, such as planning, basic accounting and financial management, marketing, technical knowledge on conservation agricultural, horticulture, nutrition and food-processing technologies, fishing techniques and sustainable NRM. Farmers in particular, more than fishers due to lack of access to improved factors of production, were better able to make informed decisions about production (what, how, when), marketing (prices, traders) and future investments.
213. ASCAs so far had proven to be the most empowering institutions supported by all projects, especially for women. The ASCAs made financial resources available so that



the women could provide for themselves and their children without being entirely dependent on their husbands. The ASCAs promoted by IFAD-supported projects did more than just provide financial services – significant social capital was also built. Membership in an ASCA created strong bonds and a sense of solidarity within and across the groups. In addition, members’ financial literacy, an important empowering skill, was developed systematically.

214. PROMER and PSP contributed to enhancing social capital through their support to farmers’ associations. During the field visits, members of several associations proudly made well-structured presentations of their history, crops, planted areas, annual production, prices and revenue obtained and discussed their plans for the following year, including opening bank accounts, duplication of storage facilities, building storage facilities, and reaching out to other buyers. Also mentioned were their main constraints, among which were a lack of financial services, lack of mechanization for increasing the area, and a limited number of traders. Notably, they were aware of the importance of taking collective action to take advantage of arising opportunities.
215. Furthermore, PROMER’s supported functional literacy programme had a strong empowering impact, specifically for rural women. The CSPE had the opportunity to meet with women’s groups who expressed their satisfaction for the impressive change in their lives brought about by the functional literacy training programme.
216. In the fisheries sector, SBAFP/PPABS was a milestone with regards to social capital and empowerment, actively engaging the artisanal fishery communities in local development processes and empowering them with the local governments. However, the impact evaluation showed that five years after completion, participation in associations was low in the project area.
217. Work by ProPesca and partly by ProDIRPA with fishers’ and fish processors’ associations, fisheries community councils, establishment of market management groups, bodes well in terms of empowerment and strengthening fisher’s social capital. It appeared however that more efforts were required in this sense, through more empowering support to the existing groups.

#### **Food security and agricultural productivity**

218. As mentioned earlier in the report, food security was not mentioned in the 2004 and 2011 COSOPs and only PROSUL included a reference to food security in its objective framework. This gap notwithstanding, the CSPE identified some evidence of impacts on household food security through project activities.
219. PSP was contributing to improved household food security by enabling wider access for more farming households to effective extension services that promoted diversified agricultural production such as vegetable gardens, introducing more productive and less labour-intensive cropping practices, and carrying out poultry life-saving vaccination campaigns, among others. Concrete results of the extension work on improved food security and nutrition however were difficult to assess, given the how dispersed the action was, the absence of an outcome-focused monitoring and reporting system and the long causality chain between the project and producers.
220. One of the criteria for the selection of the value chains in PROSUL was their contribution to household income and food security, however the project design did not include any specific activity in this sense and did not benefit of the EU grant for nutrition. Nevertheless, meetings with the beneficiaries suggested that part of the income from the sale of agricultural products and cattle was being used for diversifying the household diet, and that vegetables produced in the horticulture schemes and vegetable gardens in the boreholes areas were also contributing to better household nutrition.
221. In the PROMER and PSP areas, the introduction of simple agricultural technologies (improved seeds, basic sowing techniques) supported by relevant capacity-building efforts, resulted in an increase in productivity and production. During the field visits,

farmers stated that part of the production, and most of the kitchen gardens produce, was consumed at home and part of the income generated was spent in further improving the quantity and quality of the diet. These were reasonable indicators of an overall positive impact on households' food and nutrition security.

222. Anecdotal evidence about the nutrition education work by CHAPANI showed a reasonable and lasting impact on improved diets for children. Food and nutrition security should also be strengthened in the short term through the incipient implementation of the MDG1c-funded nutritional education components in PROMER and ProPesca. And it could also be reasonably expected that in the medium to long term, awareness of the importance of a healthy and balanced diet will increase through the integration of the nutrition education modules in the curriculum of the FFS. Whether the latter however will result in improved food and nutritional security will remain to be seen. In all of this, adequate monitoring of the nutritional status of beneficiaries of IFAD-supported projects could bring strong credibility to the whole portfolio, also because many other organizations work in this direction and it was not easy, nor it will be in future, to attribute results to IFAD-supported interventions.
223. In the fisheries sector, although the impact of SBAFP/PPABS on food security was assessed as positive by the 2010 CPE and the 2014 CPRV, the 2016 impact evaluation assessed it to be marginal and not significant, when compared to households located in the impact evaluation control areas.
224. No data were available on impacts on catches from the IFAD-supported projects in the fisheries and aquaculture sector. However, fish landings from the small-scale fisheries subsector have steadily increased over the past couple of decades. The 2014 fish landing data showed an increase of 24 per cent over 2012 landings in marine finfish captures, and the country's annual production of fishery products in 2015 was 289,000 tonnes, of which 90 per cent came from small-scale fisheries. Currently, ongoing analyses by all projects should provide further information on the actual source of the catches, whether fisheries or aquaculture. Although the causal link, or attribution, between the IFAD-supported projects and the recorded increase has not been established, it is reasonable to argue that the impact on productivity may have been generated by SBAFP/PPBAS, ProPesca and PROAQUA.

#### **Institutions and policies**

225. IFAD's portfolio was found to be highly successful in developing the capacities and skills of staff in both governmental institutions and service providers, with which IFAD worked and through which the portfolio had been implemented, as discussed here below.
226. PSP focused on strengthening the public extension service at all levels, from national to district, through institutional support (salary incentives, transport means, computer equipment and operating costs) and capacity development events on technical, managerial and financial aspects. As a result, well-trained and adequately equipped staff were capable of providing higher-quality extension services to a larger number of smallholder farmers. PSP was also supporting the development of the National Extension Monitoring and Evaluation System (SMEA), which should allow more accurate monitoring of the NAES coverage and outputs, and contribute to better informed decision-making on agricultural development issues.
227. PROMER was planning to support the training of National Road Agency staff in the construction and rehabilitation of climate change-resilient roads, and all concerned IFAD-supported loans invested in this type of rehabilitation in their respective areas of intervention. This was in compliance with the recently approved New Strategy for Roads that made the application of more climate-resilient designs for both existing and newly-constructed feeder roads mandatory.
228. PROMER has been supporting the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in the dissemination of market information through community radios. The project was also

lobbying with the district governments for them to cover the cost of market information gathering.

229. Some legacy resulted from RFSP/PAFIR, in terms of strengthening the capacity of the Central Bank of Mozambique in its approach to rural finance and in contributing to the elaboration of the National Rural Finance Strategy in 2011. In addition, the project contributed to support AMOMIF (the Microfinance Institutions Association) and create the Rural Finance Reference Group in MITADER, which promotes rural finance policy dialogue among all industry stakeholders.
230. SBAFP/PPABS was instrumental in setting into motion an impressive process of institutional change and policy reform in the sector, which was still in place and tailored to the Government's decentralized administration. This was mostly visible through the adoption of PESPA 2006-2016, supported by the project, to guide the development of artisanal fisheries, and the ongoing elaboration, in September 2016, of PESPA II. Also, the establishment of a fishing exclusion zone protecting the interests of artisanal fishers through the formulation and adoption of sectoral policies and management measures, and the diversification of fishing practices and technologies resulted in a slightly higher fish production for the beneficiary group.
231. The long-term collaboration between IFAD and the Government's artisanal fisheries organizations had led to – in the words of the direct stakeholders – huge gains in learning and capacity development, all of which was an added value both for the organizations and the producers. The full integration of the ProPesca team in IDEPA will also be a guarantee of long-lasting impacts from the learning and experience gained from the project. With respect to ProDIRPA however, no impacts at the institutional level could be identified.
232. **Rural poverty impact – summary.** The strongest impact was visible in food security, through capacity development of farmers on simple but appropriate technologies; and on institutional development. However, with respect to food security, the lack of robust data does not allow any firm conclusion on the longer-term impacts from the improved productions and access to markets. As in the case of effectiveness, the main obstacle to more positive impacts on incomes and assets was a direct consequence of the gap in making accessible financial services for beneficiaries to profitably engage in the proposed value chains. During the time left for ongoing projects, filling this gap, supported by outcome- and impact-focused M&E systems, should be the absolute priority. Overall rating for rural poverty impact was thus assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **Sustainability of benefits**

233. Sustainability relates to the likelihood that the stream of benefits generated by the project would continue after closure. The CSPE analysed the following critical aspects of sustainability: (i) economic and technical; (ii) institutional; and (iii) social. Similar to impacts, the assessment of sustainability for the ongoing projects should be considered as "potential", considering that all projects at the time of the CSPE with the exception of ProDIRPA, still had between 18 and 24 months to make progress in implementation.<sup>52</sup>
234. In terms of **economic and technical sustainability**, most projects did invest considerable time and resources in developing the technical and managerial capacities of farmers, breeders, fishers and traders to some extent. The knowledge and skills acquired, for example by farmers on agricultural techniques, by fishers with respect to the use of ice on board their boats, and by fishmongers on fish processing and transformation, to mention a few, will likely remain with beneficiaries, and enable them to improve their production through enhanced productivity. However, the capacity of farmers' and fishers' associations to maintain their engagement in the value chains beyond projects' lives will vary across the portfolio, depending on the

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<sup>52</sup> The CSPE did not assess the sustainability criterion for PROSUL.

robustness of the links developed with traders during the projects, and on the level of benefits producers will maintain over time.

235. PROMER strengthened technical, managerial and financial capacities of value chain actors in three categories of associations to ensure the sustainability of the established market linkages. The most developed associations should easily continue operating with traders and markets, together with some associations in the medium--strength category, that may also grow further. For example, some associations had already independently established farming contracts with new traders, and were getting reasonably good prices and others had access to credit from the District Development Fund without the support of the project. However, the capacity of the third group to remain connected to traders appeared weaker and the project exit strategy may need to provide specific attention to these to prevent the loss of all benefits achieved so far.
236. With respect to the sustainability of the value chains under development, in particular for ProPesca, but not only, all efforts so far will likely fail unless appropriate financial products beyond the ASCAs are universally accessible to beneficiaries before the end of the projects. The progress made by ProPesca in 2016 in developing new financial products represented a great stride in this direction and the project could still achieve robust results. Should this not happen however, and should results closer to project completion date still be fragile, adequate measures should be taken to allow a proper handover of the pending work to the envisaged new IFAD-supported project on rural finance.
237. The FFS and farmers' associations supported by PSP were at various stages of strength and development. Well-trained extension staff will likely have the capacity to continue providing adequate extension services after the project closure, and the enhanced relation between NAES and producers, thanks to the project's operational support, should bode well for long-term constructive collaboration. This however will only be sustained if, when and where the NAES has sufficient operational capacity, including transport means, fuel, daily allowances, equipment and inputs, to be an active, visible and useful presence for farmers. The proof of this was visible in those non-priority districts where the NAES was not supported by PSP, and faced significant challenges in its work.
238. The responsibility for maintenance of infrastructure constructed by IFAD-supported projects, namely roads, markets and cattle fairs, was automatically handed over to the local government institutions, i.e. municipal councils and district administrations, once the works were completed. The evidence stemming from the SBAFP/PPABS with respect to post-project maintenance of the social infrastructures was not promising and the CSPE noted that maintenance of earlier completed roads and water points in the markets was not always properly conducted, due to financial constraints. In this respect, the current national financial crisis may enhance the risk of limited or no maintenance, and loss of investments. To the knowledge of the CSPE, no project engaged so far in strengthening the capacity of farmers' and fishers' associations to negotiate with local authorities about maintenance of public infrastructures important to their livelihoods and economic activities. Whether this could be an option for some projects in the context of their exit strategies, possibly supported and coordinated by the ICO in consideration of its broader interest in safeguarding investments, could be a matter for discussion.
239. SBAFP/PPABS did not develop an exit strategy, which would have helped in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and actors in ensuring that beneficiaries received the necessary inputs and services after completion. However, the project was part of a longer chain of IFAD support to the artisanal fisheries subsector and the ongoing ProPesca did address some of the technical challenges left pending by SBAFP/PPABS. Conversely, the grass-roots institutions established by the latter for the management of social infrastructures were too weak to gain standing in

dialogue with governmental authorities and resource allocation processes, and their survival was often challenged.

240. In terms of **institutional sustainability**, SBAFP/PPABS' strong legacy was the support and empowerment of the provincial delegations and the improvement of the operational capacity of the governmental structure of the fishery sector at all levels, which were still visible by the time of the CSPE. The implementation of the project through a governmental organization ensured stability of Government support; the same appeared to apply to the sustainability perspectives of ProPesca, which is fully embedded within IDEPA. Similarly, PSP was working from within the National Directorate for Agricultural Extension (DNEA) and its activities were entirely mainstreamed in the regular operations of the NAES, which bodes well for the long term. Furthermore, institutional sustainability was also manifest through the links that had been established across governmental organizations, for example with National Road Agency and the Energy Fund. The latter was highly interested in continuing its collaboration with IDEPA and IFAD.
241. Conversely, the PMUs of PROSUL and PROMER operated rather independently from the governmental organizations responsible for the projects. Here there will be a need for further strengthening the institutional linkages at national, provincial and district levels and promoting governmental ownership of project activities.
242. With respect to RFSP/PAFIR, the PCRV raised several concerns relating to the institutional sustainability of most of the project's outputs, with an exception made for the ASCAs. The CSPE received no information on the current situation of the matching grant facility, which represented the main investment facility for the Fund for Economic Rehabilitation. Prevailing views among stakeholders were that most microfinance SPs supported by RFSP/PAFIR had no real capacity to deliver the required services and were not interested in a long-term engagement in this endeavour. However, a few microfinance institutions out of the 94 that had been supported by the project were still active in rural districts at the time of the CSPE.
243. In terms of **social sustainability**, ASCAs established and supported by all projects appeared to have the best chances to sustain themselves beyond the projects' lives, given the high level of cohesion and interest of participants, the appropriateness of the mechanism to the social context, the growing financial literacy of members and most important, the strong financial and economic benefits they generate. In fact, many ASCAs already functioned independently and were very likely to continue doing so.
244. Similarly, social sustainability appeared assured for the benefits of the functional literacy training promoted by PROMER; most beneficiaries also showed interest in enrolling in more advanced literacy training courses and if resources are made available, through the project or the Government, the benefits will grow and expand over time. Conversely, the strength and cohesion of groups supported by both PSP and ProPesca did not appear sufficient yet to ensure sustained functioning; this is an area where the exit strategy may help in filling the existing gaps.
245. Last, but not least, no project had developed an exit strategy by the time of the CSPE. This may have been the result of a strong focus still on implementation, even in projects with 18 months to go. However, adequate planning for an exit strategy should be part of the pathway to impact and sustainability from the early phases of project implementation. Exit strategies should consider: (i) the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and actors in ensuring that beneficiaries receive the necessary inputs and services after completion; in the case of the ongoing projects, the availability of rural financial services will be crucial; (ii) post-project operation and maintenance requirements and responsibilities for the infrastructures developed during the project's lifetime; and (iii) strengthening of grass-roots institutions to give them more leverage in policy dialogue.

246. **Sustainability of benefits – summary.** The main driver for sustainability was the strong integration between some PMUs and line ministries and the efforts on capacity development at all levels. Threats exist nonetheless, in particular on the perspectives of sustained benefits for farmers and fishers from the value chains: this concern should be at the core of the preparation of robust exit strategies for the projects coming to completion over the next 18-24 months. Altogether, the three dimensions of sustainability for the portfolio are assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## **B. Other performance criteria**

### **Innovation and scaling up**

247. The assessment of innovation and scaling up is the extent to which IFAD projects (i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) were, or will likely be scaled up by governmental organizations, donors, the private sector and other agencies.
248. Overall, several innovations previously unknown in the intervention areas, though usually already in use and well known outside Mozambique, have been introduced through the projects, either by design or during implementation on various topics, including agriculture technologies, value chain development and infrastructure.<sup>53</sup>
249. Insofar as agricultural technologies were concerned, in collaboration with two IFAD regional grants, the PSP enabled the piloting of both plant clinics and DBM biological control in the project districts with very promising results. DNEA was planning to gradually integrate these two initiatives in the public extension agenda throughout the country, where appropriate and applicable.
250. In the artisanal fisheries subsector, SBAFP/PPABS and ProPesca introduced a number of fishing gear and boat-construction technologies, including use of ice on board boats, as well as solar-powered ice-makers and freezer systems, that were innovative for the country. In mid-2016, ProPesca was also introducing on a pilot scale, navigation equipment that may prove to be a viable and useful investment for boat owners, both in terms of increased capture and enhanced safety at sea. Another potentially important innovation, whose acceptability and sustainability however had not yet been proven, was the full utilization of the fish, including scales and skins, for handicraft and other non-edible products for market.
251. In infrastructures, the IFAD portfolio contributed to the application of climate change resilient standards for the rehabilitation of rural roads, a new mandatory standard requirement for all roads.
252. Value chain development on different products in agriculture, livestock and artisanal fisheries was possibly the core innovative aspect of the IFAD portfolio in Mozambique. The comprehensive value chain model promoted by PROMER and by the sequence of SBAFP/PPABS and ProPesca integrates most of the required elements for linking poor producers with markets, including: (i) physical infrastructures such as roads, market-places, storage and processing units; (ii) capacity development of producers and adoption of new cropping, breeding, fishing and processing techniques and of new crops, so that better quality and more and diversified production can be achieved; (iii) support to farmers' associations for the negotiation of more profitable sales contracts in bulk; (iv) capacity development of traders; (v) improved communication with market information; and (vi) negotiation of fair contract farming conditions. The model also foresees improving access of participants to rural financial products. In the case of PROMER, moreover, the addition of functional literacy proved to be highly successful and relevant and merits scaling up.
253. **Scaling up.** By the time of the CSPE, some of the innovations introduced by IFAD-supported projects had already been scaled up through wider adoption, e.g. using ice on board artisanal fishers' boats; or integrated in the Government's standards and

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<sup>53</sup> The CSPE did not assess the innovation criterion for PROSUL.

programmes, as was the case for the climate change resilient roads, the plant clinics and DBM biological control. Although there was no evidence of a common strategy leading to successful upscaling, also due to the diversity across the innovations and users, two commonalities across the three innovations were identified: (i) the clear and short causality chain between the adoption of the innovation and the enhancement of quality and production in the case of ice on board and plant pest and disease control respectively; and (ii) an enabling institutional environment that was open to innovate and ready to support the upscaling. For other innovations that will prove their worth, the ICO and PMUs need to allocate time and resources to collect, analyse and document the results, which is part of a knowledge management process, and if appropriate, disseminate these through communication and training activities.

254. **Innovation and scaling up – summary.** Several projects introduced innovations in farming and fishing technologies, on approaches to value chain development and on resilience to climate change. Scaling up was also proving successful on those technologies that did not need additional inputs, such as credit, for broader adoptions. The CSPE rates innovation and scaling up as **satisfactory** (5).

### **Gender equality and women's empowerment**

255. This section analyses the extent to which the portfolio and the two COSOPs under evaluation contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision-making; and workload balance between men and women.
256. The 2004 COSOP gave strong visibility to gender equality and women's empowerment by raising the corporate commitment to the level of cross-cutting strategic focus, together with HIV and AIDS. The 2011 COSOP only foresaw that each project should develop an "inclusion and gender strategy", with no further detail. Most project design reports established clear targets for including women among project beneficiaries. Reported figures on outreach (see tables 6 and 7 above) indicated that by the time of the CSPE, the target requirements were largely being met. With respect to the preparation and implementation of related strategies, progress was more uneven.
257. ProPesca correctly decided to refer to the IDEPA Gender Strategy 2009-2013 as the overall framework of reference for the development of a project Gender and Social Inclusion Plan for the period 2014-2016. This plan was prepared by a thorough consultation process with women and had different provisions depending on the cultural contexts of the different provinces. A gender specialist in the PMU was responsible for the implementation of the plan, which included capacity development and awareness-building to increase women's access to fisheries resources.<sup>54</sup> The project also included a Fund for the Promotion of Female Entrepreneurs, which had recently been converted into a special fund for women working on fish transformation and conservation. The collection of gender-disaggregated statistics had also improved, though the PMU acknowledged that no specific data analysis had been carried out so far.
258. PROMER conducted a gender baseline in 2009, which was reviewed in 2014 and assessed in 2016. Its findings were the basis for the elaboration of a gender action plan, based on the Gender Action Learning System approach, which also took into account to some extent a youth inclusion perspective, and proposed both mainstreamed and pilot actions. The PMU included a gender focal point, a solution that may not prove to be sufficient considering the challenges raised by the action plan.
259. Like ProPesca, PSP and PROSUL decided to defer their approach on gender issues to a national gender strategy for agriculture. PROSUL indeed contributed, financially and through the PMU's gender officer, to the development of a new MASA gender

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<sup>54</sup> ProPesca design report also foresaw functional literacy to be integrated in the support to ASCAs. The CSPE did not find any evidence of this activity.

strategy;<sup>55</sup> a final draft was ready for discussions within the Ministry in September 2016, with a view to finalize it as soon as possible.

260. For PROSUL, women constituted a direct target group in all value chains and the project should pilot the implementation of Gender Action Learning System to ensure that gender equity is mainstreamed in all aspects of project implementation. The Gender Unit in IFAD's Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA) and the ESA Gender Desk in the IFAD IRON office in Nairobi provided capacity development to PROSUL on Gender Action Learning System on one occasion, also extended to all ongoing projects, and more was planned in the future. Nevertheless, there was no tangible evidence of any progress in this respect. For example, the project could not provide gender-disaggregated data with respect to the support provided in access to the land use rights (DUATs) through its land tenure component.
261. **With respect to results in improved access to advisory services**, the PSP emphasized agricultural extension strategies encouraging women to take up leading positions in groups and associations, thus contributing to the expression of their needs, but did not establish targets. Extension agents in the project districts had been exposed to gender equality modules in their training. Although evidence from the field visits suggested that women farmers do attend meetings and discussions with extension agents, it also suggested that much more systematic and in-depth capacity development and support were necessary, and over the long term, to achieve tangible results in this respect and avoid that integration of a gender perspective in agriculture remains confined to a few token actions. For example, cooking demonstrations conducted by male extension agents may raise some awareness among men and women alike on the importance of a balanced diet, but are unlikely to trigger significant changes in household dietary patterns.
262. **With respect to improved participation in decision-making**, two main results emerged:
- (a) Over 70 per cent of the farmers' associations supported by PROMER had women in leadership positions and 11 per cent of the associations only comprised women. Along with having improved their negotiation skills and ability to deal with traders, women appeared to be more respected in their communities and participated in the local decision-making committees;
  - (b) An uncontroversial success in women's empowerment throughout the whole portfolio was represented by the ASCAs, as had also been reported in the 2010 CPE. Although some variations in participation existed across projects, in general women were the large majority of ASCAs membership. ASCAs contribute to members' financial literacy, social empowerment, enhanced access to, and possibly ownership of, assets, and to an overall improvement of livelihoods. A second highly successful initiative, and strongly empowering at the individual level, were the functional literacy courses supported by PROMER in the farmers' associations engaging with the project. Anecdotal evidence suggested that both types of interventions enhance women's decision-making power in the households, although the same evidence also indicated that violence against women in rural areas went unabated and unchallenged, which raised some key questions on the actual meaning of empowerment.
263. **Gender equality and women's empowerment – summary.** In conclusion, the assessment of the portfolio against the three sub-indicators for gender equality and women's empowerment was as follows:
- (a) Women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services: more women have access to advisory services in all areas supported by the project portfolio; possibly the lack of gender disaggregation in monitoring led to an

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<sup>55</sup> The first Gender Strategy in the Ministry of Agriculture, developed in 2005, was no longer relevant. The Gender Unit comprised in 2016 of one gender focal point in the Policy Analysis Division.



under-estimation of improved access for women to assets and resources, and the only strong evidence in this respect was associated to the ASCAs;

- (b) Participation in decision-making: in some cases, projects have enabled women to take on leadership roles in producers' organizations; only anecdotal evidence was available about changes in the intra-household decision-making;
  - (c) Workload balance between men and women: no project had addressed this issue.
264. Thus, although efforts have been made to improve the awareness and competence of staff in PMUs and governmental organizations on gender equality issues, and significant results have been achieved with respect to women's participation in projects' activities, consequent changes in the perceptions of the role of women, their empowerment and progress towards gender equality goals remained somewhat elusive at community and household level. More effort appeared to be necessary to improve gender analysis during planning, implementation, M&E (including for systematically collecting sex-disaggregated data) and raising awareness on the ways in which perceptions of the position and roles of women can be changed among male and female beneficiaries.
265. These findings broadly correspond to the descriptor provided in IFAD's gender markers at completion or evaluation level, for partial gender mainstreaming. This entails making a partial contribution to addressing gender needs and promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; addressing two of the gender policy objectives; facilitating the participation of women who account for a significant number of beneficiaries. Hence, the CSPE assessed this indicator to be **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **Environment and natural resources management**

266. The 2004 COSOP mentioned NRM only as one of the thrusts that are core to rural development, with no further elaboration. Since then, IFAD developed its first Climate Change Strategy in 2010 and the 2011 COSOP identified NRM as one of the main thrusts of its strategic objective 1, while also recognizing climate change as an important, albeit generic challenge.
267. In this context, NRM and adaptation to climate change were not a highlight of IFAD's portfolio under evaluation, even though Mozambique is a particularly vulnerable country to the impacts of climate change; over the last two decades, the country has been exposed to a higher incidence of droughts and flooding, often at the same time in different regions. Poor rural households who depend on agriculture and artisanal fisheries for their livelihoods are particularly affected by and vulnerable to the extreme events per se, as well as to the effects of climate change on rainfall and temperature patterns and on the availability of fisheries resources.
268. In the agricultural sector, only PROSUL made specific reference to NRM in its design report, foreseeing the development of community-based NRM plans for the red meats value chain. By the time of the CSPE, no progress had been made in this respect. However, although respective design reports did not include NRM, other projects expanded their activities in this sense during implementation, as follows:
- PROMER promoted improved agricultural practices to reduce extensive and often environmentally destructive cultivation practices such as slash-and-burn;
  - PSP piloted the DBM biological control technology, which should be up-scaled as a standard NAES package.
269. In the artisanal fisheries sector, despite the groundwork of SBAFP/PPABS in improving the management of artisanal fisheries through the creation and support of community fisheries councils (CCPs), ProPesca did not follow-up adequately on these achievements by incorporating environmental and NRM concerns in its design. In terms of results, the bulk of environmental awareness in fishing communities was achieved under SBAFP/PPABS and the task for putting this into practice was then

handed over to the CCPs. These structures are key in the management of fisheries at community level, but at the time of the evaluation, still lacked the resources and capacity to effectively pursue their mandate. For example, even when legalized, they lacked enforcement authority and faced financial challenges threatening their existence in general. Furthermore, the evaluation did not see sufficient evidence of empowerment and capacities across the CCPs to tackle the challenges they were confronted with.

270. SBAFP/PPABS foundational work in this respect should have been followed up by ProDIRPA, whose objective was to support the implementation of co-management at the local level through the CCPs. Again, delays in its implementation have affected co-management work at field level. Overall, the importance of this mechanism for sustainable fisheries-based livelihoods did not appear to be well catered to by the overall limited remit of ProDIRPA.
271. Finally, ProPesca's support to fisheries research also appeared insufficient. This component was supposed to assess fish stock levels and inform fisheries management. Although progress had been made for a number of species, delays in financial execution significantly affected the implementation of this component. Consequently, the information generated by the stock assessments could not be used during project life for planning and co-management purposes. Similarly, ProDIRPA started mapping resources in Nampula, Sofala and Zambezia Provinces, but it appeared unlikely that this work could be completed by project end, unless it is extended.
272. **Natural resources management – summary.** This criterion tackled issues that played a paramount role in alleviating rural poverty and improving the livelihoods of rural producers, and the importance of sustainable NRM has been recognized and considered "inseparable from IFAD's mission"<sup>56</sup> for a long time. Thus, much stronger attention to sustainable NRM was due in project designs dealing with rural poverty, and NRM itself in the current portfolio. In this context, and despite visible efforts in some projects to integrate these concerns, the CSPE assessed this criterion as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

#### **Adaptation to climate change**

273. With respect to adaptation to climate change, in the current portfolio only PROSUL integrated a relevant added-on component that represented the first grant financed by IFAD's ASAP fund. The aim of this component was to increase the climate resilience of the three PROSUL value chains and reduce the impact of climate change on the productivity and profitability of the smallholder farming systems at stake. Funds were being used as follows:
- Diversification of horticultural crops and promotion of more climate-resilient practices, e.g. the use of shade-cloth greenhouses and the establishment of a basic meteorological facility;
  - Development of a commercial system for the multiplication of new high-yielding, drought and pest-resistant cassava varieties; supply of a quality inputs start-up kit and development of cost-effective climate-resilient packages to ensure appropriate, climate-resilient crop- and soil management practices;
  - Construction of multifunctional boreholes, establishment of fodder banks and hay-making training and the development of community-based NRM for cattle breeding.
274. Although it was too early to assess the long-term sustainability of any of these measures, it had already emerged that the cost of shade-cloth greenhouses was far too high to become an interesting and viable investment for Mozambican farmers.

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<sup>56</sup> IFAD Climate Change Strategy, EB 2010/99/R.2/Rev.1.

275. During the MTR it was decided that PROMER should take on a more active role in addressing climate risks. It has thus been planned that the project in its second phase, should promote the rehabilitation of climate-change-resilient roads. Furthermore, the project was planning to allocate funds to introduce adaptation measures including: (i) messages about climate change impact on agriculture and adaptation measures on community radios, (ii) a module on climate change adaptation in the FFS curriculum, (iii) building the capacity of district officers for monitoring the maintenance and rehabilitation of climate-change-resilient roads, and (iv) training SPs to support the development of farmers' associations in climate change adaptation.
276. The PSP, although not initially foreseen, also integrated the promotion of conservation agriculture and small-scale irrigation as part of the NAES effort to address the effects of climate change.
277. In ProPesca, the project design report did not take climate change into consideration despite the strong impact this has on fisheries' resources. This emerged very clearly during the limited interactions the CSPE had with fishing communities in Nampula Province, where interviewees systematically described how livelihoods were affected by decreasing catches and unsafe, unusual weather conditions for fishing, and how sturdier boats and gear for off-shore fishing were lacking. It is arguable that even back in 2011 this area of work should have been given greater consideration in the project's core thrust. During implementation, in addition to the shift to climate-resilient road rehabilitation, climate change adaptation was also indirectly promoted in target communities through diversification of income sources, e.g. membership of ASCAs and targeting of under-exploited fish species, training of professionals to improve the sea-worthiness of boats and use of ice on board to maximize fishing days in times of good weather, and safety at sea. CCPs have also an important role in raising awareness and providing information on weather conditions to their communities.
278. Finally, the recruitment of an ASAP junior expert posted in the ICO to provide support on climate change adaptation to PROSUL and other IFAD-supported projects should significantly contribute to raising awareness and developing the capacity of PMUs and partners to mainstreaming climate change adaptation in project components, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of their activities and strengthening the adaptive capacity of beneficiaries.
279. **Climate change – summary.** IFAD developed its Climate Change Strategy in 2010, which means that more projects in Mozambique should have integrated this perspective in their design reports. Nevertheless, adjustments during implementation across most projects bode well for future results and the CSPE assessed this criterion **as moderately satisfactory (4).**

### **C. Overall project portfolio**

280. The overall implementation of the project portfolio under evaluation benefited of a number of elements, including: good level of project alignment with the Government's priorities and a strong sense of ownership by governmental organizations for all projects; good credibility of IFAD as a partner that led to excellent performance in leveraging additional resources, which also contributed to enhancing the relevance of, and fill gaps in projects' thrusts; competent and committed PMUs; the introduction of some important innovations; and the strong focus on institutional development of the whole portfolio.
281. At the same time, performance has been significantly hampered by a number of key factors: complex project designs; long inception periods partly stemming from design complexity, partly by harmonization with the national system for financial execution; significant delays in implementation due to lengthy procedures within the Government and with some international partners; and failure to provide access to appropriate financial products for projects' beneficiaries to effectively engage in value chains.

Other factors also undermined to some extent effectiveness and impact, including the limited capacity to integrate a gender equality approach in project implementation and the very limited attention in project design to NRM and climate change adaptation.

282. Taking into consideration the above and the assessment of all the evaluation criteria, the overall project portfolio achievement is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**. Table 12 provides a summary of portfolio ratings, while details by project are presented in annex II.

Table 12  
**Assessment of project portfolio achievement**

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>CSPE rating</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	4
<b>Project performance</b>	
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	3
Sustainability of benefits	4
<b>Other performance criteria</b>	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4
Innovation and scaling up	5
Environment and NRM	3
Adaptation to climate change	4
<b>Overall project portfolio achievement</b>	<b>4</b>

### Key points

- The loan portfolio was well-aligned with Government policies and strategies, and over time, it enhanced its relevance to IFAD's overarching goals. Strong Government ownership was also an important feature.
- Work was in progress with respect to achievement of results, including on the initially neglected objectives of food security and nutrition; arguably, most projects should be able to take significant steps towards expected results before completion, however only if the respective rural finance components gain strength and fill in the current crucial gap in the value chain model. However, no project dedicated any attention to PLWH, although this was foreseen in two project designs and was a national priority.
- Low efficiency triggered by multiple causes risks jeopardizing the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of most projects. Bottlenecks have been identified and urgent action on all of them will be required to enable smooth implementation in future.
- Institutional sustainability appeared strong, due to good integration between some PMUs and line ministries and the efforts on capacity development at all levels.
- The portfolio was quite innovative, and bodes well for scaling up on farming and fishing technologies, approaches to value chain development and resilience to climate change.
- All projects paid good attention to integrating women among beneficiaries and some levels of empowerment were visible; however more sustained efforts are necessary to focus on gender equality rather than "adding women", learning from the positive experience so far.
- The thrust of the portfolio required a much stronger focus on NRM; however, the attention given to climate change adaptation may represent a positive step forward in tackling both issues.

## **IV. Non-lending activities**

283. This section assesses IFAD's performance in Mozambique in carrying out non-lending activities, namely knowledge management, policy dialogue and partnership-building. In the context of knowledge management, also the M&E systems of both programme and projects are discussed. Each of the three areas was analysed and rated individually and a final consolidated scoring was provided. In addition, an assessment is presented of IFAD's national grant-funded projects implemented in Mozambique in 2010-2016, and of two selected regional grants that funded activities in Mozambique during the same period. Finally, within the partnership-building perspective, a brief description of IFAD's support to South-South and Triangular Cooperation with Mozambique is provided.

### **A. Knowledge management**

284. The 2011 COSOP included knowledge management as an important area of work "contributing to policy dialogue and innovation", to be carried out under almost the full responsibility of the Country Programme Team. Evidence for knowledge management would stem from a "programme M&E system", managed by a programme support group responsible for implementing a knowledge management programme strategy underpinned by project-level knowledge management strategies. Areas of focus for knowledge management were also identified in the Results Management Framework, linking projects to strategic objectives, as part of the policy dialogue agenda.
285. The annual reviews of the COSOP identified early on that project M&E systems were focused on output indicators, and that a disconnect existed across the outcome and impact indicators of projects and COSOP. This clearly hampered the possibility of establishing a programme M&E system fed from a direct flow of information and lessons from the projects. A positive step to address this gap was made in the second half of 2016, with a strong potential to make a dent in future M&E systems, with the ICO recruiting a consultant to support projects in identifying outcome indicators, informed by a gender equality perspective. This appeared to be a very useful step, as projects should be able to better report on their results. Also, the ICO itself should be able to learn important lessons from this effort, feeding into the preparation of a truly results-based strategic COSOP, and ensuring better harmonization upward and downward across outcome-level indicators for both projects and the country programme.
286. Also, all COSOP reviews stressed the need to "do more" on knowledge management, with the ICO taking the lead role in this. Evidence available to the CSPE showed a progressive intensification of knowledge management activities and outputs over time. In 2014, a major step forward was the establishment of the SPCU (IFAD Sub-Programme Coordination Unit) with resources from the EU-funded MDG1c. The mandate of this M&E and knowledge management unit was to provide support and coordination to the IFAD initiatives funded through the sub-programme. The unit comprised staff and consultants of the National Directorate of Treasure in the MEF. Over time, the scope of SPCU's support has expanded to the whole of the IFAD-supported portfolio, taking on the role foreseen in the COSOP for the programme support group.
287. By the time of the CSPE, the SPCU had developed, in partnership with the ICO, a knowledge management template and guidance document, to support projects in identifying good practices, describing their results and developing related success stories. The document appeared to be a good trigger to raise the focus of project M&E units on the need to analyse and report at the outcome level. Consequently, SPs have been requested to include success stories in their progress reports. In addition, the ICO prepared several communication products on best practices emerging in IFAD-supported projects; a few of these, on the participatory process for the selection of roads to be rehabilitated and the production of climate-smart cassava, have been posted in the Mozambique IFAD rural poverty portal.

288. These products have undoubtedly contributed to the visibility of IFAD projects in Mozambique, disseminating experiences and achievements. However, in the view of the CSPE, they mostly fell in the category of communication products rather than knowledge management, as in general they were not underpinned by a rigorous analytical work of the key factors leading to the successful outcomes. Two main reasons seemed to have a bearing in this: first, across projects and in the SPCU itself, there was limited shared understanding of what knowledge management is, how knowledge can be produced and what a knowledge product looks like; second, knowledge production require skills, competences and resources not easily available in the current PMUs and among SPs, as they were not foreseen in the project design phase. In this respect, in addition to actions aimed at improving the understanding of PMUs on what knowledge management is, collaboration with relevant national research institutions could help with the preparation of baseline studies, the analysis of case studies, organization of discussion in workshops and activities for dissemination. An example of a potentially highly useful knowledge management product would be an in-depth analysis of what did or did not work in IFAD's portfolio with respect to rural finance services. The strong rationale for this effort would be that this topic was part of the 2011 COSOP policy dialogue agenda, has unsuccessfully absorbed important financial and time resources in the portfolio, and is expected to be again one of the areas of focus of the next COSOP.
289. The knowledge management projects and programme strategies foreseen in the 2011 COSOP would have also helped in identifying the links between key issues from the projects that could feed, through knowledge products, into the policy dialogue agenda. However, these strategies were not prepared. Admittedly, it is also legitimate to question how a project or even a country team can be held fully responsible for developing both a knowledge management strategy and knowledge products, complex and costly, in the absence of adequate financial and human resources. In this respect, the ICO budget for knowledge management had so far been US\$10,000 per year, which did not allow much scope for action.<sup>57</sup> Lack of resources notwithstanding, work was ongoing and the SPCU might be able to slowly steer projects towards products with stronger knowledge contents.
290. At the same time, an interesting feature of the Mozambique portfolio has been the rich informal and internal learning and stocktaking process that occurred in the design of new projects, although it could also be argued that so far, the knowledge generated has remained within the respective institutional boundaries:
- (a) The three successive IFAD-supported fisheries projects, most notably thanks to the full integration of the SBAFP/PPABS team into ProPesca, also captured experience and lessons from artisanal fisheries projects funded by other partners;
  - (b) The experience taken from the Agricultural Markets Support Programme on market linkages interventions was very relevant in designing PROMER; and
  - (c) The re-formulation of the PSP took into account the experience of supporting the national NAES.
291. With regards to participation in information exchange platforms, ICO staff were members of the Government and partners' sector- and thematic groups, namely the agriculture, rural finance, fisheries, nutrition, environment, and natural resources working groups, where experience sharing, aid coordination and policy issues are discussed. Active participation was happening, though slightly hampered by human resources constraints and less than optimal coordination.
292. Although the ICO promoted the exchange of experience between projects, the CSPE noted room for improvements in terms of organizing better tailored events depending

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<sup>57</sup> The IOE corporate-level evaluation of IFAD's decentralization experience found that ICOs have the potential to contribute to knowledge management, but have limited time and resources for doing so.

on the needs of various stakeholders. For example, project coordinators might benefit from focused discussions on key issues about project management and strategic coordination, whereas exchange of experiences and field visits with producers might be more productive for technical staff from projects, Government and service providers.

293. With respect to the use of IFAD's knowledge and experience in other countries that could be useful for Mozambique, the CSPE found limited evidence of this happening. There may be room for exploring interesting avenues, in particular with other Lusophone countries. Conversely, based on their extensive experience in the implementation of the MDG1c, SPCU staff did, and was still in the process of contributing to an IFAD corporate-level effort to develop a manual and guidelines for developing projects with the EU as partner.
294. **Assessment summary.** The CSPE acknowledges that efforts have been made by the ICO and the SPCU in terms of improving results from knowledge management work. On the other hand, there is room for improvement in terms of bringing to Mozambique IFAD's knowledge and experience from other countries. The CSPE scores knowledge management as **moderately satisfactory** (4).

## **B. Policy dialogue**

295. Policy dialogue has been an area of focus at IFAD for several years. The 2011 COSOP, in line with the 2004 COSOP, defined IFAD's engagement in policy dialogue to be primarily driven by evidence emerging from project results through robust systems of knowledge management, linked to innovation and scaling up, and promoted through multistakeholder venues where policy changes would be advocated and discussed. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the quite ambitious policy dialogue agenda in the results framework included several priority areas for policy dialogue linked to each project, namely agricultural extension, artisanal fisheries, rural finance, value chains and market integration. Capacity development of local stakeholders to engage in policy dialogue, including Government and producers' organizations, was also meant to be part and parcel of this area of work.
296. IFAD's action in policy dialogue in 2006 led to highly visible results in the fisheries sector, with the elaboration and approval of the PESPA through SBAFP/PPABS. The policy had a positive impact on livelihoods opportunities in the artisanal fisheries sector until 2015. In 2016, MIMAIP, building on that positive example, was preparing PESPA II. Still in the artisanal fisheries sector, the planned work of ProDIRPA on tenure and access rights of fishing communities, and its close collaboration with MITADER and NGOs such as WWF and CARE, bode well for producing lessons that could feed into new relevant legislation. Similarly, IFAD and Government's interest in aquaculture development should enable policy dialogue based on the expected contribution from the PROAQUA grant to the strategic approach to aquaculture in the country.
297. More recently, two innovations introduced by IFAD were successfully integrated into national programmes and standards: the plant clinics and the DBM biological control, both valuable approaches to phyto-sanitary control that had been introduced through a successful collaboration between IFAD-funded regional grants and PSP, were being up-scaled through the NAES.
298. In the area of nutrition, through the EU-funded grant, the PSP was contributing to mainstreaming nutrition in the NAES by developing a dedicated module in the FFS manual and through raising awareness of extension agents on nutrition.
299. At another level, in mid-2016 the SPCU within the National Directorate of Treasure of the MEF/DNT facilitated discussions between IFAD projects and the e-SISTAFE Unit to jointly identify solutions to the challenges embedded in the electronic platform. This was a good example of how field-level issues can be given visibility at the level of the central Government and bear a potential impact on strategic level decision-making.

300. A less visible but relevant contribution to the policy dialogue with the Government took place in the meetings between IFAD senior officers, usually the CPM/Country Director (but not only) and Government senior management. This usually happens/ed during supervision and MTR missions. Since 2015, IFAD has strengthened its capacity for policy dialogue thanks to the presence of the Country Director, who has been quite active in establishing and strengthening constructive working relationships with key ministers. In this respect, it is important to stress that for policy dialogue to be effective, personal and institutional clout are of paramount importance, as well as time to develop trust and credibility.
301. In the United Nations context, IFAD contributed to expanding the breadth of dialogue and engagement between the United Nations and the Government by making, jointly with FAO, a substantial and successful effort to convince the United Nations Country Team to introduce a new economic pillar in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period 2009-2011, which was an extension of the earlier framework. Also, as mentioned earlier, the ICO's participation in the different thematic and sectoral working groups coordinated by the Government with its partners represented an indirect contribution to a broader corporate engagement in national policies.
302. In the view of the CSPE, policy dialogue was mostly hampered by: (i) the high turnover of CPMs in the period under evaluation, and the very small size of the ICO until 2015, as discussed later in this report; (ii) the slow progress in project implementation and therefore in achieving results that could feed into discussions about policies, together with the already mentioned weaknesses in M&E and knowledge management systems; and (iii) the limited time resources available to the country director for policy dialogue, amplified by the lack of specifically earmarked resources in the administrative budget for this work.
303. Finally, no evidence was found of any IFAD activity contributing to the capacity development of relevant civil society organizations on policy dialogue, as proposed by the COSOP document.
304. **Assessment summary.** This was based on the existing good potential for all the ongoing projects to contribute lessons learned and experience for ICO and IFAD to better engage in policy issues, both with the Government and through platforms with other partners. IFAD was clearly well-respected at the national level, was considered a credible organization and the country director should "be there to stay", all key factors in achieving good results in this area of work. Thus, the CSPE assessed policy dialogue as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### **C. Partnership-building**

305. The 2011 COSOP collectively called partnerships all relationships that IFAD would develop, or maintain, with various categories of key stakeholders for the implementation of the COSOP. The document however also clarified to some extent the key features of each of these relationships, and emphasized harmonization with the Government, institutional strengthening with producers' organizations; engagement through value chains with the private sector, and coordination and complementarities with development partners. This section will discuss and assess the partnership between IFAD, the Government and a range of other partners.
306. **IFAD highly valued by the Government.** With respect to the partnership between IFAD and the Government, there was strong and clear evidence that this partnership was highly valued and that IFAD was considered a special partner for the Government, especially, but not only, at the central level. Trust, respect and credibility that were developed over long years of unfailing collaboration informed the rapport between IFAD and the ministries and national administrations with which it collaborates. IFAD's flexibility, openness and willingness to find solutions were mentioned several times by most, if not all stakeholders. At the provincial and district level, typically IFAD's profile was reflected through the actual projects, and these were usually well-appreciated.



307. **Development partners.** IFAD was also found to be a trustworthy partner by other development agencies, as testified by the extent of additional financial resources leveraged for the implementation of the ongoing portfolio: all IFAD-supported loans hereby evaluated have received financial contributions, and most national grants have been fully funded by other donors. In the portfolio assessed in this evaluation, the leveraged resources from development partners represented 42 per cent of the total when loans and grants were all included; and 40 per cent when only loans and related grants were considered. These resources however have not come without transaction costs in terms of added complexity to management and financial execution. In this respect, there may be room for identifying more efficient ways of collaboration with several partners in terms of rules and procedures. In any case, this appeared to be an interesting model of portfolio development that might be replicated wherever IFAD can leverage resources from other partners for enhancing the scope and relevance of its own resources.
308. **Rome-based agencies.** Strong relevance and added value for the IFAD portfolio in Mozambique were embedded in the collaboration with FAO and WFP, the other two United Nations Rome-based agencies. Prior to the period under evaluation, between 2008 and 2011, IFAD, WFP and FAO had implemented the joint programme "Building Commodity Value Chains and Market Linkages for Farmers' Associations" funded by the Spanish Millennium Development Goals Fund. The programme promoted food production by Mozambican small farmers to supply WFP operations in the country, and obtained a prize from IFAD for the joint work between the three agencies, built on the respective comparative advantages.
309. This successful experience was a good stepping stone for FAO, IFAD and WFP to prepare a consolidated, though not joint project proposal in 2011 for the EU-funded grant "Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1c in Mozambique" (MDG1c).<sup>58</sup> An EU MTR in 2015 recognized the relevance of the programme, but pointed out the little coordination among the three agencies, which originated in the initial conception of the grant as separate streams of resources for each partner. In fact, at the time of design, the work of the three agencies overlapped in one district only, while in six districts, out of a total of 68 targeted by the MDG1c, two of them were present. The MTR also stressed that the possible complementarity of interventions between agencies had not been realized, due to different approaches and lack of coherence for nutritional education.
310. These weaknesses notwithstanding, there was evidence at the time of the CSPE that progress was being made in terms of inter-agency collaboration at field level, for example in Zambezia Province between PROMER and PSP that worked on value chains and agricultural production with FAO promoting e-vouchers for inputs purchase; and in Manica province, the three agencies were coordinating their respective work at community level on FFSs, nutrition and health committees, and aquaculture ponds.
311. In this respect, the MDG1c also offered a platform for the United Nations Rome-based agencies to develop a habit of working together in the country, and at different levels. In addition to the frequent interaction among MDG1c coordinators in each agency, the three heads of offices in Maputo had launched a programme of field visits to the provinces and districts where projects supported with MDG1c funds were operating. This appeared as precious "social capital" for the three agencies that deserves attention in terms of both upscaling and strengthening at country level in future, also for policy dialogue with the responsible ministries, and as a knowledge management product for broader use beyond Mozambique.
312. **NGOs, the private sector and research centres.** IFAD-supported projects have been collaborating with a range of NGOs, the private sector and national and

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<sup>58</sup> As already discussed extensively throughout the report, in the case of IFAD the grant was used as top-up resources for expanding activities and include nutritional education components in PSP, PROMER and ProPesca; and to fund a self-standing project for the promotion of aquaculture, PROAQUA, which is discussed in the next section.

international research centres, all in the role of service providers for implementing project components or sub-components. In general, these were contractual relationships, rather than partnerships where every side commits a similar contribution to a common goal. Relationships have also mostly been between PMUs and service providers, with the ICO in the background. Although in some cases problems emerged related to the administrative and financial aspects of the contracts, usually these relationships were smooth and constructive.

313. **Gaps.** In this quite positive picture, two types of potential partnership-building have lagged behind: cooperation with non-IFAD projects that could bring added value was virtually non-existent, with the exception of the collaboration in the framework of MDG1c; and there was no substantive collaboration with the World Bank, nor with the African Development Bank since the closing of RFSP/PAFIR. The new COSOP might consider giving attention to these potential partnerships, in particular with a view to upscale successful experiences from IFAD-supported projects.
314. **Assessment summary.** During the period under evaluation, IFAD has developed solid and successful partnerships with the Government as testified in interviews with the CSPE; with several development partners as proven by the size of the financial resources leveraged for cofinancing; and with FAO and WFP in the context of the European Union-funded MDG1c implementation. The experience during this period should lead to several lessons learned for ICO and IFAD, in terms of costs and benefits of some partnerships, and the posting of the country director in Maputo should also definitely contribute to open up new constructive partnerships in future. Based on the above, **the CSPE assesses performance in partnership-building as satisfactory (5)**, an improvement over the 2010 CPE rating.
315. Another form of developing partnerships is South-South and Triangular Cooperation, one of IFAD's priorities, serving as a conduit for transferring knowledge, resources and technology and contributing to the overarching goal of rural poverty reduction. Neither of the Mozambique COSOPs addressed South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Nevertheless, a workshop was organized in Mozambique in August 2014, as part of the IFAD-China South-South Cooperation initiative, managed from headquarters. The workshop gathered 55 participants from 13 African and Middle Eastern countries, including Mozambique, and a Chinese delegation led by the Vice Minister for Finance, representatives of IFAD and other donors in Mozambique. It included exchange and sharing on subjects relating to pro-poor agricultural policies, agricultural research, extension and agribusiness development for modernization of agriculture, and South-South cooperation on family farming. It also offered the opportunity to review China-Africa agricultural cooperation experiences, challenges and best practices and was an interesting manner for IFAD to facilitate exchange between Mozambique and potential partners.
316. In the context of the South-South and Triangular Cooperation, it is worth noting that IFAD did not facilitate so far any South-South and Triangular Cooperation with Brazil, despite the latter's interest in the last decade to develop this type of relationship with African countries and the obvious added value of collaboration between Lusophone countries. Moreover, IFAD has an important portfolio in Brazil, and has financed several grants supporting South-South and Triangular Cooperation between Brazil and other countries, including in Africa, and Brazil has South-South and Triangular Cooperation activities in Mozambique with other organizations, including in the area of agriculture and rural development. Therefore, there seems to be potential for partnership development in this context.

## D. Grants

317. This section briefly discusses two national and two regional grants; it also draws in its synthesis, on the contribution of all grants to the IFAD portfolio in the period under evaluation.
318. During the 2011 COSOP, IFAD implemented five national grants for a total budget of US\$33.7 million.<sup>59</sup> Three of these, MDG1c, CHAPANI and ProDIRPA, were cofinancing loans and two were separate grants, as discussed earlier in the report. Both strategic thinking and opportunism appear to have played a role in this successful fund-leveraging effort, which stemmed in any case from IFAD's constructive partnerships with some donors and a good degree of flexibility in opening up to additional resources.
319. During the period 2010-2016, also 15 global and regional grants had planned to conduct activities in Mozambique. Two of these were selected for assessment by the CSPE, mostly based on their full integration for implementation in the PSP and therefore in the NAES, which was an important factor in enabling visibility, positive results and long-term sustainability. The projects were:
- (a) One applied research grant to the Kenya-based International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE), implemented in Mozambique, Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia in the period October 2012 and June 2016, with the title "Programme for Scaling up Biological Control of the Diamondback Moth on Crucifers in East Africa to Other African Countries", 1370-ICIPE (DMB); and
  - (b) An action research grant to the Centre for Agricultural Bioscience International (CABI), implemented in Mozambique, Uganda and Rwanda in the period October 2013 and March 2016, with title "Plantwise, a country-based approach to improving farmer livelihoods through reduced crop losses and increased productivity", 1412-CABI (plant clinics).
320. The **Community Investor Partnership Project** focused on developing community-investors partnerships, through participatory approaches, to secure investments and improve livelihoods. Its objective was to generate lessons to feed into policy engagement on the conditions and requirements needed for successful partnerships, including the need to diversify and strengthen local livelihoods and food security. The project was thus relevant to the COSOP portfolio focused on value chains and market integration.
321. Most of the proposed outputs were achieved, namely: 13 community-investor partnerships based on the out-growers' scheme model; 11 case studies focused on different models of partnerships, mostly developed by students from the Eduardo Mondlane University; a guideline document valid for investors and communities about the process of establishing a partnership, based on the case studies; and more than 1,000 people trained, including community members, governmental officers and investors. Two major gaps were identified: the very limited collaboration with PROMER, although the two projects operated in the same provinces; and the absence of contracts based on the use of communities' rights on natural resources
322. **PROAQUA** was designed to promote small-scale tilapia farming in inland districts of the Manica and Sofala provinces with a food and nutrition security goal. The project was thus aligned with the Fisheries Master Plan and the Plan of Action for large scale diffusion of aquaculture 2012-2014,<sup>60</sup> which foresaw the expansion of micro-scale aquaculture ponds at the household level. The project was to be implemented by the National Institute for Aquaculture through a newly established provincial delegation in Manica and Sofala provinces. Implementation had been seriously delayed due to

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<sup>59</sup> The largest share of this amount was provided in euros through the EU-funded MDG1c grant. The amount included here corresponds to the figures provided by ICO as of 31 July 2016.

<sup>60</sup> Plano de acção para massificação de piscicultura 2012-2014.

difficulties in recruiting national and international staff, registration in e-SISTAFE, and needs for capacity development in the PMU on fiduciary aspect. When in 2016 the National Institute for Aquaculture was merged into IDEPA, the already tenuous links with the central level grew even thinner.

323. Moreover, since project approval the national strategic approach to aquaculture had shifted towards the development of commercially-oriented aquaculture, possibly using the concept of aquaparks, i.e. areas of concentration of aquaculture ponds where economies of scale on inputs and commercialization of harvest could be achieved. At the time of the CSPE, MIMAIP considered that the project was still important to test small-scale aquaculture production under local conditions. This required a significant shift in the project focus from the initial community development initiative model, towards a participatory action-research approach to assess how different variables, such as feeding, population and re-population, tank size and location among others, would affect productivity at the local level. However, as of September 2016 there was no evidence that such an adjustment was taking place.
324. At field level, the very few producers who had harvested appeared highly satisfied and reported improvements in food availability and income from sales. Nevertheless, it was clear to all stakeholders, producers included, that even the micro-size aquaculture model was only viable for better-off farmers due to the high cost of digging the ponds and the lag-time of the investment, which appeared to pay back in 12-18 months under probably optimal management conditions. Also, the complexities linked to the procurement on the national market of both fingerlings and feed could at best be tackled by a very strong investment in capacity-building of groups of aquaculture producers, but no step in this direction had been taken. The establishment of ASCAs in the communities where producers were opening ponds was an interesting initiative per se, but with little relevance for aquaculture. This because the investments required for opening the ponds and feeding the fish until marketing, could at best be met only through the annual division of earnings in groups that had already achieved a certain level of financial maturity, for producers with a strong capacity to save per se, and this was definitely not the case in the districts of intervention.
325. Furthermore, PROAQUA assumed that women would automatically benefit from the project "household approach". This appeared to be a misplaced assumption, as the project was not challenging in any way the assumed roles and current lower position of women. Evidence rather suggested that women were involved in the project, but as a labour force, performing basic daily tasks such as feeding, weeding, etc. and left out of pond management decisions. At most, the name of a wife would be used to ask for an additional set of inputs to open a new pond, when the husband had already benefited of support from the project.
326. MIMAIP expressed strong interest for sustained collaboration with IFAD on aquaculture, to make it a commercially viable economic activity with the private sector, even with foreigners involved in the upstream fingerlings production phase. In this scenario, it is doubtful that PROAQUA can generate any useful lesson through its current approach. A possible alternative for consideration could be re-directing all remaining project resources towards piloting the establishment of small-scale aquaparks, designed with a poverty- and food insecurity alleviation focus that should be economically viable while offering an income-generating opportunity to poor households in their environs.
327. The main objective of the **regional DBM project** was the extension of successful experiences in biological control of DBM in crucifer crops (cabbages) in eastern Africa to other central and southern African countries. The Department of Plant Protection of MASA was the leading institution and the Eduardo Mondlane University was responsible for its financial management. NAES staff carried out extension activities and information dissemination.
328. The project was highly relevant to the small producers of cruciferous in Mozambique who suffered great losses and reduced incomes from the incidence of DBM. The

project also showed a good degree of effectiveness, implementing the planned activities and even expanding beyond the initial targets. Main activities included: surveys of DBM and its natural enemies in the country; establishment of lab facilities at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo and the Higher Polytechnic Institute of Manica for rearing, releasing and monitoring in the field of the natural enemies of the pest; training of NAES staff in integrated pest management (IPM) and on DBM-parasitoids mass rearing, field surveys and baseline data collection; promotion among small farmers of locally adapted bio-control, IPM technologies through FFS; adaptation and translation into Portuguese of a manual on IPM of crucifers; awareness-raising on vegetable IPM methodologies with policy makers, pesticide dealers and the general public. Eventually, the DBM practices were disseminated in nine districts of six provinces.

329. The CSPE had direct evidence of the positive results of the DBM project at field level. In the sites visited, farmers strongly stated that the release of natural enemies and the application of other crop management practices had significantly reduced the incidence of DBM, which used to decimate their crops. Also, leader farmers, both men and women, trained by the project showed an impressive understanding of issues related with IPM. The main weaknesses identified related to the still limited availability of affordable alternative bio-compatible pesticides, and the continuous use of chemical pesticides on other crops. However, these could arguably be issues beyond the scope of the grant, as a more comprehensive approach to IPM would be necessary in Mozambique.
330. The **plant clinics** project had as the main objective the testing of an innovative method in providing advisory services complementing other extension methods. Plant clinics consist of regularly planned advisory services by two trained extension agents in the role of "doctors", to farmers who bring samples of plants affected by pests and diseases. The extension agents diagnose the problem and provide advice on control measures that is intended to be practical, economical, feasible, environmentally safe and locally relevant, often based on IPM principles. Plant clinics usually take place twice a month in each community involved in the programme. Information gathered at plant clinics is also expected to contribute to the implementation of an information system, from district to national level, aimed at timely control of emerging pest and diseases outbreaks, or an early-warning system.
331. The project appeared to be relevant and effective. The CSPE found generalized enthusiasm about the plant clinics, both among farmers and extension agents, also because the clinics could be incorporated without major disruption in the normal work of the extension agents supplied with some basic equipment (table, chairs, umbrella, magnifying glasses, razor and a camera). The main project activity was extensive training at all levels on various aspects of the plant clinics, which was provided by highly qualified professionals from the Centre for Agricultural Bioscience International. In addition, ten plant clinics were established and an on-line knowledge bank for Mozambique that includes best-practice pest management tools was created. Plans existed for scaling up the results to a total of 71 new plant clinics established in the districts covered by the PSP. In addition, the DNEA was developing specific arrangements with the provincial governments to ensure the continuation of the plant clinics methodology by the NAES, through the provincial budgets.
332. **Assessment summary.** In conclusion, with respect to the whole grants portfolio, including all national and regional initiatives linked to loans and the four discussed here, there was strong evidence of a high level of interconnectedness and synergies across the whole portfolio. The grants attached to the loans enhanced the relevance of and filled gaps existing in the loans' thrusts, in particular on nutrition, HIV/AIDS and NRM. This link was less successful for the separate Community Investor Partnership Project grant, but its main output, the manual, could still be used by other IFAD-funded projects. The regional grants were successfully integrated through PSP into the NAES, which strengthened their perspectives of institutional sustainability. And PROAQUA met a Government requirement that had been set aside at the time of

designing ProPesca and may pave the way to more significant engagement by IFAD in the aquaculture subsector.

## E. Overall assessment

333. The 2011 COSOP discussed each of the components of the non-lending portfolio and envisaged links between M&E systems, from projects to programmes, that should feed into knowledge management and underpin policy dialogue to be pursued with a range of partners. These actions however were not expressed as part of a coherent plan, let alone a strategy, and each pillar remained anchored to individual projects, thus losing the added value of a programmatic approach.
334. This initial gap may have been one of reasons behind the shortcomings in the overall performance of the non-lending activities. Contributing factors were also the relatively high turnover of CPMs and the constrained human resources in the ICO, until relatively recently, as well as the lack of dedicated sufficient financial resources to any of the three pillars. Thus, the overall rating of this area of work is scored as **moderately satisfactory (4)**, with table 13 showing the scoring for each component.

Table 13

### Assessment of non-lending activities

<i>Non-lending activities</i>	<i>Rating</i>
Knowledge management	4
Policy dialogue	4
Partnership-building	5
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4</b>

#### Key points

- Progress was being made on knowledge management for the portfolio and recent steps bode well for the medium-term. However, more resources and attention should be dedicated to this area of work.
- Achievements on policy dialogue were mostly reflected during the 2011 COSOP by up-take in national standards and programmes of some of the innovations proposed by IFAD through its projects. Delays in project implementation prevented achieving results that could be fed into policy dialogue at a more strategic level. Nevertheless, the presence over the last year of a resident country director appears to have contributed to an improved rapport with the Government and bodes well for more visible results in the short term.
- IFAD in Mozambique has been highly successful in establishing very constructive partnerships with: the Government, by being highly appreciated for flexibility, openness and resilience of the relationship; donor partners, who have extensively contributed financial resources to the country portfolio; and FAO and WFP in the context of the collaboration between United Nations Rome-based agencies on key issues such as nutrition. A wealth of lessons can also be generated from the less successful partnerships, in particular at the level of cost efficiency, and there was scope for improvement of the partnerships with multilateral development banks.
- Grants have played a very useful role in IFAD's portfolio by enhancing the relevance and the scope of action of the loans. This, despite weaknesses and delays in implementation that have undermined to some extent the effectiveness of the approach.

## V. Performance of partners

335. This section will assess the performance of IFAD and the Government of Mozambique during the period under evaluation. With respect to IFAD, the analysis included project design, supervision and mobilizing technical support, self-assessment, solving problems and implementation bottlenecks and organization and resources of the country office. Government performance was assessed in the areas of contribution to project preparation, exercising ownership, providing policy guidance, mobilization of human and material resources, implementation management, responsiveness to supervision recommendations, fiduciary aspects and M&E.

### A. IFAD

336. **Project design.** As discussed earlier in the report, many of the project designs for the ongoing IFAD-supported loans and grants tended to be rather complex, over complicated in terms of implementation arrangements, and weakly grounded in the reality of the country. This, in particular with respect to national capacities for implementation and to context analysis for identifying products and market outlets also in a value chain perspective, e.g. cassava and aquaculture. Limited attention was also given in all project designs to NRM, climate change, poverty alleviation and gender equality.
337. This type of weakness had also been raised by the 2010 CPE, which observed how project design had often been based on very optimistic assumptions and lacked critical institutional assessment, also because four of the six loans analysed in 2016, namely RFSP/PAFIR, SBAFP/PPABS, PRONEA/PSP and PROMER, were already operational in 2010. However, also PROSUL, formulated well after the CPE or some components of the MDG-1c, appeared to suffer from the same weaknesses, indicating that there are lessons still to be learned.
338. On the other hand, the Government had a strong sense of ownership for most projects, also because in two cases, PROMER and ProPesca, projects were designed fully building on the experience gained through similar earlier IFAD-supported interventions. Based on the available evidence, and without going into the details of each project design process which was beyond the mandate of this evaluation, the CSPE reached the conclusion that little use was made in all project designs of lessons learned outside the country in terms of project architecture and challenges in value chain development, in addition to weak quality enhancement and quality assurance processes with regards to integrating the key IFAD topics mentioned above.
339. **Supervision and implementation support.** Since 2008, IFAD directly supervised all projects under implementation, taking over from UNOPS following the relevant corporate decision. Typically, two missions have been carried out each year to every project, alternating a two-week-long supervision mission, and a one-week follow-up mission. These missions were led by the CPM or the country programme officer, and comprised other consultants, either from the ICO or specifically contracted for the purpose. The ICO usually consulted with PMUs ahead of time to identify the key issues to be discussed and identify the right skill-mix for the teams.
340. The CSPE noted that some of the MTRs were conducted later than initially planned, due to slow delivery and delays in implementation. Undoubtedly there is a trade-off between conducting an MTR when a certain level of execution has been achieved and tangible activities and outputs can be assessed, and the added value of an early discussion among peers and external observers when a project is facing strong challenges. There are no recipes for this type of decision, and the CSPE did not have evidence of strong missed opportunities in this respect.
341. Virtually all stakeholders, from project coordinators to Government senior and technical managers, appreciated the supervision and implementation support provided, for both the good suggestions and orientations about the projects, and the opportunity to discuss the missions' findings and recommendations. Missions were praised for the thorough and comprehensive approach, the extensive interaction with

the different stakeholders, and the useful recommendations they made. This also applied to the collaboration with the ICO fiduciary specialist, who occasionally carried out implementation support missions to PMUs that required closer support. At the same time, the CSPE noted that until 2016, very little was done by IFAD to effectively solve the challenges the projects faced in terms of financial execution and alignment with e-SISTAFE and governmental procedures for procurement of services.

342. Furthermore, the CSPE considered that IFAD did not explore to its full potential the option of emphasizing implementation support over follow-up work, as the latter in practice largely resembled supervision missions in composition and reporting standards, albeit shorter. Conversely, implementation support missions are shorter, focused on a specific key issue at stake, for example the development of the project gender strategy, and typically carried out by only one specialist; a more frequent use of these over follow-up missions would likely entail greater efficiency and effectiveness.
343. **Monitoring systems.** Despite a clear commitment in the 2011 COSOP to the establishment of a programme-level monitoring system fed from outcome-level project monitoring systems, and the repeated attention to it in most COSOP reviews, this did not happen. Only over the last year, with EU resources, a unit responsible for monitoring and coordination of all IFAD-supported projects became operational and active and some results were beginning to emerge by the time of the CSPE. Furthermore, the ICO itself was taking useful action in terms of supporting projects to develop outcome-level indicators within a gender equality perspective.
344. **COSOP reviews.** The 2011 COSOP included provisions for its annual and MTRs. Although the MTR did not take place, every year an annual COSOP review was carried out, with the support of a consultant. The process would typically include interviews with a broad range of stakeholders, analysis of reports, and a workshop in Maputo to discuss findings and identify recommendations. Some of the recommendations however appeared to be acted upon less than desirable; and to be recurrent from one year to the next. Limited action on knowledge management was a case in point. A possible reason for this was identified in the frequent turnover of CPMs, which hindered long-term planning and engagement; and the limited number of staff in the ICO until 2015. The annual reviews, on the other hand, were considered useful for the project coordinators for sharing experiences and good practices among projects.
345. **Country programme management team.** The CPMT is a consultative forum comprising IFAD-supported projects and other relevant stakeholders, with the mandate to monitor country programme implementation. In Mozambique, it comprised representatives of the main governmental partners, including the National Director of the Treasure (Chair) and directors from all the ministries engaged in IFAD's programmes, the country director, ICO staff, project managers, and representatives of farmers and artisanal fishers. According to the information available, the CPMT met once a year for the COSOP annual review, and occasionally at the time of the design of new projects or a MTR. The degree of participation in CPMT meetings had varied depending on the topic addressed, and overall, the country director found participation in the CPMT to be beneficial.
346. **Establishment of the country office.** The ICO in Mozambique had been initially established in 2003, as part of the three-year IFAD Field Presence Pilot Programme, with a country programme officer hosted in the FAO Representation. The 2010 CPE recommended the "establishment of a permanent and well-resourced country presence in Mozambique (consideration may also be given to outpostting the CPM from Rome as one of several options)", to enhance both portfolio supervision and non-lending activities. Since then, four CPMs, including an "acting CPM", have been responsible in succession for the Mozambique programme, with two of them being in charge for 1.5 and 2 years respectively. This turnover is somewhat high, considering IFAD's average length of five years in CPM assignments, and that continuity in the



position is essential to become familiar with the country programme and build a solid relationship with the Government and other stakeholders.

347. The incumbent country director was appointed with posting in Maputo in mid-2015, with the additional responsibility for IFAD's programme in Botswana and South Africa, and an oversight role in Angola. This appeared to stretch the country director's time resources very thin, with some potential risk for the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the role. This notwithstanding, the presence of the country director in Maputo was considered by all stakeholders to be highly positive and an indicator of the constructive partnership between IFAD and Mozambique. Key results that were mentioned included: enhanced visibility of IFAD in the country; accelerated project management processes, e.g. shorter lag-time for non-objections; and enhanced dialogue with the Government and other partners.
348. At the time of the CSPE, the ICO also comprised a country project officer who had been on board since 2003, a programme assistant recruited in 2012, the MDG1c coordination officer operational since mid-2014, and four consultants, all of whom had joined the ICO in mid/late 2015. The whole ICO effectively contributed to support the projects and raise IFAD's increasing profile in the country with a portfolio that has considerably grown over time in terms of number and size of loans. Despite the fact that the ICO team as such had existed for less than a year by the time of CSPE, there was a reasonable level of coordination and collaboration among all members. However, additional efforts in this sense appeared desirable to enable all staff members to contribute to the best of their capacity while avoiding duplication of work. In early 2016, after being hosted by FAO for 13 years, the ICO moved to new premises, with adequate office space for work and meetings and properly equipped to accommodate all staff – which could also have been an enabling factor for the building of a strong IFAD country team.
349. **Collaboration with United Nations Rome-based agencies.** As discussed earlier under partnerships, IFAD in Mozambique has been very active in collaborating closely with FAO and WFP on nutrition themes, of high relevance for the country.
350. **Flexibility and open-doors.** The Government of Mozambique regarded IFAD as a "precious" partner, largely due to the open-door policy and flexibility they perceived in their decades-long cooperation. Examples of IFAD's collaborative approach included the decision to align financial execution with e-SISTAFE; the variety of arrangements in institutional set-ups for PMUs; the approval of overly complex design and implementation models that had already proven their limitations elsewhere; the willingness to accept additional financial resources to expand the scope of ongoing projects; and most recently, the tolerance in accepting gaps in the availability of counterpart's funds.
351. Overall, IFAD has made very good efforts to be a reliable and supportive partner of the Government of Mozambique. All of this came however at some cost in terms of implementation efficiency and effectiveness. Also, the over-whelming focus in the portfolio on value chains development and integration of producers into the market, undermined the traditional attention in IFAD's thrust on poverty and vulnerability. These are lessons that can be learned and that could usefully guide the development of the next COSOP and related projects. In the light of the above, the CSPE rates IFAD's overall performance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

## **B. Government**

352. **Governmental oversight of IFAD's programme.** The core responsibility for IFAD's programme in the country rests with the National Directorate of Treasure in the MEF, whose interest and commitment to a sound management of the IFAD portfolio were remarkable. The Directorate, together with all other concerned ministries, took part in the annual reviews of the COSOP and appeared to find those useful. Nevertheless, it was only in 2015 that the need to monitor the portfolio was given real attention, with the establishment of the SPCU in MEF/DNT whose recent work was assessed as

important and useful for a more efficient and effective implementation of the whole country portfolio, as discussed earlier in the report.

353. **Governmental participation in project design and ownership.** As stated above, there was a strong ownership for the large majority of IFAD-supported projects across responsible governmental organizations. This entailed that senior managers were interested in projects' progress and results and highly appreciated the contribution these were making to enhance the effectiveness and outreach of their own organizations.
354. **Governmental support to project implementation.** The commitment and availability of many governmental organizations to collaborate with IFAD has been satisfactory. This was sustained over time, although the governmental architecture has gone through some major institutional reforms, and responsibilities for some project implementation were transferred across units or even ministries. For example, PROMER implementation was handled between three different ministries, but all have contributed to enable progress in project implementation.
355. In addition, the Government made efforts to ensure that PMUs were established in a relatively short time, as discussed in the section on efficiency. The few cases where delays in the recruitment of the project coordinator was significant, the general scarcity of competent professionals at the national level may have played a role. Also, PMUs, once established, have been remarkably stable.
356. Further, directorates and institutes in the line ministries responsible for individual projects have been responsive to recommendations and suggestions by supervision and follow-up missions and have contributed to implementation with staff time and at times, for example in the case of fisheries stock assessments, with significant financial resources. With respect to audits and evaluations, only one audit was conducted during the period under evaluation, on RFSP/PAFIR, and no evaluations until the impact evaluation of the SBAFP/PPABS and the CSPE. In all these circumstances, it appeared that the Government was unflinchingly supportive and collaborative.
357. With respect to the Government's openness to learn from the experience of IFAD-supported projects, a good indicator of this was the strong element of internal knowledge management in the cases of ProPesca and PROMER, by recruiting for the PMUs professionals who had worked in previous IFAD-supported projects in the same sector. The same open attitude to accept IFAD's proposals at the level of norms and standards, technological innovations and new sectoral components, was also noted whenever projects made concrete proposals, as happened with the adoption of climate-change resilient road rehabilitation approaches, the integration of nutritional education in the FFS curriculum and the plant clinics approach within the NAES.
358. In this overall positive context, however, a few important weaknesses with respect to the fiduciary aspects, negatively affected the efficiency of the whole portfolio:
  - (a) The limited availability of counterpart funds for IFAD-supported projects; this stemmed from the increased financial challenges the Government has been facing since 2015,<sup>61</sup> and had a direct effect on the financial execution of the PSP and an indirect effect on ProPesca and PROSUL, due to the interruptions in the functionality of e-SISTAFE;
  - (b) The complexity of e-SISTAFE: the system was highly appreciated by most because of the transparency and control it allows, but its procedures for registration proved to be exceedingly long and its planning requirements represent a major challenge for the smooth implementation of field projects like those supported by IFAD;

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<sup>61</sup> Delays in the availability of Government's counterpart funds had already occurred during SBAFP/PPABS implementation.

- (c) The complex procedures for approval of contracts and procurement-related actions, and the delays created in the process, which have significantly undermined the efficiency and therefore effectiveness of the IFAD-supported loans; without any challenge to the rationale underpinning the control procedures per se, it is vital that the Government identifies solutions that allow both compliance with rules and regulations and smooth project implementation.
359. Admittedly, the efficiency problems linked to e-SISTAFE and lengthy national procedures may have become clear and visible to all only recently, exacerbated by the financial crisis. In light of all the above, the Government's performance was rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

#### **Key points**

- IFAD has been a reliable and flexible partner for Mozambique, by providing increasing resources over time and by meeting Government's requests in terms of sectors and approaches of intervention. This however came at some cost, in terms of diverting from IFAD's traditional mandate on poverty and vulnerability alleviation, and improvement of food security and nutrition, which were and still are important needs at the national level.
- Project designs were overall weak and have contributed to weaknesses in the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole country portfolio. The absence of project and programme-level monitoring systems, and the high turnover of CPMs had a cost in terms of portfolio coordination and efficiency and in the effectiveness of non-lending activities.
- The strengthening of the Subprogramme Coordination Unit within the National Directorate for Treasure in the MEF, and the ICO's initiative to support projects to develop outcome-level indicators within a gender equality perspective, were recent positive steps forward in terms of programme-level support and monitoring and coordination that can also provide useful inputs into the upcoming process for the new COSOP formulation.
- The Government agencies directly engaged with IFAD have been seriously committed to the partnership, within their respective roles and responsibilities. At the same time, the legitimate request of alignment with the national platform for financial execution and overly slow procedures for approval of service procurement procedures have represented an additional toll on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the whole country portfolio.
- The most urgent challenge at the time of the CSPE was the complex national context that will require concerted actions and decision-making by both partners to ensure that both sides can still effectively contribute to the joint work.

## VI. Synthesis of the country strategy and programme performance

360. This section will analyse the relevance and effectiveness of the 2011 COSOP, taking into account the assessment of the performance of the lending portfolio, the non-lending activities and of partners, and provide a consolidated overall analysis of the country strategy and programme.
361. Two caveats are worth remembering here, mentioned earlier in the report. First, the 2011 COSOP was not used as guidance for the design of most projects assessed in this evaluation and had little influence on the characteristics of IFAD's portfolio during its implementation period. This is because only one loan and four grant-funded projects were formulated within its framework; and the largest of the grants, the MDG1c, focused on nutrition, which was not among the themes of the 2011 COSOP.
362. Second, since the 2011 COSOP was signed, four CPMs have been responsible for managing the IFAD programme in Mozambique. Despite the annual reviews, the sense of ownership for the COSOP and the country programme as such on both sides, IFAD's and the Government's, appeared weak.

### A. Relevance The strategy

363. **Absence of an explicit strategy.** The 2011 COSOP did not articulate an explicit strategy for the country programme, nor did it develop a theory-of-change.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, the wording of the first and last strategic objectives appeared to overlap, although the outcome-level indicators in the Management Framework allowed a clear-cut distinction between the two; the first focused on increased production and the third on access to rural finance products.
364. With this caveat in mind, it could be inferred that the strategic objectives represented each a pillar of a value chain development model, based on enhancing access to factors of production, markets and financial products. These were to be achieved through an inclusive approach in targeting and partnership at all levels.
365. **Broadening the scope.** The policy dialogue agenda inscribed under the institutional and policy objectives in the results framework expanded, to some extent, the scope of the country programme, although there was no link between the outcome indicators and the policy objectives. Overall, the framework did not represent a useful and representative tool for managing and monitoring the country portfolio.
366. A "Rationale supporting the Country Strategic Opportunities Programme", i.e. a matrix unpacking each strategic objective into aim, pathways and actions, was developed in the 2013 annual review, most probably as an attempt to provide some sense of a strategy and direction where these were missing. There was no evidence that this was ever used throughout the COSOP period as a reference for programme management.

#### Policy and strategy alignment

367. **Strong alignment.** Alignment with the national policies and procedures was an important element of the 2011 COSOP, possibly to counterbalance the previous country programme that had been found by the 2010 CPE to be closer to IFAD's strategies and policies than to the national ones.
368. The COSOP core thrust was fully anchored to PARP 2011-2014, which represented the medium-term strategy of the Government of Mozambique for putting into operation its Five-Year Government Program. This was further strengthened through the focus of the COSOP and of most loans on value chain development, which was at the core of PEDSA 2011-2020.

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<sup>62</sup> IOE developed a simplified mapping of the logical chain of the 2011 COSOP, included in annex 7.

369. Until 2014, neither the COSOP nor the country portfolio paid explicit attention nor provided resources to improving the food security and nutrition of the rural poor, despite the fact that these were, and still are one of the major challenges in rural Mozambique, a priority across all national policies, and one of the overarching goals of IFAD.

### **Strategic objectives**

370. **Strategic objective thrusts.** The COSOP articulated each strategic objective into three thrusts, or components that would contribute to achieving the strategic objective itself. The strategic objectives, formulated as outcomes, broadly corresponded to the objectives of the ongoing projects, to avoid discrepancies between the ongoing portfolio and the COSOP. However, the outcome-level indicators in the COSOP results framework were largely disconnected in the case of strategic objective 1 from the production focus of all ongoing projects at the time.

### **Coherence**

371. **Good level of coherence.** The COSOP underlined the coherence within the country programme, based on complementarity between projects. For example, across the loans, the support provided through the PSP to the NAES would benefit the productivity and production of those associations supported by PROMER, and later by PROSUL, to engage in value chains and integrate in the markets; and RFSP/PAFIR should have enabled access to appropriate and sustainable financial products by participants in all value chains.
372. Complementarity between loans and grants was also evident in the fisheries sector, with CHAPANI and ProDIRPA filling important gaps left by the ProPesca's focus on value chains; and across the portfolio, when the EU-funded grant provided resources for work on nutrition in the PSP, PROMER and ProPesca.

### **Targeting**

373. **Focus on better endowed producers.** By identifying the "small-scale producers who have the potential to expand and commercialize their activities" as main beneficiaries of the country programme, the COSOP approach to targeting further steered the country portfolio away from the 2004 COSOP strong poverty focus, towards those rural producers who had the potential to expand their production and engage with the market. This was further emphasized by specifying that IFAD projects be implemented in geographical areas that had potential for market integration
374. Provisions were made for gender equality and inclusion of youth, as for the preparation of relevant strategies by all projects. The document mentioned the importance of HIV and AIDS among vulnerable populations in the fisheries sector, but did not include any activities directed to this population, although the CPE 2010 had called for a specific strategy in this respect. At the level of the portfolio, one project fully addressed the issue of HIV and AIDS among fishing communities; and two included specific activities targeted to PLWH in their designs.

### **Relevance assessment summary**

375. The COSOP and the country portfolio were well-aligned and coherent with national policies. Although complementarities and synergies across projects, both loans and grants, could have been established, this only happened to a limited extent. Furthermore, a major gap existed with respect to the priority and importance given in the national policies and IFAD goals to improving food security and nutrition of the rural poor, as well as to enhance the access of PLWH to livelihoods opportunities.
376. In light of the findings and analysis, the CSPE assessed the relevance of the strategy underpinning the 2011 COSOP and of the country portfolio in the period 2010-2016 as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

## B. Effectiveness

377. **Assessing results against the COSOP indicators.** Table 14 shows the strategic objectives, outcome-level indicators and the results achieved by the time of the CSPE, as per the available information.

Table 14

**Results against the COSOP results framework indicators**

<i>Strategic objectives</i>	<i>Outcome indicators</i>	<i>Result over COSOP period</i>
To facilitate the integration of small producers (smallholders and artisanal fishers) into profitable and accessible markets	<p>Production of selected crops increased: <i>Maize</i>: from 2.1 to 3.0 million tons; <i>Rice</i>: from 260 to 450 thousand tons</p> <p>Av. yields of selected crops increased: <i>Maize</i>: from 1.1 to 1.8 tons/ha <i>Rice</i>: from 1.2 to 1.8 tons/ha</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Production of selected livestock products increased</li> <li>• Quantity of higher value fish caught increased</li> </ul>	None of the projects operational during the period under evaluation worked on maize and rice productions; only one project, PROSUL, was working in livestock and no information was available on increases in production. With regards to fisheries, national statistics indicated in 2014 an overall increase in captures, but no information was available yet on what type of catch had increased
The access of smallholders and artisanal fishers to production factors, technologies and resources is increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Value of sales of selected products (crops and livestock) by smallholder farmers increased</li> <li>• Value of sales of higher value fish by artisanal fishers increased</li> </ul>	<p>Information generated by PROMER indicated a fourfold increase in the volumes of crop production sold by small holders. No information was available on the value</p> <p>No information was available on the value of the catch</p>
The access and participation of smallholders and artisanal fishers to markets that can bring them equitable shares of profit are increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 124 000 new rural clients (M/F) receiving a loan or using saving services</li> <li>• 26 000 members (M/F) of savings and credit groups</li> </ul>	Data available indicate that 58,654 people, 53.5 per cent of which were women, were members of credit and savings associations

378. **Challenges in measuring outcome-level indicators.** Except for the crop-related indicators, which could not be linked to any of the projects in the country portfolio, all other outcome-level indicators reflected the expected results for each project and all together could provide a good idea of the quantitative achievements of the portfolio. This, if the projects had developed adequate systems for the accurate recording of yields and overall outputs. This was not the case, to the best knowledge of the CSPE. It is also debatable whether the investment required for capturing this type of information would be worthwhile, and that the indicators could ever be measured in a meaningful and credible manner, besides anecdotal evidence.

379. **Absence of outcome-level data.** IFAD's effectiveness in Mozambique could not be assessed against the COSOP outcome indicators, as there was not sufficient information to make an informed judgment and rating. However, the COSOP did not come forth as a programme, rather as an ex post umbrella statement of limited relevance and usefulness for the actual portfolio. Thus, the CSPE argued that an assessment based on the 2011 COSOP outcome indicators would not be representative of the whole portfolio.

380. **Progress towards strategic objectives.** Keeping in mind the strong caveats of a lack of data and unclear wording of the strategic objectives, the CSPE found evidence that several results were achieved through the projects. Despite the delays in implementation, progress towards the COSOP strategic objectives was slowly being made, as briefly synthesized here below:

- (a) Improvements in the production and productivity of maize and of different crops, mostly horticulture, were visible for the beneficiaries of IFAD-supported interventions, thanks to the stronger operational capacity of the NAES, the direct

links created between research and extension and to innovative phyto-sanitary practices and methods made available. Improvements in the quality of livestock being marketed were incipient in the southern provinces of the country. And some early evidence of possible contribution to higher capture levels from artisanal fisheries had to be confirmed by specific surveys.

- (b) In the order of a few tens of thousands, half of whom approximately were women, small agriculture producers were benefiting from some improvements in access to markets for their products and were improving their incomes. This was achieved through extensive capacity development for both producers and traders and for farmers' associations and groups, rehabilitation and new construction of roads and market infrastructures.
  - (c) The absolute success of ASCAs was the only result in the rural finance sector. This however was not sufficient to compensate for the delays in making available financial products suitable for investments by small producers in agriculture and artisanal fisheries, which jeopardized the results of the whole portfolio and of the COSOP itself.
381. **Additional unplanned achievements.** Some results were also recorded through the leveraged additional grant resources that enhanced the relevance of the portfolio and filled gaps in mandates and objectives. For example, the late integration of a mandate on nutritional education in some projects was leading to improved nutritional status for participants. It could be argued as well that results contributing to strategic objective 1, increased production, may also have contributed to improved food security. Furthermore, increasing attention to climate change adaptation was contributing to enhanced environmental sustainability of infrastructures and production-oriented activities.
382. **Capacity development.** Another important achievement of the country portfolio was the extensive capacity development of governmental staff and producers across a broad range of topics, ranging from technology transfer in agriculture and fisheries, to functional and financial literacy, passing through management and business development, among others. This appeared to be a long-term fruitful investment that will contribute to the overall national capacity development.
383. **Major flaw in implementation approach.** However, in the view of the CSPE, a major conceptual flaw resided in the approach adopted by projects during implementation to value chain development, which was at the core of the portfolio and of the COSOP. In practice, the model aimed at creating trade opportunities for "some", mostly by facilitating the contacts between producers and traders and enhancing the production capacities of producers. Strong emphasis was given to "enticing" the private sector to reach out to farmers who had to adjust to market requirements. Consequently, although producers undoubtedly improved their incomes, there was no substantial challenge to nor modification in the power relations between farmers and traders and the latter appeared to be the real winners of this approach. A different strategic option could have expanded the opportunities for "many" to access local markets by fostering and creating capacity for generating value addition to local products and at the local level, by developing the capacity of some within the groups and associations to become traders on behalf of the groups. This could have been integrated by capacity development regarding negotiation for farmers' organizations. Overall, the CPE found that the value chain approach adopted throughout the portfolio was a missed opportunity to achieve more sustainable and equitable results, and to contribute to larger scale poverty reduction.
384. Thus, the achieved results through the portfolio were better and broader than what was foreseen in the 2011 COSOP, but were still short of needs in a country where 53 per cent of the population lives in conditions of absolute poverty, and chronic malnutrition is estimated at 43 per cent. A missed opportunity in the implementation of the portfolio was also the lack of attention (exception made for one grant), to the needs and constraints of PLWH in accessing improved factors of production and

markets. This was a major gap, considering the incidence of the pandemic in some of the intervention areas of IFAD-supported projects.

385. **Effectiveness assessment – summary.** In view of the above, the effectiveness of the strategy underpinning the 2011 COSOP and the country portfolio in the period 2010-2016, was assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

### C. Overall assessment of the country strategy and programme performance

386. IFAD in Mozambique supported a portfolio of projects, rather than a country strategy and programme. This was due to several reasons, including a disconnect between COSOP and project designs, approval and implementation; and the high CPM turnover. The pace and progress during implementation towards objectives suffered greatly due to complex and over-ambitious project designs, harmonization with the national procedures and platforms for financial execution and an operational and institutional gap on rural finance, a major pillar of the portfolio. The targeting strategy did not appear fully relevant to the reality of the country and overall there were missed opportunities at the conceptual level that prevented achieving more in terms of poverty reduction.
387. At the same time, IFAD's portfolio contributed to extensive capacity development for governmental staff, partners and producers; it leveraged additional resources thanks to its trustworthiness among international development partners, and with these, managed to enhance the relevance and scope of the portfolio. Not least, thanks to the additional resources, nutritional education components had been integrated in both value chain perspectives and in the curriculum of the National Agricultural Extension System. At the time of the CSPE, positive impacts on household incomes were starting to accrue at least for PROMER beneficiaries; rehabilitated roads were benefiting large numbers of people; women were empowered through functional literacy initiatives; the ASCAs supported by the projects were significantly improving members' livelihoods; and some positive steps were being taken in making other financial products available for the fisheries value chains.
388. The CSPE, by taking a medium-term perspective of potential impacts, and balancing the positive achievements so far and the reasons behind the less positive results, assessed overall performance as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Table 15  
Country strategy and programme performance assessment

Relevance	3
Effectiveness	4
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4</b>



**Key points**

- The 2011 COSOP did not represent a reference framework for IFAD's portfolio in Mozambique over its implementation period, due to a disconnect with the projects' lifecycles. Also, no appropriate information was recorded by projects throughout the COSOP period that could be used to assess progress towards the COSOP strategic objectives.
- The country portfolio was well-aligned and coherent with national policies and IFAD's ability to leverage additional financial resources helped to enhance the relevance of the country programme.
- The value chain development focus of the portfolio was thus coherent with national strategies. However, the absence of appropriate measures and models in project implementation to maintain poverty alleviation and food security improvement as overarching goals led to relevance and effectiveness of the COSOP being short of what would reasonably be expected from IFAD, as the main United Nations agency that deals with poverty alleviation and improving food security in rural areas, which remain key concerns in the country.
- The precious few positive results achieved under the current strategic framework should enable a constructive process of lessons learning on what did and did not work, that can usefully inform the formulation of the new COSOP.

## VII. Conclusions and recommendations

### A. Conclusions

389. The 2011 COSOP reflected the optimism generated from 2005 onward by the steady growth of macroeconomic indicators over more than a decade. Based on the theory that poverty could be reduced through trickle-down market-based approaches and endorsing what was the then ongoing project portfolio and pipeline, the COSOP stated its goal as “improving the integration of agricultural smallholders and artisanal fishers into market dynamics”.
390. This objective was to be achieved through three projects, PROMER, ProPesca and PROSUL, that would focus on developing value chains for crops, livestock and fisheries. Complementary initiatives included: PSP, which by supporting the National Agricultural Extension System acted upon producers’ access to inputs and technologies to increase production; and RFSP/PAFIR, that by establishing a national rural finance mechanism, would make available suitable financial products for small producers. Several grants complemented the thrusts and objectives of the loans. The capacity to leverage significant additional financial resources through partnerships has been an important result of IFAD’s credibility and trustworthiness in Mozambique and could represent an interesting model to replicate elsewhere.
391. Overall, the programme was **relevant to the needs of the country and had a reasonable level of internal coherence**. Also, the alignment of the projects with national policies and strategies was good. Governmental ownership of the projects was found to be very strong, also thanks in three cases to the full integration of PMUs in the governmental organizations responsible for project execution, and to the fact that two projects built upon the experience gained in previous IFAD-supported projects.
392. However, **the COSOP and the projects did not explicitly include objectives nor approaches aimed at tackling overarching goals for both the Government and IFAD**, i.e. improvement of food security and nutrition and focus on poverty reduction. Also, some of the value chains proposed missed the potential for stronger value addition at the local level for more producers; and led to producers selling to traders who operated under almost monopolistic conditions.
393. Furthermore, the COSOP, partly endorsing the approach in the ongoing projects and partly stretching it further away from IFAD’s traditional beneficiaries, identified the target population as those who already had the potential to expand and commercialize their activities and who would receive support to enhance access to inputs, markets and credit, and be facilitated in their engagement with the private sector. This led projects to **focus on producers who already had access to better factors of production** and who often were already members of associations and groups, in districts that had a potential for surplus production and marketing, and on value chains that ended up transferring most of the added value, to outside the rural communities.
394. This meant that the **bulk of the rural producers** in the same districts of intervention, those who in good years may achieve a limited surplus and in bad years, struggle with food insecurity, were **either left out from projects’ activities or were only marginally involved** through the enhanced outreach capacity of the NAES. Further, despite the dire statistics on HIV and AIDS prevalence in the country and provisions made for this in two loan projects, only one grant project addressed related issues through awareness-raising and improving nutritional status of poor households in fishing communities. No efforts were made to integrate PLWH in the value chains, ASCAs or even in the capacity development efforts on nutrition, functional literacy or any other topic, in any of the loans.
395. Last, the **national resources management and environmental dimension of the portfolio was found to be weak overall**, with few activities dedicated to improving the management and sustainable use of land and aquatic resources. This partly

contributed to undermining potential positive impacts and sustainability of the projects with respect to food security and production, considering the high dependency of producers' livelihoods, including the economically active poor, on natural resources. Also, it was a missed opportunity because the country has vast resources that could potentially be exploited more sustainably for present and future generations. The move to value chains and products improvements should not be at the expense of sustainable management of natural resources: poverty alleviation – to be sustained and equitable in the long run – needs to be linked to improved resource use and management. Furthermore, the lack of focus on natural resources was noted as a weakness in the 2010 CPE and there were no improvements in this respect.

396. Overall, the **combination of the portfolio's targeting and market-led strategies led to a weakening of the potential contribution of the IFAD-supported programme to the broader goals of poverty reduction and food security improvement**, which never disappeared and have become even more urgent and pressing under the economic and financial crisis the country has been going through since late 2015. In this respect, IFAD and the Government should be aware of the significant risk of erosion of the good prospects for sustainability of some portfolio results, due to the increasing imbalances in the terms of trade between the prices of agricultural products and other essential goods. The possibility that the crisis could undo hard-won achievements should not be dismissed, and partners like IFAD should stand ready to keep open their support to the country.
397. Enabling access to rural finance products was one of the pillars in the proposed approach to value chain development. Indeed, in the COSOP and in the ongoing projects, the **absence of access to suitable and appropriate financial products** to support all forms of production, be it for agriculture, livestock or fisheries, was correctly identified as **one of the major obstacles to alleviating rural poverty in Mozambique**. The RFSP/PAFIR project was therefore tackling a major gap in the national rural development environment; however, the project was closed at its planned completion date without achieving its objectives. Also, adequate provisions or arrangements were not made for follow up and support to the ongoing projects to carry out their own rural finance components, which were of paramount importance for achieving results. This meant that ProPesca, PROMER and PROSUL, all had to go through lengthy procedures for amendments to their design reports and each identify its own way forward.
398. At the time of the CSPE, except for the highly successful and sustainable ASCAs, **very little tangible progress had been made in improving access to credit for small-scale rural producers in agriculture and fisheries**. This gap was undermining the effectiveness of much of the efforts made by the projects in capacity development, technology transfer, and improving access to markets. And projects were making additional efforts to develop their own rural finance mechanisms, to some extent duplicating efforts. In this context, the need for one robust and sustainable rural finance institution in the country cannot be overemphasized: in the view of the CSPE, such a body should be responsible for norms and standards setting, establishment of a guarantee fund, and supporting local and sector-specific organizations capable of engaging with rural producers and traders and supporting them with financial products appropriate to their circumstances.
399. **Delays in project financial execution and slow implementation** was recognized by all stakeholders as a **main weakness of the portfolio** under evaluation. The CSPE found efficiency to be low across the entire portfolio, except for PROMER. Causes were multiple, linked to complex project designs, legitimate and praiseworthy commitment to harmonize with complex governmental procedures, multiple partners with diverse disbursement procedures, and delays in availability of Government counterpart funds. Low efficiency led to slow progress towards results, hence low effectiveness, longer implementation times and higher management costs, and weak or insignificant overall impact. This appeared to be a major issue requiring urgent attention by both IFAD and the Government; although Mozambique benefits from

highly concessional loans from IFAD, such a low level of efficiency risks jeopardizing the benefits of this otherwise important and relevant partnership.

400. **The mixed experience in the recruitment of service providers provides an opportunity for re-thinking the project implementation model.** One of the key issues identified for this evaluation is that all projects, except for ProPesca, largely relied on the recruitment of service providers, as envisaged in the 2011 COSOP. In consideration of the breadth and diversity in the projects' scope, there was no doubt that service providers with the required experience and knowledge had to be contracted. Also, as a general characteristic, NGOs and the socially responsible private sector have a better capacity to effectively engage at community and producer levels and the contribution of these partners in project execution has been highly beneficial for all. However, the reliance on service providers should not include the delegation of tasks that best fall in the remit of PMUs. The experience gained by IFAD across the country portfolio in dealing with service providers allows a careful re-thinking of this implementation model, with a view to ensure that future projects can benefit from the added value that competent and experienced service providers can bring to IFAD-supported initiatives, without incurring over-costly and inefficient implementation mechanisms.
401. **Despite adequate attention dedicated in the COSOP, there is room for improvement in the contribution of non-lending activities to the programme.** An important part of the added value of the IFAD and Mozambique partnership was embedded in the non-lending activities carried out by the ICO. The 2011 COSOP had made provisions for a programme-level monitoring system, fed with information emerging from the projects' respective monitoring systems, that in turn would feed through adequate knowledge management work into policy dialogue. This did not happen, mostly because there was not a real programme, rather a set, albeit coherent, of independent projects that developed their monitoring systems only at the activity and output levels and could not provide any information at a higher level of results. In this respect, it is important to remember that weaknesses in monitoring and knowledge management also have indirect bearing on the potential sustainability and scaling up of project results.
402. In addition, although some progress was made in recent years on knowledge management, also thanks to the commitment of the main partner in the Government, the National Directorate of Treasure in the MEF, this remained a fuzzy concept for PMUs. Furthermore, human resources in the ICO had been far too thin to allow significant progress on both knowledge management and policy dialogue during the period under evaluation, even if some valid field-based evidence had been available. The few results achieved in this sense showed that this would fall perfectly within the breadth of influence for IFAD in the country, and that all projects could effectively contribute lessons for evidence-based policy making. However, resources, both financial and human, are required to develop adequate monitoring systems, identify potential topics, conduct relevant analysis and support scaling up through policy discussions platforms, with the Government, partners and other stakeholders as appropriate.

## **B. Recommendations**

403. From the conclusions above the CSPE formulated six key recommendations for consideration by IFAD and the Government of Mozambique that should be discussed and agreed upon by the two parties in the Agreement at Completion Point, to feed into the preparation of the future COSOP. In addition, the report contains several suggestions that address weaknesses and gaps identified by the CSPE. These did not warrant specific recommendations but will hopefully be useful for IFAD, the Government and other stakeholders.
404. **Recommendation 1. Focus on rural poor and on more vulnerable groups, including women, youth and people living with HIV (PLWH).** A bottom-up approach to reducing food insecurity, malnutrition, poverty and vulnerability is

compatible with value chain development and integration into markets, and likely to be more effective and efficient in the medium-term compared to trickle-down strategies. This, however, must be supported by project strategies that will tackle first and foremost the needs of the poorer and more vulnerable producers, and the obstacles they face in: (i) improving their productions – quality and quantity-wise; (ii) processing and transforming their products at the local level and thus add value to their produce before it reaches the market; (iii) enhancing their participation in farmers’ organizations; and (iii) strengthening their capacity to negotiate more profitable access to markets. This vision should fully inform all steps of project design and implementation: selection of participants; choice of value chains and market opportunities; identification of capacity development needs, including functional and financial literacy; nutrition; and HIV prevention.

405. **Recommendation 2. IFAD-supported projects in Mozambique should include a strong focus on supporting sustainable NRM and to strengthening climate-change resilience among their principles.** All projects should explicitly include sustainable NRM and climate change adaptation and mitigation, in line with IFAD’s most recent policies and the Government’s relevant strategies, as appropriate and relevant to their goals. This priorities should be mainstreamed throughout all activities, including capacity development and technology transfer.
406. **Recommendation 3. IFAD’s support to the rural finance sector should be conceptualized within a long-term commitment horizon, based on lessons learned so far.** Based on the extensive lessons learned and experience gained by IFAD in the country and elsewhere, a long-term engagement, possibly over a 15-year period, would be required and appropriate to enable robust and transparent institutions at all levels and across all productive subsectors to gain strength and credibility and provide sustainable financial services to the rural poor in Mozambique.
407. **Recommendation 4. Enhance efficiency of financial execution.** Integration of IFAD-funded projects into the governmental procedures and systems, e.g. e-SISTAFE, should be pursued and sustained in the spirit of governmental ownership and for transparency reasons. Some specific measures will be of paramount importance to raise implementation efficiency up to standard. These include: (i) enable e-SISTAFE to meet the requirements of IFAD-supported projects in terms of flexibility in work plans, formal requirements for beneficiaries and timing of disbursements; (ii) until e-SISTAFE is able to safely meet the specific requirements of IFAD-supported projects, for those projects that are to be executed outside e-SISTAFE, allocate 25 per cent of project budget so that throughout the year adjustments over plans and continued execution of the project can continue; (iii) develop a fast-track mechanism for approval of contracts and service procurement for IFAD-supported projects that fully complies with the requirements of the State in terms of controls and transparency; (iv) favor the application of financial agreements and accounting tools that allow counterpart funds from the Government to be provided in kind rather than cash, and avoid any requirement for parallel financial execution; (v) negotiate with other partners for mainstreaming their contributions within IFAD’s standard disbursement and financial execution procedures; and (vi) strengthen the financial-planning capacity of PMUs.
408. **Recommendation 5. Develop principles for the reliance on service providers in project implementation.** The principles should include the following lessons learned: (i) service providers should be recruited only for components and activities that governmental organizations and PMUs do not have the capacity to implement; (ii) service providers should be selected based on their proven experience and competence, and long-term engagement in the themes for which they are recruited; (iii) in general, service providers have proven to be more effective than governmental services in supporting empowering processes at the level of communities, associations, households and individuals; and (iv) service providers who do not have previous experience in handling contracts in the framework of an IFAD-funded project should be entitled to an induction training on administrative and financial procedures, and relevant clear manuals should be prepared at the very beginning of project life.

409. **Recommendation 6. Dedicate more attention and resources to knowledge management and policy dialogue.** IFAD headquarters and the ICO should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated in project and ICO budgets for non-lending activities, starting from sound M&E systems, and that the country programme rests on the following pillars:
- (a) The development of a robust outcome-level COSOP and project monitoring indicators;
  - (b) A country programme-level knowledge management strategy, closely anchored to key COSOP elements and to those project components that can be scaled up through national policies and strategies;
  - (c) The early identification of evidence-based issues and results that can be fed into the policy dialogue processes at a high strategic level, through appropriate knowledge management processes.

## Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. <i>Four impact domains</i>	X	Yes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.</li> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.</li> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.</li> <li>Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.</li> </ul>		No
<b>Project performance</b>	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision-making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and</li> <li>(ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.</li> </ul>	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity – with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
<b>Performance of partners</b>			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

\* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.



## Ratings of IFAD lending portfolio in Mozambique<sup>a</sup>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>SBAFP/PPABS</i>	<i>RFSP/PAFIR</i>	<i>PSP</i>	<i>PROMER</i>	<i>ProPesca</i>	<i>PROSUL</i>	<i>Overall portfolio</i>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>	5	3	4	5	3	n.a.	4
<b>Project performance</b>							
Relevance	4	3	4	5	5	4	4
Effectiveness	4	3	4	5	3	n.a.	4
Efficiency	4	3	3	4	3	n.a.	3
Sustainability of benefits	4	3	4	4	4	n.a.	4
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>	n.a.	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Other performance criteria</b>							
Gender equality and women's empowerment	3	5	3	4	4	n.a.	4
Innovation and scaling up	5	4	4	5	4	n.a.	5
Environment and natural resources management	4	n.a.	4	4	2	n.a.	3
Adaptation to climate change	4	n.a.	4	4	4	n.a.	4
<b>Overall project portfolio achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>4</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.a. = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management and adaptation to climate change.

## Ratings of the country strategy and programme in Mozambique

	<i>Rating</i>
<b>Overall project portfolio achievement<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Non-lending activities<sup>b</sup></b>	
Policy dialogue	4
Knowledge management	4
Partnership-building	5
<b>Overall non-lending activities</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Performance of partners</b>	
IFAD <sup>c</sup>	4
Government <sup>c</sup>	4
<b>Country strategy and programme performance (overall)<sup>d</sup></b>	
Relevance	3
Effectiveness	4

<sup>a</sup> Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings.

<sup>b</sup> Not an arithmetic average for knowledge management, partnership-building and policy dialogue.

<sup>c</sup> Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings. The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

<sup>d</sup> This is not an arithmetic average of the ratings of relevance and effectiveness of the country and strategy programme and performance. The ratings for relevance and effectiveness take into account the assessment and ratings of portfolio results, non-lending activities and performance of partners but they are not an arithmetic average of these.

## IFAD-supported lending operations in Mozambique since 1983

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Project type</i>	<i>Total project cost US\$</i>	<i>IFAD approved financing US\$</i>	<i>Cofinancing US\$</i>	<i>Counterpart US\$</i>	<i>Beneficiary contribution US\$</i>	<i>Executive Board approval</i>	<i>Loan effectiveness</i>	<i>Project completion date</i>	<i>Cooperating institution</i>	<i>Project status</i>
National Programme for Food Production in Cooperative and Family Sector	Programme Loan	25 450 000	19 800 000	0	5 600 000	0	31/03/1982	23/02/1983	30/06/1986	Not Applicable	Closed
Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project	Fisheries	11 240 000	6 020 000	1 970 000	3 240 000	0	15/09/1993	04/11/1994	30/06/2002	OPEC Fund for International Development	Closed
Niassa Agricultural Development Project (7)	Rural Development	20 100 000	12 400 000	4 100 000	3 600 000	0	20/04/1994	19/10/1994	31/12/2005	OPEC Fund for International Development	Closed
Second Agricultural Development Project	Programme Loan	16 700 000	11 400 000	4 000 000	1 250 000	0	10/09/1987	26/04/1988	31/12/1994	Netherlands, Africa Fund	Closed
Family Sector Livestock Development Programme	Livestock	25 670 000	19 400 000	0	4 200 000	2 000 000	04/12/1996	12/02/1998	30/06/2006	Not Applicable	Closed
Agricultural Markets Support Programme	Storage, processing and marketing	27 600 000	22 780 000	1 000 000	3 800 000	0	08/12/1999	07/09/2001	30/06/2008	Ireland	Closed
Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project (SBAFP)	Rural Development	32 977 000	18 000 000	11 283 000	2 989 000	384 000	12/09/2001	02/09/2002	31/03/2011	Belgian Facility for Food Security, Norway	Closed
Rural Finance Support Programme (RFSP)	Credit and Financial Services	32 200 000	7 430 000	23 050 000	990 000	690 000	18/12/2003	11/07/2005	30/09/2013	African Development Bank, African Development Fund, National Financing Institutions	Closed
PRONEA Support Project (PSP)	Agriculture Development	23 659 338	19 782 070	1 391 500	2 069 768	416 000	20/04/2006	25/11/2007	31/12/2017	EU	Ongoing
Rural Markets Promotion Programme (PROMER)	Rural Development	48 994 000	31 135 000	10 524 000	4 285 000	3 050 000	11/09/2008	26/04/2009	30/06/2018	EU	Ongoing
Artisanal Fisheries Promotion Project (ProPesca)	Agriculture Development	54 510 375	21 131 700	29 218 000	4 160 675	0	15/12/2010	24/03/2011	31/03/2018	EU, OPEC Fund for International Development	Ongoing

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Project type</i>	<i>Total project cost US\$</i>	<i>IFAD approved financing US\$</i>	<i>Cofinancing US\$</i>	<i>Counterpart US\$</i>	<i>Beneficiary contribution US\$</i>	<i>Executive Board approval</i>	<i>Loan effectiveness</i>	<i>Project completion date</i>	<i>Cooperating institution</i>	<i>Project status</i>
Pro-Poor Value Chain Development in the Maputo and Limpopo Corridors (PROSUL)	Agriculture Development	44 960 000	22 730 000	18 340 000	2 490 000	1 400 000	21/09/2012	03/10/2012	31/12/2019	Spanish Trust Fund through IFAD, United Nations Capital Development Fund, National Private Sector	Ongoing

## IFAD-supported grants in, or involving Mozambique after 2010

<i>Project/grant name</i>	<i>Grant number</i>	<i>Grant amount US\$</i>	<i>Grant recipient</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>Effective date</i>	<i>Completion date</i>	<i>Countries</i>
Network for Enhanced Market Access by Smallholders (NEMAS)	1248	1 500 000	PICO Knowledge Net Ltd.	2010		30/06/2014	
Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace	1206	500	Fundação Arthur Bernardes	2010		31/01/2012	Mozambique, Kenya, Togo, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Ghana, Ethiopia
Community Investor Partnership Project		1 595 329	Eduardo Mondlane University	2010	01/03/2011	31/12/2013	Mozambique
Land and Natural Resource Tenure Security Learning Initiative for East and Southern Africa (TSLI – ESA)	1325	200	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	2011		30/06/2013	Kenya, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Lesotho, South Africa
Understanding the Adoption and Application of Conservation Agriculture in Southern Africa	1309	750	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center	2011		30/06/2014	Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia
Rural finance knowledge management partnership (KMP) - Phase III	1330	1 500 000	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association	2011		30/06/2015	All East and Southern Africa countries
IFADAfrica Regional Knowledge Network - Phase II	1331	1 800 000	PICO Knowledge Net Ltd.	2011		31/12/2015	All East and Southern Africa countries
Programme for Technical and Capacity Strengthening for Country-level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS) in Selected African Countries	1364	1 600 000	International Food Policy Research Institute	2012		31/12/2016	Benin, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Uganda; as well as in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda
Programme for Scaling up Biological Control of the Diamondback Moth on Crucifers in East Africa to Other African Countries	1370	1 000 000	International Center of Insect Physiology and Ecology	2012		31/03/2016	Malawi and Mozambique
Programme for Alleviating Poverty and Protecting Biodiversity	1372	1 500 000	Phytotrade Africa Trust	2012		30/06/2015	Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Strengthening Country level Agricultural Advisory Services in the target countries of Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda	1395	1 000 000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services	2012		31/12/2014	Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda

<i>Project/grant name</i>	<i>Grant number</i>	<i>Grant amount US\$</i>	<i>Grant recipient</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>Effective date</i>	<i>Completion date</i>	<i>Countries</i>
Support to Farmers' Organizations in Africa Programme (SFOAP) – Main Phase	1407	500	Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions	2012		21/12/2017	
Plantwise, a country-based approach to improving farmer livelihoods through reduced crop losses and increased productivity	1412	1 400 000	Centre for Agricultural Bioscience International	2012		31/03/2016	Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda
Coastal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Nutrition Improvement Project (CHAPANI)		500 000	<i>Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo</i> Mozambique	2012	2012	31/10/2015	Mozambique
Supporting small-scale food producers' organizations in the promotion and implementation of the VGs		350	Associazione Italiana per l'Agricoltura Biologica	2013		17/01/2016	Mozambique, Argentina, Nicaragua, Nepal
A global partnership to promote local sustainable food systems that include small farmers and indigenous organizations		500	Slow Food International	2013		03/12/2015	Brazil, Bolivia, Sao Tomé, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Mozambique and Uganda
Understanding changing land issues for poor rural people in sub-Saharan Africa		325	International Institute for Environment and Development	2013		31/03/2016	Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and Uganda
Strengthening Artisanal Fishers' Resource Rights Project (ProDIRPA)		623 347	Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDEPA)	2013	2013	31/12/2016	Mozambique
Support to Accelerate Progress towards MDG1C in Mozambique – IFAD Sub-Programme (MDG-1c)		27 603 500	Three IFAD-supported loan projects	2013		2018	Mozambique
Project for Promotion of Small-Scale Aquaculture (PROAQUA)		3 411 223	Institute for the Development of Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDEPA)	2013	2013	30/06/2017	Mozambique

## List of key persons met

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
<b>Government</b>			
Mr Abdul Zacarias	Head of International Relations and Communication Department	Banco de Moçambique, International Relations, Communication and Image Department	Maputo
Mr Adamo Seni	Technical officer- International Relations and Communication Department	Banco de Moçambique, International Relations, Communication and Image Department	Maputo
Ms Anchia Espirito Santo	Technical officer- International Relations and Communication Department	Banco de Moçambique, International Relations, Communication and Image Department	Maputo
Mr Alves Jaime Mattos	Administrator	District Administration	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Mr Dinis M.O. da Costa	Permanent Secretary	District Administration	Nacala Porto, Nampula
Mr Luciano Augusto	Administrator	District Administration	Ilha de Moçambique, Nampula
Mr Manuel David	Administrator	District Administration	Gondola, Manica
Mr Simon Teixeira	Assistant to the Administrator	District Administration	Memba, Nampula
Mr Antonio Joaquim	Extension supervisor	District Economic Activity Service	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Mr Arsenio Pedro Candoa	Director	District Economic Activity Service	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Mr Augusto Nampuio	Director	District Economic Activity Service	Mossuril, Nampula
Mr Castigo Bofana	Director	District Economic Activity Service	Sussundenga, Manica
Mr Jacobo Manoel Antonio	Extension officer	District Economic Activity Service	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Ms Adelia Tomas	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Antonio F. Abilio	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Mr Antonio Jorge Falusso	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Ms Beatriz Daniel	Director	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Ms Benedita C. Adriano	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Bilden da Cruz	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Mr Chinoca B. M. Joaquim	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Ms Dionisia Tomas	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Edwin Pinho	Substitute Director	District Economic Development Service	Gondola, Manica
Ms Ercilia Xavier	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Gaza
Mr Hipolito Nhami	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Inácio Mugabe	Director	District Economic Development Service	Chokwe, Gaza
Ms Januaria A. Mazive	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane

## Annex VI

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
Mr Jorge A. Dimande	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Mr Justino Alexandre	Extension Supervisor	District Economic Development Service	Zavala, Inhambane
Mr Juvencio Silva	Extension Supervisor	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Lazaro Africano Benete	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Manuel S. Bauque	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Max Cavele	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Mr Narciso Marcelino	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Obadias R. Nacute	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Ms Paula Simene	Extension Supervisor	District Economic Development Service	Morrumbene, Inhambane
Ms Rute João Malate	Technician	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Saul Massaite	Extension supervisor	District Economic Development Service	Gondola, Manica
Mr Victor V. Vilanculo	Extension officer	District Economic Development Service	Inharrime, Inhambane
Mr Raul José Fernando	Director	District Education, Youth and Technology Services	Nacala Porto, Nampula
Mr Nelson José Soeiro	Head	District Health, Women and Social Action Service	Memba, Nampula
Mr Armenio Maricoa	Extension Coordinator	DSAE	Ribaue, Nampula
Mr Americo Semana	Programme manager	Energy Fund, Studies and Planification Division (FUNAE)	Maputo
Mr Edson Uamusse	Head of Studies and Planning Division	Energy Fund, Studies and Planification Division (FUNAE)	Maputo
Mr Augusto Isabel	General Director	Fund for Economic Rehabilitation (FARE)	Maputo
Mr Marcelino Aurelio	Technician	Ministry of Education and Human Development, Provincial Directorate (DPEDH)	Nampula
Mr Ilidio José Miguel	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA)	Maputo
Mr Batista Zunguze	PROSUL Agribusiness Advisor	MASA, Agriculture Promotion Centre (MASA/Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Agriculture Promotion Centre (CEPAGRI))	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Ms Beatriz Julio Muchate	PROSUL Administrative Assistant	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Mr Carlos Pedro Mucavele	Director	MASA/CEPAGRI	Maputo
Mr Daniel Mate	PROSUL Coordinator	MASA/CEPAGRI	Maputo
Mr Daniel Simango	PROSUL Land Tenure Officer	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Mr Egidio Mutimba	PROSUL Climate Change Advisor	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Mr Francisco Lisboa	PROSUL Gender Officer	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Mr Lazaro Nhangombe	Economist	MASA/CEPAGRI	Maputo
Mr Manuel Antonio Langa	Value Chain Specialist	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Ms Natercia Sarmento	PROSUL Financial Officer	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Ms Pureza Monjane	Cassava Specialist	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province



## Annex VI

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
Ms Rachida Jafar Abdul	PROSUL Procurement Officer	MASA/CEPAGRI	Xai-Xai, Gaza province
Mr Aderito Mavie	Chief	MASA/CEPAGRI	Maputo
Mr Helio Neves	Chief	MASA/CEPAGRI	
Ms Célia Cassimo	Gender Focal Point	MASA, Directorate for Planning and International Cooperation (DPCI)	Maputo
Mr Chauque	Deputy Director	MASA/DPCI	Maputo
Ms Ana Maria Mesquita	PSP	MASA, National Directorate for Agricultural Extension (DNEA)	Maputo
Ms Anabela Salomon	PSP	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Ms Clementina Machungo	PSP Coordinator	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Mr Helder Gemo	PSP extension expert	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Mr Jeronimo Francisco	PSP nutrition expert	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Ms Licinia Cossa	Plant protection officer	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Mr Narciso Marcos	PSP procurement officer	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Ms Sandra Silva	National Director	MASA/DNEA	Maputo
Mr Afonso A. Nair	Coordinator	MASA/DNEA, Department for Extension and Communication	Maputo
Mr Inácio Tiago Nhancale	Chief	MASA/DNEA, Department for Technical Assistance	Maputo
Ms Guilhermina Matiquite	Coordinator	MASA/DNEA, Planning Department	Maputo
Mr Mahomed Rafik Valá	National Director	MASA, National Directorate of Agriculture and Silviculture (DINAS)	Maputo
Mr Americo Manuel Conceicao	National Director	MASA/National Veterinary Directorate (DINAV)	Maputo
Mr Ilidio Hele	Technician	MASA/DINAV	Maputo
Mr Fernando Rodrigues	Chief	MASA/DINAV	Maputo
Ms AnaBela dos Muchangos	Chief	MASA/DINAV	Maputo
Mr Zacarias Massicame	Chief	MASA/DINAV	Maputo
Mr Paiva Munguambe	General Director	MASA, National Institute for Irrigation	Maputo
Ms Filomena Maiopue	Director	MASA, Provincial Directorate	Inhambane
Mr Anastacio Macuvele	Technician	MASA, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture	Inhambane
Mr Elton Amadeu Francisco	Technician	MASA, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture	Inhambane
Mr Rafael Baule	Technician	MASA, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture	Inhambane
Mr Saugir X. Zunguza	Technician	MASA, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture	Inhambane
Mr Benedito Ines Luis Macama	Technician	MASA, Provincial Directorate for Agriculture/ Provincial Agricultural Extension Services (DPA/SPER)	Nampula
Mr Bernardo Penicela	Technology Officer	MASA, DPA/SPER	Gaza
Mr Cremildo Joaquim	Extension Coordinator	MASA, DPA/SPER	Inhambane
Mr Domingos Chemane	Chief	MASA, DPA/SPER	Inhambane
Mr Ernesto S. Pacule	Chief	MASA, DPA/SPER	Nampula
Mr Felipe Luis Bueno	Planning, M/E expert	MASA, DPA/SPER	Manica
Mr José Amandio Lobson	Chief	MASA, DPA/SPER	Zambezia

## Annex VI

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
Mr José Manuel Silvestre	Chief	MASA, DPA/SPER	Manica
Mr Domingos Diogo	Technical Advisor	MASA, Statistics Department	Maputo
Mr José António Gaspar	Focal Point MDG1c	MASA, Technical Secretary for Food Security and Nutrition	Maputo
Ms Isabel Maria Sumar	National Director	Ministry of Economy and Finance, Directorate for Cooperation (MEF)	Maputo
Mr Adriano Ubisse	National Director	MEF, National Directorate of Treasure (DNT)	Maputo
Ms Ester José Dos Santos	Deputy Director	MEF/DNT	Maputo
Ms Emilia Coutinho	Director	MEF/DNT, Loan Division (DEMP)	Maputo
Ms Fatima Gimo	Technical Officer	MEF/DNT/DEMP	Maputo
Ms Nelton Manjate	Technical Officer	MEF/DNT/DEMP	Maputo
Ms Olinda Custodio Cavele	Technical Officer	MEF/DNT/DEMP	Maputo
Mr Carlos Abacar	Coordination officer	MEF, National Directorate of Treasure, MDG1c Coordination Unit	
Mr Jorge Rungo	Coordination officer	MEF, National Directorate of Treasure, MDG1c Coordination Unit	
Mr Narciso Manhenje	Coordinator	MEF, National Directorate of Treasure, MDG1c Coordination Unit	Maputo
Ms Elisa João	Technical Officer	Ministry of Industry and Trade	Maputo
Ms Malisenda Machatine	Chief, Markets Department	Ministry of Industry and Trade	Maputo
Ms Suzana Mafuiane	Deputy National Director	Ministry of Industry and Trade	Maputo
Mr Victor Lopes	Technician	Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER), Nampula Provincial Directorate (DPTADER)	Nampula
Mr Alexandre Milice	PROMER MDG1c programme officer	MITADER, National Directorate of Rural Development (DNDR)	Maputo
Ms Carla Honwana	PROMER Project Coordinator	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
Mr Carlos Uachisso	PROMER knowledge management and M&E officer	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
Ms Deodette Chachuaio	ProParceria coordinator, former	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
Mr Edson Natha	PROMER Agribusiness Officer	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
Mr Farai Manhanga	PROMER Agribusiness Officer	MITADER/DNDR	Nampula
Mr Luciano Tomé Quipa	PROMER M&E officer	MITADER/DNDR	Nampula
Mr Mario Quissico	PROMER Market Intermediaries Officer	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
Mr Olegario dos Anjos Banze	National Director	MITADER/DNDR	Maputo
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## Annex VI

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Ms Filmina Antia	Director	MIMAIP, National Directorate for Fisheries Policy	Maputo
Ms Angélica Dengo	Director	MIMAIP, National Directorate for International Cooperation	Maputo
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## Annex VI

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Ms Marcia de Castro	Resident Coordinator	Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator	Maputo
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Mr Antonio Inguane	Methodology manager	Iniciativa para Terra Comunitarias (ITC-F)	Maputo
Mr Jordão Matimule Junior	Extension Director	National Association for Agricultural Extension (ANEA)	Nampula

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
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Mr Renaldo João	Advocacy Officer	UNAC	Maputo
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Mr Morgen Gomo	Agricultural Sector Leader	SNV	Maputo
Ms Zaida Mapanda	Animal Production and Natural resources Officer	SNV	Merone
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Mr Graudolfo Mazive	Extension officer	SNV/Malhalhe	Inhambane
Mr José Mario Marsimino	Director	SNV/OLIPA	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
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Mr Orlando Arturo Rebel	Market officer	SNV/OLIPA	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Mr Bernardo Feliano	Project Manager	UATAF	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
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Ms Aurora Malene Psico	Director of Financial Area	GAPI	Maputo
Ms Etelvina Sousa	PROSUL/GAPI Horticulture Component Coordinator	GAPI	Maputo

<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
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Mr Lenine Matavele	District Officer	GAPI	Maputo
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Mr Agostinho Magenge	Executive Director	MD Consultores, Lda	Maputo
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Mr Jaime Suleman Lucas	Trader	Self-employed	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
Ms Aissa Momade	Project Manager	Verde Azul Consult Lda	Maputo
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### Research and training institutions

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Ms Florencia Cipriano	Research Technician	IIAM/DCA	Maputo
Ms Albertina Alage	Director	Mozambique National Institute for Agricultural Research, Directorate of Training, Documentation and Technology Transfer (IIAM/DFDTT)	Maputo
Mr Felisberto Maute	Programme officer	International Livestock Research Institute, ILRI	Maputo
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
### Beneficiaries

25	Apaixonados de Chabane (Bairro Naharengue)	Members/participants	CHAPANI-supported group	Nacala Porto, Nampula
3	Mpaco horticulture production group	Members/participants	CHAPANI-supported group	Quissimajulo, Nampula
1	Alda Jones	Vice-President	Farmers' association Mafuiane irrigation scheme, PROSUL supported group	Namaacha, Gaza province
1	Anita Basilio	President	Farmers' association Mafuiane irrigation scheme, PROSUL supported group	Namaacha, Gaza province
1	José Ricardo	Secretary	Farmers' association Mafuiane irrigation scheme, PROSUL supported group	Namaacha, Gaza province
1	Xabier Tober	President	Farmers' association Mafuiane irrigation scheme, PROSUL supported group	Namaacha, Gaza province
30	Combate à Pobreza	Members/participants	OPHAVELA ASCA group	Mogovolas, Nampula



<i>Name</i>	<i>Role/Department</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
15 Mucute community aquaculture producers	Members/participants	PROAQUA-supported group	Sussundenga, Manica
15 Mudodo community aquaculture producers	Members/participants	PROAQUA-supported group	Gondola, Manica
30 Association Boa Esperança + Foro	Members/participants	PROMER-supported group	Ribaue, Nampula
25 Association Cavala	Members/participants	PROMER-supported group	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
30 Association Mitxupiú	Members/participants	PROMER-supported group	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
10 FEDAMOZA	Members/participants	PROMER-supported group	Alto Molocue, Zambezia
20 Fishers Council Committee; ASSOPIMO;	Members/participants	ProPesca-supported group	Ilha de Moçambique, Nampula
10 Fishers Council Committee; Fishers Market Management Group	Members/participants	ProPesca-supported group	Memba, Nampula
5 Fishers Council Committee; Fishers Market Management Group	Members/participants	ProPesca-supported group	Quissimajulo, Nampula
30 Fishers Council Committees; Fishers Market Management Group; ASSOPECO;	Members/participants	ProPesca-supported group	Jembesse, Nampula
60 EMC Curral do Criador 25 de Setembro	Members/participants	PROSUL-supported group	Chokwe, Gaza
15 Association Mushue Wemondoro and Association Rubuairiro Cubatana	Members/participants	PSP-supported group	Sussundenga, Manica
25 EMC in Ngadlate, Muzumuia	Members/participants	PSP-supported group	Chokwe, Gaza
25 EMC Kuphuka	Members/participants	PSP-supported group	Zavala, Inhambane
20 EMC Magugu, Bairro 25 de Setembro	Members/participants	PSP-supported group	Chokwe, Gaza
30 EMC Visit to EMC Lhuvukani	Members/participants	PSP-supported group	Chokwe, Gaza
20 Association 7 de Abril	Members/participants	PSP, Plant Clinics and DBM-supported group	Vanduzi, Manica
5 Association Campo Quatro	Members/participants	PSP, Plant Clinics and DBM-supported group	Vanduzi, Manica
10 Community of Chazuca	Members/participants	PSP, Plant Clinics and DBM-supported group	Manica, Manica
20 Community of Chitawe	Members/participants	PSP, Plant Clinics and DBM-supported group	Manica, Manica

## Simplified mapping of the logical chain of the 2011 Mozambique COSOP



Source: Elaboration of IOE, based on the 2011 Mozambique COSOP document.

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